Credit Union Division Activities, January 2003, Issue 5

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division

Credit Union Division Activities, April 2003, Issue 6

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division

Credit Union Division Activities, July 2003, Issue 7

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division

Credit Union Division Activities, Septmeber 2003, Issue 8

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division

Credit Union Division Activities, December 2003, Issue 9

Newsletter for Iowa Credit Union Division

Information provision and information needs in adult survivors of childhood cancer.

BACKGROUND: Knowledge about their past medical history is central for childhood cancer survivors to ensure informed decisions in their health management. Knowledge about information provision and information needs in this population is still scarce. We thus aimed to assess: (1) the information survivors reported to have received on disease, treatment, follow-up, and late effects; (2) their information needs in these four domains and the format in which they would like it provided; (3) the association with psychological distress and quality of life (QoL). PROCEDURE: As part of the Follow-up survey of the Swiss Childhood Cancer Survivor Study, we sent a questionnaire to all survivors (≥18 years) who previously participated to the baseline survey, were diagnosed with cancer after 1990 at an age of <16 years. RESULTS: Most survivors had received oral information only (on illness: oral: 82%, written: 38%, treatment: oral: 79%, written: 36%; follow-up: oral: 77%, written: 23%; late effects: oral: 68%, written: 14%). Most survivors who had not previously received any information rated it as important, especially information on late effects (71%). A large proportion of survivors reported current information needs and would like to receive personalized information especially on late effects (44%). Survivors with higher information needs reported higher psychological distress and lower QoL. CONCLUSIONS: Survivors want to be more informed especially on possible late effects, and want to receive personalized information. Improving information provision, both qualitatively and quantitatively, will allow survivors to have better control of their health and to become better decision makers.

Department of Commerce Iowa Credit Union Division Performance Report, FY 2004

Agency Performance Report from the Credit Union Division

Department of Commerce Iowa Credit Union Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report from the Credit Union Division

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

Provision of health care actions and services for the management of HIV/AIDS from the users’ perspective

Objective To analyse the provision of health care actions and services for people living with AIDS and receiving specialised care in Ribeirão Preto, SP. Method A descriptive, exploratory, survey-type study that consisted of interviews with structured questionnaires and data analysis using descriptive statistics. Results The provision of health care actions and services is perceived as fair. For the 301 subjects, routine care provided by the reference team, laboratory tests and the availability of antiretroviral drugs, vaccines and condoms obtained satisfactory evaluations. The provision of tests for the prevention and diagnosis of comorbidities was assessed as fair, whereas the provisions of specialised care by other professionals, psychosocial support groups and medicines for the prevention of antiretroviral side effects were assessed as unsatisfactory. Conclusion Shortcomings were observed in follow-up and care management along with a predominantly biological, doctor-centred focus in which clinical control and access to antiretroviral therapy comprise the essential focus of the care provided.


Iowa Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan