On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

An Experimental Investigation into ‘Pledge and Review’ in Climate Negotiations

A novelty of the new Paris Agreement is the inclusion of a process for assessment and review of countries’ nationally determined pledges and contributions. The intent is to reveal whether similar countries are making comparable pledges, whether the totality of such pledges will achieve the global goal, and whether, over the coming years, the contributions actually made by countries will equal or exceed their pledges. The intent is also to provide an opportunity for countries to express their approval, or disapproval, of the pledges and contributions made by individual countries. Here we report the results of a lab experiment on the effects of such a process in a game in which players choose a group target, declare their individual pledges, and then make voluntary contributions to supply a public good. Our results show that a review process is more likely to affect targets and pledges than actual contributions. Even when a review process increases average contributions, the effect is relatively small. As the window for achieving the 2 °C goal will close soon, our results suggest that, rather than merely implement the Paris Agreement, negotiators should begin now to develop complementary approaches to limiting emissions, including the adoption of agreements that are designed differently than the one adopted in Paris.

Economics of Ethical and Prosocial Behavior: Experiments on Social Responsibility, Ignorance, and Cheating

In this thesis I experimentally investigate prosocial and ethical behavior in economic interactions. The thesis consists of three experimental research papers that have a broad range of research questions on social responsibility, ignorance and cheating. With these experiments I aim to better understand when and why people behave ethically and/or prosocially and which consequences it has on their own and other players’ payoffs, and on overall efficiency. The results from the three experimental studies suggest that (i) donations to charity by employees are rewarded in an experimental setting, and the effect is driven by reciprocal concerns; (ii) there is a significant fraction of people who decide not to know about negative consequences of own actions, and the sorting of social agents of a low type into ignorance drives self-interested behavior of ignorant agents; and (iii) if the possibility of being exposed as a liar is small, the tendency to lie increases with incentives, indicating that some people have positive and finite costs of lying. Furthermore, when the participants lie, they lie to the full extent, which suggests that the intrinsic cost of lying is fixed.

El efecto de las características socioeconómicas sobre la consistencia en la toma de decisiones: Un análisis experimental

Este ensayo explora, en forma experimental, cual es el efecto de las características socioeconómicas sobre la consistencia en las preferencias cuando los agentes se encuentran eligiendo entre loterías. El análisis parte de un experimento realizado con los estudiantes de la carrera de Economía y Negocios internacionales y, se encuentra que el sexo, el estrato socioeconómico, el ingreso, la edad y el semestre en forma conjunta no son relevantes para explicar la consistencia en las preferencias. Sin embargo, también se encuentra que la edad y el semestre podrían ayudar a explicar la consistencia.

Foil rolling : a new interpretation of experimental results

This paper explores a new interpretation of experiments on foil rolling. The assumption that the roll remains convex is relaxed so that the strip profile may become concave, or thicken in the roll gap. However, we conjecture that the concave profile is associated with phenomena which occur after the rolls have stopped. We argue that the yield criterion must be satisfied in a nonconventional manner if such a phenomenon is caused plastically. Finite element analysis on an extrusion problem appears to confirm this conjecture.

Experimental studies on comparison of microwave curing and thermal curing of epoxy resins used for alternative mould materials

In this present work attempts have been made to study the glass transition temperature of alternative mould materials by using both microwave heating and conventional oven heating. In this present work three epoxy resins, namely R2512, R2515 and R2516, which are commonly used for making injection moulds have been used in combination with two hardeners H2403 and H2409. The magnetron microwave generator used in this research is operating at a frequency of 2.45 GHz with a hollow rectangular waveguide. In order to distinguish the effects between the microwave and conventional heating, a number of experiments were performed to test their mechanical properties such as tensile and flexural strengths. Additionally, differential scanning calorimeter technique was implemented to measure the glass transition temperature on both microwave and conventional heating. This study provided necessary evidences to establish that microwave heated mould materials resulted with higher glass transition temperature than the conventional heating. Finally, attempts were also made to study the microstructure of microwave-cured materials by using a scanning electron microscope in order to analyze the morphology of cured specimens.

Experimental Infection of Culex Annulirostris, Culex Gelidus, and Aedes Vigilax With a Yellow Fever/Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine Chimera (Chimerivax TM-JE)

Australian mosquitoes from which Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) has been recovered (Culex annulirostris, Culex gelidus, and Aedes vigilax) were assessed for their ability to be infected with the ChimeriVax-JE vaccine, with yellow fever vaccine virus 17D (YF 17D) from which the backbone of ChimeriVax-JE vaccine is derived and with JEV-Nakayama. None of the mosquitoes became infected after being fed orally with 6.1 log(10) plaque-forming units (PFU)/mL of ChimeriVax-JE vaccine, which is greater than the peak viremia in vaccinees (mean peak viremia = 4.8 PFU/mL, range = 0-30 PFU/mL of 0.9 days mean duration, range = 0-11 days). Some members of all three species of mosquito became infected when fed on JEV-Nakayama, but only Ae. vigilax was infected when fed on YF 17D. The results suggest that none of these three species of mosquito are likely to set up secondary cycles of transmission of ChimeriVax-JE in Australia after feeding on a viremic vaccinee.