Crystallization and preliminary X-ray analysis of SIII-SPIII, a ahospholipase A2 isolated from the venom of Bothrops jararacussu

Large single crystals have been obtained of SIII-SPIII, a phospholipase A2 from the venom of Bothrops jararacussu. The crystals belong to the orthorhombic system space group C222, and diffract X-rays to a resolution of 1.9 Å. Preliminary analysis reveals the presence of one molecule in the crystallographic asymmetric unit. The crystal structure is currently being determined using molecular replacement techniques.

Critical numbers of attractive Bose-Einstein condensed atoms in asymmetric traps

A quantitative analysis of the critical number of attractive Bose-Einstein condensed atoms in asymmetric traps was studied. The Gross-Pitaevskii (GP) formalism for an atomic system with arbitrary nonspherically symmetric harmonic trap was also discussed. Characteristic limits were obtained for reductions from three to two and one dimensions from three to two and one dimensions, in perfect cylindrical symmetries as well as in deformed ones.

Crystallization and preliminary X-ray diffraction analysis of three myotoxic phospholipases A2 from Bothrops brazili venom

Two myotoxic and noncatalytic Lys49-phospholipases A2 (braziliantoxin-II and MT-II) and a myotoxic and catalytic phospholipase A2 (braziliantoxin-III) from the venom of the Amazonian snake Bothrops brazili were crystallized. The crystals diffracted to resolutions in the range 2.562.05 angstrom and belonged to space groups P3121 (braziliantoxin-II), P6522 (braziliantoxin-III) and P21 (MT-II). The structures were solved by molecular-replacement techniques. Both of the Lys49-phospholipases A2 (braziliantoxin-II and MT-II) contained a dimer in the asymmetric unit, while the Asp49-phospholipase A2 braziliantoxin-III contained a monomer in its asymmetric unit. Analysis of the quaternary assemblies of the braziliantoxin-II and MT-II structures using the PISA program indicated that both models have a dimeric conformation in solution. The same analysis of the braziliantoxin-III structure indicated that this protein does not dimerize in solution and probably acts as a monomer in vivo, similar to other snake-venom Asp49-phospholipases A2.

Diencephalic asymmetries: morphological, immunohistochemical and ultrastructural analysis of habenular nuclei in elasmobranchs and teleosts

The habenular nuclei are diencephalic structures present in Vertebrates and they form, with the associated fiber systems, a part of the system that connects the telencephalon to the ventral mesencephalon (Concha M. L. and Wilson S. W., 2001). In representative species of almost all classes of Vertebrates the habenular nuclei are asymmetric, both in terms of size and of neuronal and neurochemical organization, although different types of asymmetry follow different evolutionary courses. Previous studies have analyzed the spread and diversity of the asymmetry in species for which data are not clear (Kemali M. et al., 1980). Notwithstanding that, it’s still not totally understood the evolution of the phenomenon, and the ontogenetic mechanisms that have led to the habenular asymmetry development are not clear (Smeets W.J. et al., 1983). For the present study 14 species of Elasmobranchs and 15 species of Teleostean have been used. Brains removed from the animals have been fixed using 4% paraformaldehyde in phosphate buffer; brains have been analyzed with different tecniques, and I used histological, immunohistochemical and ultrastructural analysis to describe this asymmetry. My results confirm data previously obtained studying other Elasmobranchs species, in which the left habenula is larger than the right one; the Teleostean show some slightly differences regarding the size of the habenular ganglia, in some species, in which the left habenular nucleus is larger than the right. In the course of studies, a correlation between the habits of life and the diencephalic asymmetry seems to emerge: among the Teleostean analyzed, the species with benthic life (like Lepidorhombus boscii, Platichthys flesus, Solea vulgaris) seem to possess a slight asymmetry, analogous to the one of the Elasmobranchs, while in the other species (like Liza aurata, Anguilla anguilla, Trisopterus minutus) the habenulae are symmetrical. However, various aspects of the neuroanatomical asymmetries of the epithalamus have not been deepened in order to obtain a complete picture of the evolution of this phenomenon, and new searches are needed to examine the species without clear asymmetry, in order to understand the spread and the diversity of the asymmetry among the habenulae between the Vertebrates.

