Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2013

Includes bibliography.

Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1998

Includes bibliography.

Relação de longo prazo entre o investimento direto externo e variáveis macroeconômicas entre janeiro de 1999 à dezembro de 2007

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Lograr estética y función en el sector posterior con resinas compuestas

La operatoria dental actual cuenta con un conocimiento más profundo de las diferentes estructuras dentarias que sumado al gran adelanto tecnológico y científico en la ciencia de los biomateriales; fruto de innumerables investigaciones, nos permiten contar hoy, con una nueva generación de materiales restauradores, lo que hace más crítico y exigente el conocimiento y análisis por parte del profesional, de las técnicas a efectuar, la realización depurada de procedimientos y los biomateriales a utilizar, con el fin de realizar tratamientos que sean biocompatibles, eficientes y de importante longevidad.

How does country risk matter for foreign direct investment?

In this paper, we aim to identify the political and financial risk components that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations. Our paper is the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact of various components of not only political risk but also financial risk on inward FDI, from both long-run and short-run perspectives. Using a sample of 93 countries (including 60 developing countries) for the period 1985-2007, we find that among the political risk components, government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, religious tensions, democratic accountability, and ethnic tensions have a close association with FDI flows. In particular, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, and external conflict appear to be the most influential components of political risk in attracting foreign investment. Among the financial risk components, only exchange rate stability yields statistically significant positive coefficients when estimated only for developing countries. In contrast, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and services, foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, net international liquidity as the number of months of import cover, and current account as a percentage of GDP yield negative coefficients in some specifications. Thus, multinationals do not seem to consider seriously the financial risk of the host country.

UMA ANÁLISE DA RELAÇÃO ENTRE VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS E O COMPORTAMENTO DAS AÇÕES DE MAIOR LIQUIDEZ DO ÍNDICE IBOVESPA

As ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, refletem o comportamento das ações de um modo geral, bem como a relação das variáveis macroeconômicas em seu comportamento e estão entre as mais negociadas no mercado de capitais brasileiro. Desta forma, pode-se entender que há reflexos de fatores que impactam as empresas de maior liquidez que definem o comportamento das variáveis macroeconômicas e que o inverso também é uma verdade, oscilações nos fatores macroeconômicos também afetam as ações de maior liquidez, como IPCA, PIB, SELIC e Taxa de Câmbio. O estudo propõe uma análise da relação existente entre variáveis macroeconômicas e o comportamento das ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, corroborando com estudos que buscam entender a influência de fatores macroeconômicos sobre o preço de ações e contribuindo empiricamente com a formação de portfólios de investimento. O trabalho abrangeu o período de 2008 a 2014. Os resultados concluíram que a formação de carteiras, visando a proteção do capital investido, deve conter ativos com correlação negativa em relação às variáveis estudadas, o que torna possível a composição de uma carteira com risco reduzido.

Desoxyepothilone B is curative against human tumor xenografts that are refractory to paclitaxel

The epothilones are naturally occurring, cytotoxic macrolides that function through a paclitaxel (Taxol)-like mechanism. Although structurally dissimilar, both classes of molecules lead to the arrest of cell division and eventual cell death by stabilizing cellular microtubule assemblies. The epothilones differ in their ability to retain activity against multidrug-resistant (MDR) cell lines and tumors where paclitaxel fails. In the current account, we focus on the relationship between epothilone and paclitaxel in the context of tumors with multiple drug resistance. The epothilone analogue Z-12,13-desoxyepothilone B (dEpoB) is >35,000-fold more potent than paclitaxel in inhibiting cell growth in the MDR DC-3F/ADX cell line. Various formulations, routes, and schedules of i.v. administration of dEpoB have been tested in nude mice. Slow infusion with a Cremophor-ethanol vehicle proved to be the most beneficial in increasing efficacy and decreasing toxicity. Although dEpoB performed similarly to paclitaxel in sensitive tumors xenografts (MX-1 human mammary and HT-29 colon tumor), its effects were clearly superior against MDR tumors. When dEpoB was administered to nude mice bearing our MDR human lymphoblastic T cell leukemia (CCRF-CEM/paclitaxel), dEpoB demonstrated a full curative effect. For human mammary adenocarcinoma MCF-7/Adr cells refractory to paclitaxel, dEpoB reduced the established tumors, markedly suppressed tumor growth, and surpassed other commonly used chemotherapy drugs such as adriamycin, vinblastine, and etoposide in beneficial effects.

