A review of offshore wind power development in the United Kingdom

Currently wind power is dominated by onshore wind farms. However, as the demand for power grows driven by security of energy supply issues, dwindling fossil fuel supplies and greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, offshore wind power will develop rapidly because of the decline of viable onshore sites. The United Kingdom has a target of 21% renewable electricity by 2020 and this is expected to come mostly from wind power. Britain is the most active internationally in terms of offshore wind farm development with almost 48GW in some stage of development. In addition the Scottish Government, the Northern Ireland Executive and the Government of Ireland undertook the 'Irish-Scottish Links on Energy Study' (ISLES), which examined the feasibility of creating an offshore interconnected transmission network and subsea electricity grid based on renewable energy sources off the coast of western Scotland and the Irish Sea. The aim of this paper is to provide an appraisal of offshore wind power development with a focus on the United Kingdom. © 2013 IEEE.

Commonwealth legislative power and "non punitive" detention: a constitutional roadmap

In 2004 The High Court handed down a number of decisions concerning detention imposed for purposes allegedly unrelated to punishment. This paper outlines the way the Federal Constitution restricts (and also facilitates) the imposition of "non punitive detention" by our governments. Such laws (as passed by the Federal Legislature) are constitutionally valid provided they can be characterised as falling within a legislative head of power under  section 51 off he Constitution. The power to detain for non punitive purposes can be reposed by the Legislature in the either the Executive or Judicial arms of government. Detention by the Executive is non punitive (and therefore does not offend the separation of powers) even though it involves a deprivation of liberty, provided it is imposed for “legitimate non punitive purposes”.  Legitimacy is in turn determined by reference to the section 51 heads of power. Detention for non punitive purposes by the judicial arm of government is constitutionally valid provided that (i) a “judicial process ” is adopted and (ii) (arguably) there is some link (albeit tenuous) with a previous finding of criminal guilt. The continuing existence of the “constitutional immunity ”from being detained by other than judicial order identified by the High Court in its 1992 decision in Lim v Minister for Immigration is called into question.

Understanding executive presence : Perspectives of business professionals

Executive presence is an unclear concept but one that reportedly has a substantial influence on successful leadership. The purpose of this study was to understand the meaning of executive presence from the perspectives of business professionals with expertise in the effectiveness of organizational executives. From interviews with 34 professionals, 5 main findings emerged: (a) executive presence is based on audience perceptions of the characteristics of particular people, (b) 10 core characteristics affect executive presence (status and reputation, physical appearance, projected confidence, communication ability, engagement skills, interpersonal integrity, values-in-action, intellect and expertise, outcome delivery ability, and coercive power use), (c) perceptions are based on impressions made during initial contacts (first 5 characteristics) and on evaluations made over time (second 5 characteristics), (d) the characteristics combine in different ways to form 4 presence archetypes (positive presence, unexpected presence, unsustainable presence, and dark presence), and (e) the majority of the executives described as having presence were men. Based on the interview material, we suggest that a person with executive presence is someone who, by virtue of how he or she is perceived by audience members at any given point in time, exerts influence beyond that conferred through formal authority. The findings serve to highlight the complexity of executive presence, particularly in terms of the breadth of characteristics that underpin this construct and the influence of time on people's perceptions.

The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999

This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentiallyled agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

Contribution of energy services to the Millennium Development Goals and to poverty alleviation in Latin America and the Caribbean: executive summary

Includes bibliography

Essays On CEO Compensation: New Evidence On The Managerial-Power Vs. Optimal Contracting Debate

This dissertation analyzes the effect of market analysts’ expectations of share prices (price targets) on executive compensation. It examines how well the estimated effects of price targets on compensation fit with two competing views on determining executive compensation: the arm’s length bargaining model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize shareholders’ interests, and the managerial power model, which assumes that a board seeks to maximize managers’ compensation (Bebchuk et al. 2005). The first chapter documents the pattern of CEO pay from fiscal year 1996 to 2010. The second chapter analyzes the Institutional Broker Estimate System Detail History Price Target data file, which that reports analysts’ price targets for firms. I show that the number of price target announcements is positively associated with company share price’s volatility, that price targets are predictive of changes in the value of stocks, and that when analysts announce positive (negative) expectations of future stock price, share prices change in the same direction in the short run. The third chapter analyzes the effect of price targets on executive compensation. I find that analysts' price targets alter the composition of executive pay between cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation. When analysts forecast a rise (fall) in the share price for a firm, the compensation package tilts toward stock-based (cash-based) compensation. The substitution effect is stronger in companies that have weaker corporate governance. The fourth chapter explores the effect of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and its reinforcement in 2006 on the options granting process. I show that the introduction of SOX and its reinforcement eliminated the practice of backdating options but increased “spring-loading” of option grants around price targets announcements. Overall, the dissertation shows that price targets provide insights into the determinants of executive pay in favor of the managerial power model.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Executive Reorganization: Building a State Government That Worked for People -- Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling & Sheena Wilson “In the Crucible of Change”

One of the primary accomplishments of Governor Forrest Anderson in 1969-71 was the reorganization of the Executive Branch of Montana government, something that had been attempted six different times between 1919 and 1962 as state government had grown from twenty agencies to almost 200 uncontrolled boards, bureaus and commissions. The chaotic structure of the executive branch disempowered governors of both parties and empowered the private corporations and organizations that were the power structure of Montana. With remarkable political acumen, Governor Anderson figured out how to get that near impossible job done. Central to his efforts was the creation of an Executive Reorganization Commission, including eight legislators and the Governor, the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment that limited the executive branch to no more than twenty departments under the Governor, and the timely completion of a massive research effort to delineate the actual structure of the twenty departments. That story is told in this episode by three major players in the effort, all involved directly with the Executive Reorganization Commission: Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling and Sheena Wilson. Their recollections reflect an insider’s perspective of this significant accomplishment that helped change Montana “In the Crucible of Change.” Tom Harrison is a former Republican State Representative and State Senator from Helena, who was a member of the Executive Reorganization Commission. As Majority Leader in the Montana House of Representatives in 1971, he was the primary sponsor of the House’s executive reorganization bill and helped shepherd the Senate’s version to passage. Harrison was the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1976 after which he practiced private law for 3 more decades. He served in the Montana Army National Guard for almost 34 years, rising to the rank of Colonel in the position of Judge Advocate General. He was a founding Director of Federal Defenders of Montana (legal representation for indigents accused within the Federal Judicial System); appointed Chairman of the original Montana State Fund (workers' compensation insurance) by Gov. Stephens; served as President of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Helena Kiwanis Club and St. Peter's Community Hospital Foundation, as well as Chairman and Director of AAA MountainWest; and was a founder, first Chairman and Director of the Valley Bank of Helena for over 25 years. Diana Dowling was an attorney for the Executive Reorganization Commission and helped draft the legislation that was passed. She also worked for Governor Forrest Anderson and for the 1972 Constitutional Convention where she prepared and directed publication of official explanation of the new Constitution that was mailed to all Montana voters. Diana was Executive Director of the Montana Bar Association and for 20 years held various legal positions with the Montana Legislative Council. For 12 years she was a commissioner on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and for 7 years was a member of Montana State Board of Bar Examiners. Diana was the first director of the Montana Lottery, an adjunct professor at both Carroll College and the UM Law School, and an administrative officer for Falcon Press Publishing Co. Diana is currently - and intends to continue being - a perpetual college student. Sheena Wilson came fresh out of the University of Montana to become a Research Assistant for the Executive Reorganization Commission. Later she worked for seven years as a field representative in Idaho and Montana for the Mountain Plains Family Education Program, for thirteen years with Congressman Pat Williams as Executive Assistant in Washington and Field Assistant here in Montana, owned and managed a Helena restaurant for seven years, worked as Executive Assistant for State Auditor John Morrison and was Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Brian Schweitzer his full 8 years in the Governorship. Though currently “retired”, Sheena serves on the Montana Board of Investments, the Public Employees Retirement Board and the Capitol Complex Advisory Council and is a partner in a dry-land wheat farm in Teton County that was homesteaded by her great uncle.

The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya

Recent studies on the history of economic development demonstrate that concentration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and that institutional changes that diffuse power, though beneficial to the society in general, are opposed by some social groups. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution primarily because it did not reduce the powers of the executive to any significant degree. Using data of voting patterns in the constitutional referendum and following the rational choice framework, I estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and demonstrate that groups voting decisions depend on expected gains and likelihood of monopolizing power. The results also reveal the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power diffusion process, and therefore the study establishes a channel through which ethnic fragmentation impacts on economic development.

The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29

Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives. These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.

Who Is Influential and Why? The Determinants of Reputational Power

Power is one of the most fundamental concepts in political science, and it is a crucial aspect of decision-making structures. The distribution of power between political actors and coalitions of actors informs us about who is actually able to influence decision-making processes. It is thus no surprise that power is a centerpiece of our assessment of political decision-making in Switzerland. In line with the main argument of this book, Chapter 3 has uncovered important changes in decision-making structures, which resulted in a rebalancing of power between governing parties, interest groups and state executive actors. Conjecturing about the reasons that may account for these changes, we pointed to factors of an organizational and institutional nature. For example, we put forward the decline of pre-parliamentary procedures oriented towards corporatist intermediation as a possible explanation for the weakening of interest groups. More generally, in several chapters it has been suggested that there is a relationship between the institutional design of a decision-making process, the related importance of decision-making phases and an actor's participation in these phases on the one hand, and the power of actors (and coalitions of actors) on the other. In addition, the analyses carried out in Chapters 2 to 5 draw our attention to the differences in power structure across decision-making processes or types of processes.

Energy from the West : a progress report of a technology assessment of western energy resource development : executive summary : prepared for Office of Research and Development, Environmental Protection Agency /

"Contract no. 68-01-1916."

Water resources and power; a report to the Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Reorganization plan no. 9 of 1950 : providing for the reorganization of the Federal Power Commission : report (to accompany S. Res. 255)

Also in Congressional serial volume 11368.