Public Governance durch Open Government: Zwei sich ergaenzende Ansaetze fuer die staatliche Aufgabenerfuellung der Zukunft

Waehrend zu Public Governance eine breite wissenschaftliche Debatte existiert und die Analyse staatlicher Aufgabeerfuellung davon profitiert, so steht die praxisnahe Umsetzung weniger im Zentrum der wissenschaftlichen Betrachtungen. Open Government hingegen entwickelt sich als relevante Praktikerbewegung ohne in die wissenschaftliche Diskussion eingeflossen zu sein. Dieser Artikel verbindet die beiden bislang unabhaengig voneinander existierenden Ansaetze und zeigt den Mehrwert von Open Government zur Umsetzung von Public Governance auf.

Foreign Direct Investment Relations between Myanmar and ASEAN

Myanmar highly appreciates foreign direct investment (FDI) as a key solution reducing the development gap with leading ASEAN countries. Accordingly, it is welcomed by the government. Myanmar's Foreign Investment Law was enacted in 1988 soon after the adoption of a market-oriented economic system to boost the flow of FDI into the country. Foreign investors positively responded to these measures in the early years and FDI inflow into Myanmar gradually increased during the period from 1989 to 1996. However, after 1997, FDI inflow was dramatically reduced and markedly declined until 2004. In 2005, FDI inflow increased at an unprecedented rate and reached the highest level in the country's history. However, this growth was not sustainable in the subsequent years, as it declined again and turned stagnant at the previous level. In terms of source regions, ASEAN is a major investor in Myanmar, which investment is significantly exceeds the combined investment of other regions of the world. Among top ten countries, Thailand's investment alone is significantly more than combined total investments of the other nine countries. Next to Thailand in terms of investments in Myanmar are Singapore and Malaysia among ASEAN, at second and third places, respectively. The combined total FDI inflows into the power and oil and gas sector represent about 65 percent of the total investment. There are many opportunities for foreign investment in other sectors, which are not, yet exploited. ASEAN countries will certainly be source countries of Myanmar FDI in the future, and Myanmar should expand to other Asian countries like Japan, India, China, Korea, and Hong Kong where its FDI portfolio is concerned. To effectively attract FDI into the country, Myanmar needs to minimize the effect of policy while opening and encouraging other potential sectors of FDI to foreign investors in ASEAN and Asian countries.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 and U.S.-R.O.C Relations

On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from “liberating Taiwan” and the Kuomintang from “attacking the mainland,” brought about the existence of a de facto “two-China” situation.

Post-1988 civil-military relations in Myanmar

This paper explores the development of civil–military relations in Myanmar since 1988. After the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) took over the state by means of a coup d’état in 1988, the top generals ruled the country without recourse to significant formal political institutions such as a constitution, elections and parliament. A unique authoritarian regime, where political power was predominantly under the military’s influence, lasted for more than 20 years in the country. It seemed to many observers that the military regime was highly durable and that its dictator, General Than Shwe, had no intention of altering the highly repressive character of the political system. However, a new leader, President Thein Sein, who came to power in March 2011, has decided to implement some political and economic reforms that could undermine the Tatmadaw’s dominant role in politics and the economy. This paper examines the background to this sudden political change in Myanmar, focusing on the relationship between its dictator, the military and the state. This paper’s main argument is that Than Shwe has carefully prepared the transition of 2011 as a generational change in the Tatmadaw and in state leadership. The argument is also made that the challenges created by Thein Sein can be understood as a result of his redefinition of national security and balancing of security-centralism with state-led developmentalism.

Party Elites and the Search for Credibility : Plaid Cymru and the SNP as New Parties of Government

Peer reviewed

Using WordNet relations and semantic classes in information retrieval tasks

In this paper we explore the use of semantic classes in an existing information retrieval system in order to improve its results. Thus, we use two different ontologies of semantic classes (WordNet domain and Basic Level Concepts) in order to re-rank the retrieved documents and obtain better recall and precision. Finally, we implement a new method for weighting the expanded terms taking into account the weights of the original query terms and their relations in WordNet with respect to the new ones (which have demonstrated to improve the results). The evaluation of these approaches was carried out in the CLEF Robust-WSD Task, obtaining an improvement of 1.8% in GMAP for the semantic classes approach and 10% in MAP employing the WordNet term weighting approach.