Asymmetric synthesis of benzylic and heterobenzylic amines

C2-Symmetrical, enantiopure 2,6-di[1-(1-aziridinyl)alkyl]pyridines (DIAZAPs) were prepared by a high-yielding, three-step sequence starting from 2,6-pyridinedicarbaldehyde and (S)-valinol or (S)-phenylglycinol. The new compounds were tested as ligands in palladium-catalyzed allylation of carbanions in different solvents. Almost quantitative yield and up to 99% enantiomeric excess were obtained in the reactions of the enolates derived from malonate, phenyl- and benzylmalonate dimethyl esters with 1,3-diphenyl-2-propenyl ethyl carbonate. Asymmetric synthesis of 2-(2-pyridyl)aziridines from chiral 2-pyridineimines bearing a stereogenic center at the nitrogen atom was development. The envisioned route involves the addition of chloromethyllithium to the imine derived from 2-pyridinealdehyde and (S)-valinol, protected as O-trimethylsilyl ether. The analogous reaction performed on the imine derived from (S)-valine methyl ester gave the product containing the aziridine ring as well as the α-chloro ketone group coming from the attack of chloromethyllithium to the ester function. Other stereogenic alkyl substituents at nitrogen gave less satisfactory results. Moreover, the aziridination protocol did not work on other aromatic imines, e.g. 3-pyridineimine and benzaldimine, which are not capable of bidentate chelation. The N-substituent could not be removed, but aziridine underwent ring-opening by attack of nitrogen, sulfur, and oxygen nucleophiles. Complete or prevalent regioselectivity was obtained using cerium trichloride heptahydrate as a catalyst. In some cases, the N-substituent could be removed by an oxidative protocol. The addition of organometallic (lithium, magnesium, zinc) reagents to 2-pyrroleimines derived from (S)-valinol and (S)-phenylglycinol gave the N-substituted-1-(2-pyrrolyl)alkylamines with high yields and diastereoselectivities. The (S,S)-diastereomers were useful intermediates for the preparation of enantiopure 1-[1-(2-pyrrolyl)alkyl]aziridines by routine cyclization of the β-aminoalcohol moiety and of (S)-N-benzoyl 1-[1-(2-pyrrolyl)alkyl]amines and their N-substituted derivatives by oxidative cleavage of the chiral auxiliary. 1-Allyl-2-pyrroleimines obtained from (S)-phenylglycinol and (S)-valinol underwent highly diastereoselective addition of allylmetal reagents, used in excess amounts, to give the corresponding secondary amines with concomitant allyl to 1-propenyl isomerisation of the 1-pyrrole substituent. Protection of the 2-aminoalcohol moiety as oxazolidinone, amide or Boc derivate followed by ring closing metathesis of the alkene groups gave the unsaturated bicyclic compound, whose hydrogenation afforded the indolizidine derivative as a mixture of separable diastereomers. The absolute configuration of the main diastereomer was assessed by X-ray crystallographic analysis.

Non linear response of planar asymmetric systems

The seismic behaviour of one-storey asymmetric structures has been studied since 1970s by a number of researches studies which identified the coupled nature of the translational-to-torsional response of those class of systems leading to severe displacement magnifications at the perimeter frames and therefore to significant increase of local peak seismic demand to the structural elements with respect to those of equivalent not-eccentric systems (Kan and Chopra 1987). These studies identified the fundamental parameters (such as the fundamental period TL normalized eccentricity e and the torsional-to-lateral frequency ratio Ωϑ) governing the torsional behavior of in-plan asymmetric structures and trends of behavior. It has been clearly recognized that asymmetric structures characterized by Ωϑ >1, referred to as torsionally-stiff systems, behave quite different form structures with Ωϑ <1, referred to as torsionally-flexible systems. Previous research works by some of the authors proposed a simple closed-form estimation of the maximum torsional response of one-storey elastic systems (Trombetti et al. 2005 and Palermo et al. 2010) leading to the so called “Alpha-method” for the evaluation of the displacement magnification factors at the corner sides. The present paper provides an upgrade of the “Alpha Method” removing the assumption of linear elastic response of the system. The main objective is to evaluate how the excursion of the structural elements in the inelastic field (due to the reaching of yield strength) affects the displacement demand of one-storey in-plan asymmetric structures. The system proposed by Chopra and Goel in 2007, which is claimed to be able to capture the main features of the non-linear response of in-plan asymmetric system, is used to perform a large parametric analysis varying all the fundamental parameters of the system, including the inelastic demand by varying the force reduction factor from 2 to 5. Magnification factors for different force reduction factor are proposed and comparisons with the results obtained from linear analysis are provided.