Fashions and fads in finance: contingent emulation and the political economy of sovereign wealth fund creation. IHS Political Science Series No. 131, July 2012

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-owned or managed investment vehicles, have proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as political controversy has surrounded them. Why? The extant literature depicts the process of SWF creation as driven by functional imperatives associated with “excess” revenue and reserves accumulated from commodity booms and large current account surpluses. I argue that SWF creation also reflects in large part a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been constructed as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries took on these characteristics, they followed their peers. Put simply, fashions and fads in finance matter for policy diffusion. I assess this argument using a new dataset on SWF creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results suggest peer-based contingent emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to create a SWF, especially among fuel exporters. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 – 5 September 2010. The author would like to thank Eric Neumayer for his many suggestions and comments on previous versions of the manuscript. The author would also like to thank Zachary Elkins for sharing data. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Natali Bulamacioglu and Christopher Gandrud.

The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.

Turkey's economy: a story of success with an uncertain future. OSW Commentary No. 120, 2013-11-05

In the decade since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey’s economy has become synonymous with success and well-implemented reforms. Economic development has been the basis of both socio-political stability inside the country and of an ambitious foreign policy agenda pursued by the AKP. However, the risks associated with a series of unresolved issues are becoming increasingly apparent. These include the country’s current account deficit, its over-reliance on short-term external financing, and unfinished reforms, for example of the education sector. This leaves Turkey exposed to over-dependence on investors, especially from the West. Consequently, Ankara has become a hostage of its own image as an economically successful state with a stable socio-political system. Any changes to this image would cause capital flight, as exemplified by the outflow of portfolio investment1 and an increase in the cost of external debt2 that followed the nationwide protests over the proposed closure of Gezi Park last summer. In addition, Turkey remains vulnerable to potential changes in investor sentiment towards emerging markets.

A stronger, growth-oriented surveillance for EMU. EuropEos Commentary No. 1, 19 April 2010

This Commentary finds that the recent adjustment measures taken by the Greek government in combination with the financial support proffered by the Eurogroup may not be sufficient to deal with the risk of instability in EMU in the longer term. The author argues that other imbalances, most notably the current account imbalances within EMU, need to be addressed to avoid a deflation spiral that would aggravate sustainability problems in highly indebted countries. The Greek crisis highlights the need to take steps to strengthen the economic governance of the euro area. A key component of these steps would be a stronger, growth-oriented, surveillance.

Filling the gap: open economy considerations for more reliable potential output estimates. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/11, October 2015

This paper argues that the Phillips curve relationship is not sufficient to trace back the output gap, because the effect of excess demand is not symmetric across tradeable and non-tradeable sectors. In the non-tradeable sector, excess demand creates excess employment and inflation via the Phillips curve, while in the tradeable sector much of the excess demand is absorbed by the trade balance. We set up an unobserved-components model including both a Phillips curve and a current account equation to estimate ‘sustainable output’ for 45 countries. Our estimates for many countries differ substantially from the potential output estimates of the European Commission, IMF and OECD. We assemble a comprehensive real-time dataset to estimate our model on data which was available in each year from 2004-15. Our model was able to identify correctly the sign of pre-crisis output gaps using real time data for countries such as the United States, Spain and Ireland, in contrast to the estimates of the three institutions, which estimated negative output gaps real-time, while their current estimates for the pre-crisis period suggest positive gaps. In the past five years the annual output gap estimate revisions of our model, the European Commission, IMF, OECD and the Hodrick-Prescott filter were broadly similar in the range of 0.5-1.0 percent of GDP for advanced countries. Such large revisions are worrisome, because the European fiscal framework can translate the imprecision in output gap estimates into poorly grounded fiscal policymaking in the EU.

Are Germans wasting their savings abroad? CEPS Commentary, 7 April 2016

Germany is running a current account surplus of about 8% of GDP, which means that about one-third of all German savings (equal to 24% of GDP) has to be invested abroad every year. It has become by now almost a cliché that these huge excess savings are being wasted abroad. But this is a popular misconception based on the divergence between the available data on the (cumulated) current account balance (cCAB) of Germany and its net international investment position (NIIP). A closer look at the data actually suggests that the NIIP is probably not measured correctly and that the observed returns on German investment abroad have remained above most domestic returns.

UMA ANÁLISE DA RELAÇÃO ENTRE VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS E O COMPORTAMENTO DAS AÇÕES DE MAIOR LIQUIDEZ DO ÍNDICE IBOVESPA

As ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, refletem o comportamento das ações de um modo geral, bem como a relação das variáveis macroeconômicas em seu comportamento e estão entre as mais negociadas no mercado de capitais brasileiro. Desta forma, pode-se entender que há reflexos de fatores que impactam as empresas de maior liquidez que definem o comportamento das variáveis macroeconômicas e que o inverso também é uma verdade, oscilações nos fatores macroeconômicos também afetam as ações de maior liquidez, como IPCA, PIB, SELIC e Taxa de Câmbio. O estudo propõe uma análise da relação existente entre variáveis macroeconômicas e o comportamento das ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, corroborando com estudos que buscam entender a influência de fatores macroeconômicos sobre o preço de ações e contribuindo empiricamente com a formação de portfólios de investimento. O trabalho abrangeu o período de 2008 a 2014. Os resultados concluíram que a formação de carteiras, visando a proteção do capital investido, deve conter ativos com correlação negativa em relação às variáveis estudadas, o que torna possível a composição de uma carteira com risco reduzido.

