Paràmetres i indicadors de qualitat en l'avaluació d'una revista electrònica. El cas de BiD: textos universitaris de biblioteconomia i documentació

L'objectiu de l'article és l'establiment d'un conjunt de paràmetres i indicadors que permetin l'avaluació de revistes electròniques accessibles via web. La metodologia emprada consisteix a analitzar els paràmetres i indicadors genèrics descrits per Lluís Codina i concretar-los, a partir d'exemples, perquè puguin ser aplicats en un recurs web específic: una revista electrònica. Una vegada definits els indicadors específics, es procedirà a avaluar la revista BiD, de la Facultat de Biblioteconomia i Documentació de la Universitat de Barcelona, amb la finalitat de comprovar-ne la funcionalitat. Del resultat de l'estudi, es destaquen els punts febles que presenta actualment la revista i s'estableix un conjunt de propostes destinades a millorar-los.

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 11, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 14, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, April 15, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, May 17, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

List of Bid Proposal Holders, June 21, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, July 19, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

Prices of medicines: a case-study on the impact of the rate-of-return regulation in the United Kingdom

This work carries out an empirical evaluation of the impact of the main mechanism for regulating the prices of medicines in the UK on a variety ofpharmaceutical price indices. The empirical evidence shows that the overall impact of the rate of return cap appears to have been slight or even null, and in any case that the impact would differ across therapeutic areas. These empiricalfindings suggest that the price regulation has managed to encourage UK-based firms¿ diversification in many therapeutic areas

List of Bid Proposal Holders, August 16, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, September 20, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, October 5, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, October 18, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, November 9, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders

List of Bid Proposal Holders, November 15, 2011

List of Bid Proposal Holders