138 resultados para countering extremism
Resumo:
Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.
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In May 2014, around one in four Europeans voted for protest parties and anti-establishment candidates in the first pan-European poll since the euro crisis began. The rise of populism across Europe has brought more extremism of various kinds into the European Parliament. It could change the balance of power between the institutions, and be detrimental to EU policies, legislation and funding that nurture open societies. This chapter will consider the impact of xenophobic populist parties, who have also become increasingly anti-EU, not considering here the extreme left Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who entered the Parliament.
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The relations of the European Union (EU) with Africa are increasingly spreading beyond the domain of humanitarian and development cooperation. The continent’s growing potential is producing vast webs of interlinkages in the realms of energy and commerce, among others. At the same time, such interdependencies bring with them increased vulnerabilities to insecurity on the continent. Nigeria exemplifies such a dilemma. The country has just taken the top spot as Africa’s largest economy. Of late, however, violent Islamic extremism ravages the north of the country, threatening the stability of one of Europe’s foremost energy suppliers and a growing trade partner. Thus, this paper sets out to uncover the EU’s response to such a crisis, as well as examining the factors lying behind this response. While the study argues that the issue is potentially ‘Europeaniz-able’ from a member state perspective, deep engagement is seen to be held back by the absence of an effective entry point for securitization with this important ally, as well as the intractability of the EU’s purported multi-functional approach to the idiosyncrasies of the conflict in question, in which not only transnational terrorist groups, but also the central government are centrally implicated in deepening insecurity.
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The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process.
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The contradictory interests of the EU and Azerbaijan have brought negotiations on their contractual relations to a halt. The EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources has weakened the normative dimension of its policy towards Azerbaijan, rendering it incapable of countering rejection of democratic reform by Azerbaijan’s authorities. While the EU’s current approach seems to favour a more pragmatic focus on energy cooperation, this policy brief argues that a combination of normative obligations and pragmatic interests is required − implemented through leverage over Azerbaijan and a better coordination of this policy across the EU member states and institutions.
Resumo:
La présente thèse entend donner sens à un concept qui occupe une place centrale au sein de la pensée de Theodor W. Adorno mais qui, parce que notoirement difficile à définir, n’a pas reçu l’attention qu’il mérite : la mimêsis (Mimesis). Il s’agira, plus exactement, de comprendre la mimêsis comme un point nodal de la critique adornienne, qui nous permet de comprendre au nom et en vue de quoi elle se déploie. Car sous toutes ses acceptions – et nous verrons qu’elles sont fort variées – la mimêsis adornienne est toujours invoquée dans le but de contrecarrer les tendances hétéronomes (c’est-à-dire : déshumanisantes) propres aux sociétés capitalistes avancées. Surtout, elle est constamment présentée comme un correctif matérialiste au type de rationalité abstraite qui sous-tend ces sociétés. Cette tâche s’avère d’autant plus lourde que, malgré son important poids normatif, la mimêsis ne fait pas l’objet, chez Adorno, d’une théorisation explicite. Il nous faudra pallier cette indétermination, en identifiant d’abord les assises normatives les plus premières de la critique adornienne (0.0. Introduction : les fondements normatifs de la critique adornienne), pour ensuite rendre compte des fonctions particulières qu’occupe la mimêsis au sein de cette critique (1.0. Les fonctions critiques de la mimêsis adornienne). Ce travail de débroussaillage exégétique et interprétatif nous permettra de constater que la mimêsis adornienne recèle trois types de potentiels critiques distincts. D’abord, en ce qu’elle est présentée – dans les travaux des années 1930 et 1940 surtout – comme une impulsion psychosomatique à même de trahir, l’instant d’une brève résistance, la violence infligée à la nature intérieure et extérieure de l’homme par les forces réificatrices de la rationalité instrumentale (Instrumentelle Vernunft), la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un mimétisme (Mimikry) bioanthropologique dont la valeur est principalement expressive (2.O. Mimikry : le potentiel bioanthropologique de la mimêsis). Ensuite, lorsqu’elle sera pensée – à partir de la fin des années 50 surtout – comme une compétence proprement épistémique qui permet au sujet connaissant de rencontrer à nouveau puis de redéterminer les objets de son expérience, la mimêsis adornienne peut être comprise comme un correctif critique à la logique appropriative de la pensée identifiante (identifizierendes Denken) (3.O. Affinität et Entäusserung : le potentiel épistémique de la mimêsis). Enfin, dans la mesure où elle informe le modus operandi de l’oeuvre d’art d’avant-garde telle que défendue par Adorno dans la Théorie esthétique, et qui consiste à détourner, en les retournant contre elles-mêmes, les contraintes imposées par le monde totalement administré (total verwaltete Welt), la mimêsis peut être comprise comme une Methexis subversive, c’est-à-dire comme une stratégie séditieuse à même de conjurer l’hétéronomie sociale en l’anticipant et en l’incorporant (4.0. Methexis subversive : le potentiel stratégique de la mimêsis). Ainsi, tout en voulant rendre justice à la très grande polysémie du concept, nous aimerions démontrer que la mimêsis adornienne pointe constamment vers une forme ou une autre de résistance : comme expression, comme extériorisation ou comme subversion.
