Public Administration, Science and Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis

The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak in the United Kingdom is regarded as one of the worst public policy crises the British government has experienced during the postwar era. In material terms, it has led to the slaughter of 3.3 million cattle and estimated economic losses of £3.7 billion. In administrative terms, the crisis brought about the dissolution of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. This article examines the istitutional context in which decisions about the scientific evidence on BSE were made. The authors argue that a centralized system in which government agencies control science for government is inherently vulnerable to alliances of experts and interest groups that undermine the credible assessment of public health and safety risks. Specific societal conditions may encourage risk-opportunistic behavior among policy makers that is conducive to delays and inaction until such time as the evidence of a health risk becomes overwhelming.

Assessing the determinants of public confidence in the police: A case study of a post-conflict community in Northern Ireland

Drawing upon original survey research this article seeks to identify the generative processes that influence perceptions of the police in the context of an inner-city neighbourhood in Northern Ireland that has been affected by increases in crime and disorder in the aftermath of the peace process. Conceptually we draw upon recent research from England and Wales that outlines confidence in the police in terms of instrumental and expressive dimensions. We apply this framework and consider whether it provides a useful template for understanding the post-conflict dynamics of police-community relations in our study area. Contrary to much received wisdom our analysis suggests that instrumental concerns about crime and illegal activity are a more influential predictor of attitudes to the police than expressive concerns with disorder and anti-social behaviour. Consequently our discussion points to the variance in local and national survey data and questions the degree to which the latter can usefully inform our understanding of trends and developments in discrete micro-spaces. Our conclusion outlines the potential policy implications for state policing practice in deprived urban spaces.

Justice as Improvisation:The Law of the Extempore

Justice as Improvisation: The Law of the Extempore theorises the relationship between justice and improvisation through the case of the New York City cabaret laws. Discourses around improvisation often imprison it in a quasi-ethical relationship with the authentic, singular ‘other’. The same can be said of justice. This book interrogates this relationship by highlighting the parallels between the aporetic conception of justice advanced by the late French philosopher Jacques Derrida and the nuanced approach to improvisation pursued by musicians and theorists alike in the new and emerging interdisciplinary field of Critical Studies in Improvisation (CSI). Justice as Improvisation re-imagines justice as a species of improvisation through the formal structure of the most basic of legal mechanisms, judicial decision-making, offering law and legal theory a richer, more concrete, understanding of justice. Not further mystery or mystique, but a negotiation between abstract notions of justice and the everyday practice of judging. Improvisation in judgment calls for ongoing, practical decision-making as the constant negotiation between the freedom of the judge to take account of the otherness or singularity of the case and the existing laws or rules that both allow for and constrain that freedom. Yes, it is necessary to judge, yes, it is necessary to decide, but to judge well, to decide justly, that is a music lesson perhaps best taught by critical improvisation scholars.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

Institutional Hybridity in Public Sector Reform: Replacement, Blending, or Layering of Administrative Paradigms

Despite an abundance of studies on hybridization and hybrid forms of organizing, scholarly work has failed to distinguish consistently between specific types of hybridity. As a consequence, the analytical category has become blurred and lacks conceptual clarity. Our paper discusses hybridity as the simultaneous appearance of institutional logics in organizational contexts, and differentiates the parallel co-existence of logics from transitional combinations (eventually leading to the replacement of a logic) and more robust combinations in the form of layering and blending. While blending refers to hybridity as an ‘amalgamate’ with original components that are no longer discernible, the notion of layering conceptualizes hybridity in a way that the various elements, or clusters thereof, are added on top of, or alongside, each other, similar to sediment layers in geology. We illustrate and substantiate such conceptual differentiation with an empirical study of the dynamics of public sector reform. In more detail, we examine the parliamentary discourse around two major reforms of the Austrian Federal Budget Law in 1986 and in 2007/2009 in order to trace administrative (reform) paradigms. Each of the three identified paradigms manifests a specific field-level logic with implications for the state and its administration: bureaucracy in Weberian-style Public Administration, market-capitalism in New Public Management, and democracy in New Public Governance. We find no indication of a parallel co-existence or transitional combination of logics, but hybridity in the form of robust combinations. We explore how new ideas fundamentally build on – and are made resonant with – the central bureaucratic logic in a way that suggests layering rather than blending. The conceptual findings presented in our article have implications for the literature on institutional analysis and institutional hybridity.