Kiigazítás recesszió nélkül. Esettanulmány a magyar stabilizációról = Adjustment without recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization

1995. március 12-én a magyar kormány és a központi bank szigorú kiigazítási és stabilizációs programot hirdetett meg. A cikk az első eredmények számbavételére tesz kísérletet. A program meghirdetése előtt Magyarország két egymást követő év- ben hatalmas fizetésimérleg-hiányt mutatott fel, és nemzetközi megítélése romlani kezdett. A program radikális intézkedései nyomán elkerülhetővé vált a mexikói vál- sághoz hasonló pénzügyi katasztrófa. Sok makrogazdasági mutató jól érzékelhető javulást jelez: lényegesen csökkent a kereskedelmi mérleg és a folyó fizetési mérleg hiánya, a költségvetés elsődleges egyenlege pozitív lett. Az ilyesféle stabilizációs programokat rendszerint súlyos visszaesés és a munkanélküliség nagy növekedése kíséri. Magyarország elkerülte ezeket a mellékhatásokat: a GDP drasztikus vissza- esés helyett valamelyest tovább növekedett, és a munkanélküliség változatlan ma- radt. A javulásnak nagy ára volt: az életszínvonal erőteljes csökkenése, az infláció felgyorsulása, bár a magyarországi infláció még mindig a kézben tartott, mérsékelt infláció sávjában maradt. A cikk ismerteti a program heterodox módszereit: 1. nagy leértékelés, az előre meghirdetett csúszó árfolyam rezsimjének bevezetése, valamint ideiglenes import- vámpótlék kivetése; 2. határozott jövedelempolitika, amely 12 százalékos reálbércsök- kenést kényszerített ki; 3. fiskális intézkedések, köztük jóléti jogosultságok csök- kentése (a program meghirdetése előtt ezek a jogosultságok tabuk voltak); 4. a hitel- kínálat átcsoportosítása a vállalati szektor javára, a jövedelmezőség növekedése; 5. feszített (bár nem mértéktelenül feszített) monetáris politika, amely lehetővé tette a sikeres vállalatok expanzióját; 6. a privatizáció felgyorsítása, nagy és sikeres lépé- sek egyes kulcsszektorok (energia, telekommunikáció) privatizációjában. Végezetül a tanulmány óva int a túlzott magabiztosságtól és felhívja a figyelmet a potenciális veszélyekre. A makrogazdasági javulás még törékeny. A magyar fejlődés legbiztatóbb sajátossága a termelékenység erőteljes és folyamatos növekedése. / === / On March 12, 1995 Hungary s government and central bank announced a tough program of adjustment and stabilization. This study is an attempt to asses the first results. Before the announcement of the program Hungary had a huge current account deficit for two consecutive years, and her international reputation started to decline. The program s radical measures made it possible to avoid a Mexico-style financial catastrophe. Many macroeconomic indicators show tangible improvement: the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account have been reduced significantly, the primary budget shifted to surplus. These kinds of adjustment programs are usually associated with deep recession and a large increase of unemployment. Hungary avoided these adverse side-effects: GDP instead of a drastic decline, continued to grow somewhat, and unemployment remained unchanged. There was a high price for the improvement: a sharp decline in the standard of living, and an acceleration of inflation, although Hungary is still in the range of controlled, moderate inflation. The paper describes the heterodox instruments of the program: (1) large devaluation, followed by a new exchange rate regime of pre-announced crawling peg, and a temporary import surcharge, (2) energetic income policy, enforcing a 12% cut in real wages; (3) fiscal measures, including cuts in welfare entitlements. That happened for the first time: before the program entitlements had been regarded as taboo ; (4) reallocation of credit supply in favor of the enterprise sector; increase of profitability; (5) tight (but not excessively tight) monetary policy, allowing the expansion of successful private busi- ness; (6) acceleration of privatisation, including large and successful steps in the privatisation of some key sectors (energy, telecommunication). Finally the paper warns against excessive self- confidence and draws the attention to potential dangers. The macroeconomic improvement is still fragile. The most reassuring feature of Hungary s development is the impressive and persistent improvement of productivity.