Resumo:
We consider blind signal detection in an asynchronous code-division multiple-access (CDMA) system employing short spreading sequences in the presence of unknown multipath fading. This approach is capable of countering the presence of multiple-access interference (MAI) in CDMA fading channels. The proposed blind multiuser detector is based on an independent component analysis (ICA) to mitigate both MAI and noise. This algorithm has been utilised in blind source separation (BSS) of unknown sources from their mixtures. It can also be used for estimating the basis vectors of BSS. The aim is to include an ICA algorithm within a wireless receiver in order to reduce the level of interference in wideband systems. This blind multiuser detector requires no training sequence compared with the conventional multiuser detection receiver. The proposed ICA blind multiuser detector is made robust with respect to knowledge of signature waveforms and the timing of the user of interest. Several experiments are performed in order to verify the validity of the proposed ICA algorithm.
Resumo:
Gibt es eine Traditionslinie extremistischer Poetiken in der deutschsprachigen Literatur? Uwe Schütte untersucht anhand literarischer Texte ab dem späten 18. Jahrhundert den Konnex zwischen historischen Phänomenen wie Revolution, Krieg oder Terrorismus und extremen biografischen Umständen wie Schizophrenie für die Herausbildung radikaler Schreibweisen. Die Spannbreite der behandelten Autoren reicht dabei von der Klassikertrias Kleist, Hölderlin und Büchner über Schriftsteller des 20. Jahrhunderts wie Ernst Jünger oder Hans Henny Jahnn bis zu den Gegenwartsautoren Ernst Herbeck und Rainald Goetz. The study investigates aesthetic representations of extremism in German-language literature from around 1800 to the present. Its aim is to examine the interplay between three different areas: historical circumstances, (auto)biographical issues, and literary texts. Discussed are texts by both major and marginal writers from various genres, ranging from classics such as Heinrich von Kleist or Friedrich Hölderlin to the marginalised poet Ernst Herbeck or the contemporary writer Rainald Goetz. Subjects and factors considered include extremist phenomena in modern history (such as revolutions, wars, terrorism) and extreme individual experiences (such as suicide or schizophrenia) on the aesthetic domain(s) with regard to the production of literary discourses that could be considered as extremist. These manifest themselves in the development of what can be viewed as ‘radical poetics’, decidedly innovative styles of writing and moral or political transgression in fiction. Being the first critical attempt to trace the history of radical discourses in German literature, the study explores the validity of creating an aesthetic category of 'literary extremism'.
Resumo:
The oharaoter of right-wing extremism in the Federal Republic has undergone extensive transformations in the seventies. As electoral support for the extreme Right declined, a whole range of new groupings emerged pursuing a militant extra-parliamentary strategy. Essential charaoteristics are an increasing tendency to use violence and a close ideological affinity to the NSDAP. They attract a growing number of young people. The increasing susceptibility of young people to rightist ideologies coincides with an economic recession of which young people especially are the victims. Widespread ignorance about Nazism and the prevalence of anti-democratic political attitudes constitute important contributary factors and point to a considerable potential for right-extremism in the Federal Republic., This potential can be attributed. to the negative effects of much of the material dealing with the NS past, to serious deficiencies in the area of historical-political education in schools and, above all, to the absence of any :real process of "coming to terms with the past" in the postwar period. Neo-Nazism is not completely isolated from other trends in West German society. Rightist elements within the established party system and broad sections of the population hold similar views and attitudes. This similarity, linked with an over-exaggerated concern with a perceived threat from the extreme Left may explain the absence of any concerted effort to deal with nee-Nazi tendencies. The response of the courts exemplifies a widespread tendency to under-estimate the significance of the extreme Right. Opposition to the Right is restricted primarily to those circles which suffered most under the Nazi regime. The analysis suggests that one must reject the simplistic view that at the present time the Right does not constitute a serious threat to West German democracy. The study evaluates the wide range of views to be found in secondary sources on the subject of neo-Nazism and is :intended, to contribute to the ongoing discussion conceming the potential for right-extremism in West Germany.
