Competition and fixation of cohorts of adaptive mutations under Fisher geometrical model

One of the simplest models of adaptation to a new environment is Fisher's Geometric Model (FGM), in which populations move on a multidimensional landscape defined by the traits under selection. The predictions of this model have been found to be consistent with current observations of patterns of fitness increase in experimentally evolved populations. Recent studies investigated the dynamics of allele frequency change along adaptation of microbes to simple laboratory conditions and unveiled a dramatic pattern of competition between cohorts of mutations, i.e., multiple mutations simultaneously segregating and ultimately reaching fixation. Here, using simulations, we study the dynamics of phenotypic and genetic change as asexual populations under clonal interference climb a Fisherian landscape, and ask about the conditions under which FGM can display the simultaneous increase and fixation of multiple mutations-mutation cohorts-along the adaptive walk. We find that FGM under clonal interference, and with varying levels of pleiotropy, can reproduce the experimentally observed competition between different cohorts of mutations, some of which have a high probability of fixation along the adaptive walk. Overall, our results show that the surprising dynamics of mutation cohorts recently observed during experimental adaptation of microbial populations can be expected under one of the oldest and simplest theoretical models of adaptation-FGM.

A textbook of botany for colleges and universities, by ... John Merle Coulter ... Charles Reid Barnes ... Henry Chandler Cowles ...

2

Vertical competition and multi-period interaction : a theoretical and behavioral analysis on the impact of strategic inventories in supply chain management

Otto-von-Guericke-Universtität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

Effects of intraspecific competition and food deprivation on the immature phase of Ascia monuste orseis (Lepidoptera, Pieridae)

The effect of intraspecific competition for food on larvae and of food deprivation for 24 h on 2nd and 4th instars of Ascia monuste orseis (Godart, 1819) was investigated. Intraspecific competition for food during the immature phase leads to long pupation time, high larval mortality, reduced adult weight, and reduced number of eggs per female. In food deprivation experiments, the major differences in A. monuste orseis performance were long pupation time in the group that was deprived during the 2nd instar; and a negative effect on reproduction in the group that was deprived during the 4th instar, with reduced adult weight. Both food deprived periods tested are critical, and deprivation during the 2nd instar seems to have an effect as drastic as during the 4th instar because it directly affects larvae survival. Immatures can resist food deprivation for 24 h during the 2nd and 4th instars (low mortality), have a compensatory behaviour (high ingestion and biomass gain) during the 5th instar, and do not demonstrate cannibalistic behaviour during food deprivation.

Competition and well-being

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that competition has a strong negative impact on social well-being, the disposition towards others, and individually experienced well-being, the emotional state, of those on the long side of the market. We conjecture that this limits the possibilities of satisfactory interaction in the future and, hence, has negative implications for efficiency in the longer-run

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.

Technical progress and product reliability under competition and monopoly

Technical progress lowers costs and prices but appears to have an ambiguous effect on product reliabilty. This paper presents a simple model which explains this observation.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Trade liberalization, competition and growth

Increasing evidence support the claim that international trade enhances innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Under Cournot competition, trade is pro-competitive. Since firms undertake cost reducing innovations, the increase in production induced by a more competitive market push firms to innovate more. Consequently, a reduction on trade barriers enhances growth by reducing domestic firm's market power.