Bounding ATE with ITT

We propose the bounds on ATE using intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator when there are compliers/noncompliers in randomized trials. The bounds are given as ITTNACE, (2) noncompliers' average treatment effect (NACE) is nonnegative. We give an example of poverty impacts of health insurance, and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard of health insurance.

Bank Borrowing and Financing of Medium-sized Firms in Indonesia

The improvement of financial intermediation functions is crucial for a robust banking system. When lending, banks have to cope with such problems as information asymmetry and adverse selection. In order to mitigate these problems, banks have to product information and improve their techniques of lending. During the 1998 financial crisis, Indonesia's banking system suffered severe damage and revealed that the country's banking intermediation functions did not work well. This paper examines the financial intermediation functions of banks in Indonesia and analyzes the importance of bank lending to firms. The focus is on medium-sized firms, and "relationship lending", one of the bank lending techniques, is used to examine financial intermediation in Indonesia. The results of logit regressions show that the relationship between a bank and a firm affects the probability of bank lending. The amount of borrowing and collateral are also affected by a firm's relationship with a bank. When viewed from the standpoint of relationship lending to medium-sized firms, Indonesian banks cannot be criticized for any malfunction of financial intermediation.

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Essays on Personal Bankruptcy Law and Small Business Financing

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution

Recently, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In places requiring community rating in their health insurance premiums, a major cause is age-based adverse selection. However, even in countries without community rating, a de facto type of partial community rating tends to occur. In this note, a modified version of Pauly et al.'s guaranteed renewability model, which addresses the problem of age-based adverse selection (Pauly et al., 1995) is presented. Their model is extended from three to 35 periods. Also, probabilities are allowed to increase by age for low-risk types using actual age-based probabilities. This extension of their work shows that private health insurance contracts available stray far from optimal contracts that deal with age-based adverse selection. This suggests that government actions to affect private insurance options are warranted.

Lifetime cover in private insurance markets

In the last few decades, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In countries and states with community rating, a major cause is adverse selection. In order to address age-based adverse selection, Australia has recently begun a novel approach which imposes stiff penalties for buying private insurance later in life, when expected costs are higher. In this paper, we analyze Australiarsquos Lifetime Cover in the context of a modified version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). We allow empirically-based probabilities to increase by age for low-risk types. The model highlights the shortcomings of the Australian plan. Based on empirically-based probabilities of illness, we predict that Lifetime Cover will not arrest adverse selection. The model has many policy implications for government regulation encouraging long-term health coverage.

Lifetime Subsidies in Australian Private Health Insurance Markets with Community Rating

This paper considers the problem of inducing low-risk individuals of all ages to buy private health insurance in Australia. Our proposed subsidy scheme improves upon the age-based penalty scheme under the current "Australian Lifetime Cover" (LTC) scheme. We generate an alternative subsidy profile that obviates adverse selection in private health insurance markets with mandated, age-based, community rating. Our proposal is novel in that we generate subsidies that are both risk- and age-specific, based upon actual risk probabilities. The approach we take may prove useful in other jurisdictions where the extant law mandates community rating in private health insurance markets. Furthermore, our approach is useful in jurisdictions that seek to maintain private insurance to complement existing universal public systems.

Exchange-traded funds and information asymmetry

This thesis focuses on three main questions. The first uses ExchangeTraded Funds (ETFs) to evaluate estimated adverse selection costs obtained spread decomposition models. The second compares the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) in Exchange-Traded Funds to control securities. The third examines the intra-day ETF trading patterns. These spread decomposition models evaluated are Glosten and Harris (1988); George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991); Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995); Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997); Huang and Stoll (1997). Using the characteristics of ETFs it is shown that only the Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan, et al (1997) models provide theoretically consistent results. When the PIN measure is employed ETFs are shown to have greater PINs than control securities. The investigation of the intra-day trading patterns shows that return volatility and trading volume have a U-shaped intra-day pattern. A study of trading systems shows that ETFs on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) have a U-shaped intra-day pattern of bid-ask spreads, while ETFs on NASDAQ do not. Specifically, ETFs on NASDAQ have higher bid-ask spreads at the market opening, then the lowest bid-ask spread in the middle of the day. At the close of the market, the bid-ask spread of ETFs on NASDAQ slightly elevated when compared to mid-day.

Bid-ask spread dynamics in foreign exchange markets

The aim of this paper is to examine the short term dynamics of foreign exchange rate spreads. Using a vector autoregressive model (VAR) we show that most of the variation in the spread comes from the long run dependencies between past and future spreads rather than being caused by changes in inventory, adverse selection, cost of carry or order processing costs. We apply the Integrated Cumulative Sum of Squares (ICSS) algorithm of Inclan and Tiao (1994) to discover how often spread volatility changes. We find that spread volatility shifts are relatively uncommon and shifts in one currency spread tend not to spillover to other currency spreads. © 2013.

Evaluating spread models with a basket security

In this article we evaluate the most widely used spread decomposition models using Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). These funds are an example of a basket security and allow the diversification of private information causing these securities to have lower adverse selection costs than individual securities. We use this feature as a criterion for evaluating spread decomposition models. Comparisons of adverse selection costs for ETF's and control securities obtained from spread decomposition models show that only the Glosten-Harris (1988) and the Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans (1997) models provide estimates of the spread that are consistent with the diversification of private information in a basket security. Our results are robust even after controlling for the stock exchange. © 2011 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

Financial Decisions via Methods of Guaranteed Control Theory

AMS subject classification: 93C95, 90A09.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.

Three essays on the microstructure of exchange traded funds

Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have increased significantly in popularity since they were first introduced in 1993. However, there is still much that is unknown about ETFs in the extant literature. This dissertation attempts to fill gaps in the ETF literature by using three related essays. In these three essays, we compare ETFs to closed ended mutual funds (CEFs) by decomposing the bid-ask spread into its three components; we look at the intraday shape of ETFs and compare it to the intraday shape of equities as well as examine the co-integration factor between ETFs on the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange; we also examine the differences between leveraged ETFs and unleveraged ETFs by analyzing the impact of liquidity and volatility. These three essays are presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, respectively. ^ Chapter one uses the Huang and Stoll (1997) model to decompose the bid-ask spread in CEFs and ETFs for two distinct periods—a normal and a volatile period. We show a higher adverse selection component for CEFs than for ETFs without regard to volatility. However, both ETFs and CEFs increased in magnitude of the adverse selection component in the period of high volatility. Chapter two uses a mix of the Werner and Kleidon (1993) and the Hupperets and Menkveld (2002) methods to get the intraday shape of ETFs and analyze co-integration between London and New York trading. We find two different shapes for New York and London ETFs. There also appears to be evidence of co-integration in the overlapping two-hour trading period but not over the entire trading day for the two locations. The third chapter discusses the new class of ETFs called leveraged ETFs. We examine the liquidity and depth differences between unleveraged and leveraged ETFs at the aggregate level and when the leveraged ETFs are classified by the leveraged multiples of -3, -2, -1, 2, and 3, both for a normal and a volatile period. We find distinct differences between leveraged and unleveraged ETFs at the aggregate level, with leveraged ETFs having larger spreads than unleveraged ETFs. Furthermore, while both leveraged and unleveraged ETFs have larger spreads in high volatility, for the leveraged ETFs the change in magnitude is significantly larger than for the unleveraged ETFs. Among the multiples, the -2 leveraged ETF is the most pronounced in its liquidity characteristics, more so in volatile times. ^

The Effect of Reputation Shocks to Rating Agencies on Corporate Disclosures

This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.