Summary of the evolution of the fortifications of Santa Barbara Castle in Alicante from its origins to the beginning of the eighteenth century

Since ancient times, Alicante has been considered a strategic location on the east coast of Spain. Situated close to the sea, it is protected to the southeast by the Cape of Huerta and to the southwest by the Cape of Santa Pola. The city lies at the foot of Mount Benacantil, a high outcrop which has been the site of defensive buildings since time immemorial due to its naturally strong position: it was undoubtedly one of the strongest natural sites in the Levant. Its summit, lying 160 metres above the sea, is topped by a series of fortified enclosures now known as Santa Barbara Castle. This paper briefly describes the alterations made to the castle fortifications from its origins through the Renaissance, including the Muslim and Christian periods until the late fifteenth century and subsequent alterations to adapt new bastioned fortification techniques, and depicts the status of the fortress in each period. This paper is the result of doctoral research carried out at different national and international archives and leading to a thesis presented in 2011.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

Quest for mysteries; the Masonic background for literature in eighteenth-century Germany.

Bibliographical footnotes.

English humorists of the eighteenth century : Sir Richard Steele, Joseph Addison, Laurence Sterne, Oliver Goldsmith /

"With introductions from Thackeray's English humorists'."

Henry Fox, first Lord Holland; a study of the career of an eighteenth century politician,

"Bibliography of the materials for a study of Henry Fox": v. 2, p. 382-386.

British moralists : being selections from writers principally of the eighteenth century /

"Bibliographical note of some British writers": vol. 2, p. [385]-392.

A check list of American eighteenth century newspapers in the Library of Congress.

Mode of access: Internet.

Mediaeval France from the reign of Hugues Capet to the beginning of the eighteenth century ;

Mode of access: Internet.

Early eighteenth century Palatine emigration; a British government redemptioner project to manufacture naval stores,

Bibliography: p. [229]-241; bibliographical foot-notes.

Eighteenth century vignettes

v. 1. First series.--v. 2. Second series.--v. 3. Third series.

Eighteenth century vignettes,

Mode of access: Internet.

Scottish poetry of the eighteenth century...

Mode of access: Internet.

The revival of religion in England in the eighteenth century.

Bibliographical footnotes.

History of the Waldenses ; connected with a sketch of the Christian church from the birth of Christ to the eighteenth century /

Includes index.