Synthesis of chiral ferrosalen ligands and their applications in asymmetric catalysis

A new series of chiral ferrosalen ligands was designed and synthesized. The special feature of the ferrosalen ligands is that the chirality originated from the planar chiral ferrocenyl structure. For most known salen ligands, chirality comes from central and axial chiral centers. The key building block for the construction of these ferrosalen ligands was synthesized stereoselectively by a chiral auxiliary approach. This approach does not consume any chiral material, and does not require chiral HPLC resolution. Using this method, nine ligands were prepared using ferrocene as the starting material. In addition, the steric hindrance was modulated by changing the cyclopentadienyl group to the more bulky pentamethylcyclopentadienyl- and pentaphenylcyclopentadienyl- groups. The structure of these ligands was established by 1H and 13C NMR. The structure of a ferrosalen-Cu (II) complex was determined by single crystal X-ray diffraction analysis. All the chiral ferrosalen ligands were tested in catalytic asymmetric reactions including enantioselective carbonyl-ene reaction, enantioselective Strecker-type reaction and enantioselective silylcyanation. For the carbonyl-ene reaction, up to 99% yield and 29% enantiomeric excess (ee) were obtained using ligand-Co (III) as the catalysts; For the Strecker-type reaction, a maximum of 20% ee was obtained using ligand-AlCl as the catalyst; For the silylcyanation reaction, up to 99% yield and 26% ee were obtained using ligand-AlCl as the catalyst.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

An Economic Analysis of Drawing Lines in the Sea

It is shown that low dispute costs relative to expected resource rents from oceanic resources favor drawn out disputes over maritime boundaries; asymmetric dispute costs favor agreement on boundaries wanted by the low dispute cost state party; and high symmetric dispute costs favor formation of joint development zones. The fact that most maritime boundaries have not yet been drawn suggests that state parties think that resource rents that can be drawn from the oceans are high relative to dispute costs. Moreover, the recent mini-trend towards JDZs in East Asia suggests that state parties in the area have recently reassessed dispute costs as being higher than previously believed.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence

Genetic analysis of Pitx2 in left -right asymmetry and cardiovascular development

Pitx2, a paired-related homeobox gene that is mutated in human Rieger Syndrome, plays a key role in transferring the early asymmetric signals to individual organs. Pitx2 encodes three isoforms, Pitx2a, Pitx2b and Pitx2c. I found that Pitx2c was the Pitx2 isoform for regulating left-right asymmetry in heart, lung and the predominant isoform in guts. Previous studies suggested that the generation of left-right asymmetry within individual organs is an all or none, random event. Phenotypic analysis of various Pitx2 allelic combinations, that encode graded levels of Pitx2c, reveals an organ-intrinsic mechanism for regulating left-right asymmetric morphogenesis based on differential response to Pitx2c levels. The heart needs low Pitx2c levels, while the lungs and duodenum require higher doses of Pitx2c. In addition, the duodenal rotation is under strict control of Pitx2c activity. Left-right asymmetry development for aortic arch arteries involves complex vascular remodeling. Left-sided expression of Pitx2c in these developing vessels implied its potential function in this process. In order to determine if Pitx2c also can regulate the left-right asymmetry of the aortic arch arteries, a Pitx2c-specific loss of function mutation is generated. Although in wild type mice, the direction of the aortic arch is always oriented toward the left side, the directions of the aortic arches in the mutants were randomized, showing that Pitx2c also determined the left-right asymmetry of these vessels. I have further showed that the cardiac neural crest wasn't involved in this vascular remodeling process. In addition, all mutant embryos had Double Outlet Right Ventricle (DORV), a common congenital heart disease. This study provided insight into the mechanism of Pitx2c-mediated late stages of left-right asymmetry development and identified the roles of Pitx2c in regulation of aortic arch remodeling and heart development. ^

