A contract-based system for aerospace aftercare

The logistics of the aerospace aftermarket raises a number of very interesting challenges from the perspective of electronic contracting. This is a highly dynamic domain, where contracts are established between airlines and engine manufacturers, as well as between engine manufacturers all the way down the supply lines, providing a particularly illustrative showcase for the technologies developed in the CONTRACT project. In this paper, we describe such a domain, as well as our modelling of it as a multiagent simulator where the CONTRACT framework has been used to monitor for compliance with norms.

Monitoring and Explanation of Contract Execution: A Case Study in the Aerospace Domain

In the domain of aerospace aftermarkets, which often has long supply chains that feed into the maintenance of aircraft, contracts are used to establish agreements between aircraft operators and maintenance suppliers. However, violations at the bottom of the supply chain (part suppliers) can easily cascade to the top (aircraft operators), making it difficult to determine the source of the violation, and seek to address it. In this context, we have developed a global monitoring architecture that ensures the detection of norm violations and generates explanations for the origin of violations. In this paper, we describe the implementation and deployment of a global monitor in the aerospace domain of [8] and show how it generates explanations for violations within the maintenance supply chain. We show how these explanations can be used not only to detect violations at runtime, but also to uncover potential problems in contracts before their deployment, thus improving them.

Case studies for contract-based systems

Of the ways in which agent behaviour can be regulated in a multiagent system, electronic contracting – based on explicit representation of different parties' responsibilities, and the agreement of all parties to them – has significant potential for modern industrial applications. Based on this assumption, the CONTRACT project aims to develop and apply electronic contracting and contract-based monitoring and verification techniques in real world applications. This paper presents results from the initial phase of the project, which focused on requirements solicitation and analysis. Specifically, we survey four use cases from diverse industrial applications, examine how they can benefit from an agent-based electronic contracting infrastructure and outline the technical requirements that would be placed on such an infrastructure. We present the designed CONTRACT architecture and describe how it may fulfil these requirements. In addition to motivating our work on the contract-based infrastructure, the paper aims to provide a much needed community resource in terms of use case themselves and to provide a clear commercial context for the development of work on contract-based system.

Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

Trust-based trade

There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.

Optimal Contract Pricing of Distributed Generation in Distribution Networks

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Location and contract pricing of distributed generation using a genetic algorithm

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Optimal contract pricing of distributed generation under a competitive framework

A bilevel programming approach for the optimal contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) in distribution networks is presented. The outer optimization problem corresponds to the owner of the DG who must decide the contract price that would maximize his profits. The inner optimization problem corresponds to the distribution company (DisCo), which procures the minimization of the payments incurred in attending the expected demand while satisfying network constraints. The meet the expected demand the DisCo can purchase energy either form the transmission network through the substations or form the DG units within its network. The inner optimization problem is substituted by its Karush- Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, turning the bilevel programming problem into an equivalent single-level nonlinear programming problem which is solved using commercially available software. © 2010 IEEE.

Bilevel approach for optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation in radial distribution systems using mixed-integer linear programming

In this study, a novel approach for the optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) is presented. Such an approach is designed for a market environment in which the distribution company (DisCo) can buy energy either from the wholesale energy market or from the DG units within its network. The location and contract pricing of DG is determined by the interaction between the DisCo and the owner of the distributed generators. The DisCo intends to minimise the payments incurred in meeting the expected demand, whereas the owner of the DG intends to maximise the profits obtained from the energy sold to the DisCo. This two-agent relationship is modelled in a bilevel scheme. The upper-level optimisation is for determining the allocation and contract prices of the DG units, whereas the lower-level optimisation is for modelling the reaction of the DisCo. The bilevel programming problem is turned into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear optimisation problem using duality properties, which is then solved using commercially available software. Results show the robustness and efficiency of the proposed model compared with other existing models. As regards to contract pricing, the proposed approach allowed to find better solutions than those reported in previous works. © The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2013.

Lei natural e lei civil em J-J Rousseau

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Simon Chesterman, One Nation Under Surveillance – A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty

Oxford University Press 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-958037-8