Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Adaptation of the international investment contract: the hardship clause

Este trabalho acadêmico explora, em linhas gerais, a questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional, e o tema ‘cláusula de hardship’ em específico. Objetiva-se efetuar uma análise detalhada da cláusula de hardship, como meio de adaptação e flexibilização de contratos internacionais de investimento sob a ótica da prática jurídica e mercantil contemporânea. A discussão se centra no contraste entre a possibilidade de adaptação do contrato por circunstâncias imprevisíveis e o imperativo de previsibilidade no investimento. Nesse sentido, o estudo busca oferecer soluções práticas para o dilema existente entre a necessidade de segurança na relação econômica (cumprimento do contato) e a prevenção da possibilidade de ruína financeira para quaisquer das partes no caso de uma mudança brusca no contexto dos negócios. O trabalho está centrado em uma investigação teórica acerca dos temas de readaptação contratual; diferenças entre sistemas jurídicos de estados-nações, e suas consequências no comércio internacional; e a cláusula de hardship em si. Como forma de contribuir para uma compreensão prática na questão da adaptação do contrato de investimento internacional devido a fatores imprevistos, este trabalho analisa casos reais e tendências atuais observadas na arbitragem internacional.

Optimal Contract Pricing of Distributed Generation in Distribution Networks

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Location and contract pricing of distributed generation using a genetic algorithm

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Optimal contract pricing of distributed generation under a competitive framework

A bilevel programming approach for the optimal contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) in distribution networks is presented. The outer optimization problem corresponds to the owner of the DG who must decide the contract price that would maximize his profits. The inner optimization problem corresponds to the distribution company (DisCo), which procures the minimization of the payments incurred in attending the expected demand while satisfying network constraints. The meet the expected demand the DisCo can purchase energy either form the transmission network through the substations or form the DG units within its network. The inner optimization problem is substituted by its Karush- Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, turning the bilevel programming problem into an equivalent single-level nonlinear programming problem which is solved using commercially available software. © 2010 IEEE.

Bilevel approach for optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation in radial distribution systems using mixed-integer linear programming

In this study, a novel approach for the optimal location and contract pricing of distributed generation (DG) is presented. Such an approach is designed for a market environment in which the distribution company (DisCo) can buy energy either from the wholesale energy market or from the DG units within its network. The location and contract pricing of DG is determined by the interaction between the DisCo and the owner of the distributed generators. The DisCo intends to minimise the payments incurred in meeting the expected demand, whereas the owner of the DG intends to maximise the profits obtained from the energy sold to the DisCo. This two-agent relationship is modelled in a bilevel scheme. The upper-level optimisation is for determining the allocation and contract prices of the DG units, whereas the lower-level optimisation is for modelling the reaction of the DisCo. The bilevel programming problem is turned into an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear optimisation problem using duality properties, which is then solved using commercially available software. Results show the robustness and efficiency of the proposed model compared with other existing models. As regards to contract pricing, the proposed approach allowed to find better solutions than those reported in previous works. © The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2013.

Simon Chesterman, One Nation Under Surveillance – A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty

Oxford University Press 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-958037-8

The Jewish marriage contract : a study in the status of the woman in Jewish law

by Louis M. Epstein