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Application of the agency theory for the analysis of performance-based mechanisms in road management

El WCTR es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte, y aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper develops a model based on agency theory to analyze road management systems (under the different contract forms available today) that employ a mechanism of performance indicators to establish the payment of the agent. The base assumption is that of asymmetric information between the principal (Public Authorities) and the agent (contractor) and the risk aversion of this latter. It is assumed that the principal may only measure the agent?s performance indirectly and by means of certain performance indicators that may be verified by the authorities. In this model there is presumed to be a relation between the efforts made by the agent and the performance level measured by the corresponding indicators, though it is also considered that there may be dispersion between both variables that gives rise to a certain degree of randomness in the contract. An analysis of the optimal contract has been made on the basis of this model and in accordance with a series of parameters that characterize the economic environment and the particular conditions of road infrastructure. As a result of the analysis made, it is considered that an optimal contract should generally combine a fixed component and a payment in accordance with the performance level obtained. The higher the risk aversion of the agent and the greater the marginal cost of public funds, the lower the impact of this performance-based payment. By way of conclusion, the system of performance indicators should be as broad as possible but should not overweight those indicators that encompass greater randomness in their results.

Analysis of the role of the Spitzenkörper in fungal morphogenesis by computer simulation of apical branching in Aspergillus niger

High-resolution video microscopy, image analysis, and computer simulation were used to study the role of the Spitzenkörper (Spk) in apical branching of ramosa-1, a temperature-sensitive mutant of Aspergillus niger. A shift to the restrictive temperature led to a cytoplasmic contraction that destabilized the Spk, causing its disappearance. After a short transition period, new Spk appeared where the two incipient apical branches emerged. Changes in cell shape, growth rate, and Spk position were recorded and transferred to the fungus simulator program to test the hypothesis that the Spk functions as a vesicle supply center (VSC). The simulation faithfully duplicated the elongation of the main hypha and the two apical branches. Elongating hyphae exhibited the growth pattern described by the hyphoid equation. During the transition phase, when no Spk was visible, the growth pattern was nonhyphoid, with consecutive periods of isometric and asymmetric expansion; the apex became enlarged and blunt before the apical branches emerged. Video microscopy images suggested that the branch Spk were formed anew by gradual condensation of vesicle clouds. Simulation exercises where the VSC was split into two new VSCs failed to produce realistic shapes, thus supporting the notion that the branch Spk did not originate by division of the original Spk. The best computer simulation of apical branching morphogenesis included simulations of the ontogeny of branch Spk via condensation of vesicle clouds. This study supports the hypothesis that the Spk plays a major role in hyphal morphogenesis by operating as a VSC—i.e., by regulating the traffic of wall-building vesicles in the manner predicted by the hyphoid model.

Population regulation in snowshoe hare and Canadian lynx: Asymmetric food web configurations between hare and lynx

The snowshoe hare and the Canadian lynx in the boreal forests of North America show 9- to 11-year density cycles. These are generally assumed to be linked to each other because lynx are specialist predators on hares. Based on time series data for hare and lynx, we show that the dominant dimensional structure of the hare series appears to be three whereas that of the lynx is two. The three-dimensional structure of the hare time series is hypothesized to be due to a three-trophic level model in which the hare may be seen as simultaneously regulated from below and above. The plant species in the hare diet appear compensatory to one another, and the predator species may, likewise, be seen as an internally compensatory guild. The lynx time series are, in contrast, consistent with a model of donor control in which their populations are regulated from below by prey availability. Thus our analysis suggests that the classic view of a symmetric hare–lynx interaction is too simplistic. Specifically, we argue that the classic food chain structure is inappropriate: the hare is influenced by many predators other than the lynx, and the lynx is primarily influenced by the snowshoe hare.