Could European Governance Ideas Improve Federal-provincial Relations in Canada? EDAP 6/2013

Over the past seventeen years Canada has decentralized many social programmes, moving responsibility from the federal government to 13 provinces and territories through bilateral federal-provincial agreements. In contrast, the European Union (EU) has moved in the opposite direction, building pan-European approaches and establishing new processes to facilitate multilateral collaboration among the 28 EU member states. This has been done through a new governance approach called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Using a detailed case study − employment policy − this paper explores whether Canada could learn from OMC governance ideas to re-build a pan-Canadian dimension to employment policy and improve the performance of its intergovernmental relations system. Concrete lessons for Canada to improve decentralized governance are suggested: consolidating the different bilateral agreements; using benchmarking instead of controls in fiscal transfers; undertaking research, analysis, and comparisons in order to facilitate mutual learning; revitalizing intergovernmental structures in light of devolution; and engaging social partners, civil society and other stakeholders. Post-devolution Canada is not doing badly in managing employment policy, but could do better. Looking to the EU for ideas on new ways to collaborate provides a chance for setting a forward looking agenda that could ultimately result not only in better labour market outcomes, but also improvements to one small part of Canada’s often fractious federation.

Federation without federalism. Relations between Moscow and the regions. OSW Study 49/2014

The regions of the Russian Federation are immensely diverse economically and geographically as well as when it comes to their national identity, civic awareness and political activity. We are in fact dealing with a ‘multi-speed Russia’: along with the post-industrial regions with their higher living standards and a need for pluralism in politics, there are poverty-stricken, inertial regions, dependent on subsidies from the centre. As a result of the policy of centralisation pursued by the Kremlin since 2000, the autonomy of the regions has been reduced fundamentally. This has affected the performance of the regional elites and made it difficult for the regions to use their natural advantages (such as resources or location) to their benefit. One of the effects of this policy has been the constantly decreasing number of the donor regions. The current model promotes the role of the region as a passive supplicant, for whom it is easier to seek support from the central government, offering loyalty in exchange, than to implement complex systemic reforms that would contribute to long-term development. Moscow’s control (political, economic and administrative) over the regions is currently so thorough that it contradicts the formally existing federal form of government in Russia.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

No other choice but co-operation. The background of Lithuania's and Latvia's relations with Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 99, 2013-01-04

For years now Belarus has been a key economic partner for Lithuania and Latvia. These two Baltic states have well-developed port infrastructure and thus provide what are the geographically closest and also the cheapest exit to international outlets for Belarusia’s petrochemical and chemical industries, both of which are export-oriented. As a result, the transit of Belarusian goods is one of the major sources of income for the state budgets of the two countries. This economic interdependence has affected the stance Riga and Vilnius take on Minsk at the EU forum. When in February and March 2012 the Council of the European Union was resolving the issue of imposing economic sanction on selected Belarusian companies which backed Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, this triggered a discussion on what the point of such measures is and on possible economic losses in Lithuania and Latvia. As a result of firm resistance from Latvia (which was backed by Slovenia), the Council removed those companies which were most strongly engaged in co-operation with Latvian partners from the list of those to be covered with economic sanctions. Lithuania, which is more critical of the political situation in Belarus, did not express its official opposition to the sanctions. Despite some differences in the policies adopted by Riga and Vilnius, it turned out that Minsk could count on strong support from local business groups in both of these countries, as these groups fear impediments in this highly profitable co-operation and also retaliation from the Belarusian government. The existing economic bonds mean that neither Vilnius nor Riga have any other choice but to co-operate with Belarus. They must therefore adopt a carefully balanced policy towards Minsk. At the same time, being EU member states, they do not officially deny that a problem exists with the violation of human rights by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. It is for this reason that the governments of Latvia and Lithuania will be interested in maintaining the status quo in relations with Minsk. On the other hand, Belarus in a way also has no other choice but to use the ports in Lithuania and Latvia, and this will prevent it from excessively escalating tension in relations with these two countries.

Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation, Part I. OSW Report, June 2007

The start of accession negotiations between Ankara and the EU is vital for the future of both Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its member state, as well as for the geopolitical situation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appreciating the significance of these issues, the Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided to launch a project entitled "Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation". The goal of this project is to present, within the context of accession negotiations, Turkey's greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara's relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and the USA. This Report is the first of three which will be published as part of the project. The Report includes texts on Turkish-US relations since 2003, major political and social challenges on Turkey's path towards the EU and the current condition of the Turkish economy. The Report was developed between July 2005 and November 2006, over which time CES workers and associates searched for publicly available materials in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on three research trips to Turkey, where they met local researchers, analysts, politicians and officials. The authors of the Report would like to express their gratitude to everyone who have shared their opinions with them, and to the Polish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassador Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej Ananicz for their expert support and assistance in the authors' work on this Report. This Report does not present the official stance of the Polish government on the issues discussed therein; instead it reflects the personal views of its authors, who have made their best efforts to ensure that their work is reliable.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.