A case study of the Ottawa Valley whitewater rafting industry : standards and risks

This qualitative case study identifies and discusses the standards and risk management practices of the Ottawa Valley whitewater rafting industry and the impacts of the government enforced Special-purpose Vessels Regulations are discussed. Data collection occurred using a single case study design, which included interviews and document analysis. This study found that internal, industry, and actual standards are influenced through a variety of sources. These standards were found to affect the risk management practices of commercial whitewater rafting providers. In general, these standards promoted a high level of risk management within the Ottawa Valley rafting industry. The Special-purpose Vessels Regulations were found to be non-influential in raising the risk management standards of the Ottawa Valley whitewater rafting industry.

Responsiveness to change by standard-form contract drafters: A case study of the FIDIC White Book

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to focus on the Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) White Book standard form of building contract. It tracks the changes to this contract over its four editions, and seeks to identify their underlying causes. Design/methodology/approach – The changes made to the White Book are quantified using a specific type of quantitative content analysis. The amended clauses are then examined to understand the nature of the changes made. Findings – The length of the contract increased by 34 per cent between 1990 and 2006. A large proportion of the overall increase can be attributed to the clauses dealing with “conflict of interest/corruption” and “dispute resolution”. In both instances, the FIDIC drafting committees have responded to international developments to discourage corruption, and to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution. Between 1998 and 2006, the average length of the sentences increased slightly, raising the question of whether long sentences are easily understood by users of contracts. Research limitations/implications – Quantification of text appears to be particularly useful for the analysis of documents which are regularly updated because changes can be clearly identified and the length of sentences can be determined, leading to conclusions about the readability of the text. However, caution is needed because changes of great relevance can be made to contract clauses without actually affecting their length. Practical implications – The paper will be instructive for contract drafters and informative for users of FIDIC's White Book. Originality/value – Quantifying text has been rarely used regarding standard-form contracts in the field of construction.

A Case Study of an Agency's Three Family Preservation Contracts

This article presents a case study of a nonprofit child welfare agency that delivered family preservation services under three different purchase-of-service (POS) contracts. The research specifically focuses on how certain POS contract provisions and reimbursement rates influence the delivery of family preservation services. The three contacts examined differed on criteria, such as reimbursement mechanism, service volume, definition of clientele, and reimbursement rate. The study found that as reimbursement rates decline and as administrative costs increase, the service provider struggled with cash flow, staffing, fundraising, and service provision, among other things. It is concluded that contract-related resources, policies, and procedures impact provider agencies in multiple, significant ways that are critical to the provision of services and the accomplishment of positive client outcomes.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

With or without you...judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Research Papers in Law, 3/2007

From the Introduction. The study of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law of the regarding the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) is fascinating in many ways.1 First, almost the totality of the relevant case law is extremely recent, thereby marking the first ‘foundational’ steps in this field of law. This is the result of the fact that the AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999.2 Second, as the AFSJ is a new field of EU competence, it sets afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its member states, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) measure of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions beg for answers which should take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.3 Third, and as a consequence of the above, the vast majority of the ECJ’s judgments relating to the AFSJ are a) delivered by the Full Court or, at least, the Grand Chamber, b) with the intervention of great many member states and c) often obscure in content. This is due to the fact that the Court is called upon to set the foundational rules in a new field of EU law, often trying to accommodate divergent considerations, not all of which are strictly legal.4 Fourth, the case law of the Court relating to the AFSJ, touches upon a vast variety of topics which are not necessarily related to one another. This is why it is essential to limit the scope of this study. The content of, and steering for, the AFSJ were given by the Tampere European Council, in October 1999. According to the Tampere Conclusions, the AFSJ should consist of four key elements: a) a common immigration and asylum policy, b) judicial cooperation in both civil and penal matters, c) action against criminality and d) external action of the EU in all the above fields. Moreover, the AFSJ is to a large extent based on the Schengen acquis. The latter has been ‘communautarised’5 by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further ‘ventilated’ between the first and third pillars by decisions 1999/435 and 1999/436.6 Judicial cooperation in civil matters, mainly by means of international conventions (such as the Rome Convention of 1981 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) and regulations (such as (EC) 44/20017 and (EC) 1348/20008) also form part of the AFSJ. However, the relevant case law of the ECJ will not be examined in the present contribution.9 Similarly, the judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 226 EC proceedings against member states, will be omitted.10 Even after setting aside the above case law and notwithstanding the fact that the AFSJ only dates as far back as May 1999, the judgments of the ECJ are numerous. A simple (if not simplistic) categorisation may be between, on the one hand, judgments which concern the institutional setting of the AFSJ (para. 2) and, on the other, judgments which are related to some substantive AFSJ policy (para. 3).

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.