Resumo:
Following the end of the Cold War and the ensuing changes to the international landscape, thinking about security has tended to become more discursive and interpretative in nature. What counts as security has increasingly derived from security discourses (that is, 'securitisation') and uncertainty about the multi-faceted future facing various countries and regions. Within this post-Cold War discourse, the Western Mediterranean has emerged as a region fraught with latent and manifest threats in the economic, political, societal and military sectors. Improved access to EU markets for Maghrebi exports; the security of energy supplies to the EU from Algeria and Libya; lack of democracy and the advance of political Islam; the flow of northward migration and worries about law and order in France, Italy and Spain; the growth in military expenditure and weapons proliferation in the Maghreb; all have been central to the securitisation agenda. However, this agenda has often lacked credibility especially when inter-linkages have purportedly been established between economic underdevelopment and political instability, between the advance of political Islam and the threat to energy supplies, or between immigration and the threat to national identity. Such inter-sectoral linkages distract from the credibility of those 'securitisation instances' which correspond to reality; the former linkages have often been exploited by extremist politicians in south-west European countries as well as by regimes in the Maghreb to advance their respective interests. Thus, securitisation may defeat its main purpose; it may generate responses out of keeping with the aims proclaimed at the outset, aims centred on the countering of real threats and the ensuring of greater stability.
Resumo:
Climate change has been a security issue for mankind since Homo sapiens first emerged on the planet, driving him to find new and better food, water, shelter, and basic resources for survival and the advancement of civilization. Only recently, however, has the rate of climate change coupled with man’s knowledge of his own role in that change accelerated, perhaps profoundly, changing the security paradigm. If we take a ―decades‖ look at the security issue, we see competition for natural resources giving way to Cold War ideological containment and deterrence, itself giving way to non-state terrorism and extremism. While we continue to defend against these threats, we are faced with even greater security challenges that inextricably tie economic, food and human security together and where the flash points may not provide clearly discernable causes, as they will be intrinsically tied to climate change. Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest development gains that can be realized by some regions could be reversed by climate change. This means that climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental disaster that is unfolding. As such, addressing climate change has become central to the development and poverty reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions. In Latin America, poorer countries and communities, such as those found in Central America, will suffer the hardest because of weaker resilience and greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors such as agriculture. The US should attempt to deliver capability to assist these states to deal with the effects of climate change.
Resumo:
Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.
Resumo:
The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.
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This thesis studies the economic return for fluent-bilingualism in South Florida among native-born whites using IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series) data for Miami-Dade County (1990). Previous mainstream-oriented theories focus on the benefit in English acquisition for immigrants and their descendants, either denying or ignoring the possible benefit of minority language retention in addition to English acquisition. An alternative literature, on the other hand, suggests that minority language retention can be beneficial in at least three areas: 1) enhancing cognitive ability; 2) accessing community-level social capital; and 3) serving as human capital. This study assesses economic returns in employment and earnings, using logistic and OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression respectively. The results, countering the mainstream-oriented theories, suggest that fluent bilingualism does have economic consequences. Rather than fully supporting the positive effects thesis, the patterns shown are much more complicated, contingent on an individual's ethnic membership and educational level. Theoretical and substantive implications are discussed and suggestions for future research are made.
Resumo:
At the crux of health disparities for women of color lies a history of maltreatment based on racial difference from their white counterparts. It is their non-whiteness that limits their access to the ideologies of “woman” and “femininity” within dominant culture. As the result of this difference, the impact of the birth control movement varied among women based on race. This project explores how the ideology attributed to the black female body limited black women’s access to “womanhood” within dominant culture, and analyzes the manners in which their reproductive autonomy was compromised as the result of changes to that ideology through time. This project operates under the hypothesis that black women’s access to certain aspects of femininity such as domesticity and motherhood reflected their roles in slave society, that black women’s reproductive value was based on the value of black children within slave culture, and that both of these factors dictated the manner in which their reproductive autonomy was managed by health professionals. Black people’s worth as a free labor force within dominant culture diminished when the Reconstruction Amendments were added to the constitution and slavery was deemed unconstitutional—resulting in the paradigmatic shift from the promotion of black fertility to its recession. America’s transition to the medicosocial regulation of black fertility through Eugenics, the role of the black elite in the movement, and the negative impact of this agenda on the reproductive autonomy of black women from low socioeconomic backgrounds are enlisted as support. The paper goes on to draw connections between post-slavery ideology of black femininity and modern-day medicosocial occurrences within clinical settings in order to advocate for increased bias training for medical professionals as a means of combating current health disparities. It concludes with the possibility that this improvement in medical training could persuade people of color to seek out medical intervention at earlier stages of illness and obtain regular check-ups by actively countering physicians’ past transgressions against them.