Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

A robust position control for induction machines

ICEM 2010

Synthetic molecular machines for active self-assembly : prototype algorithms, designs, and experimental study

Computer science and electrical engineering have been the great success story of the twentieth century. The neat modularity and mapping of a language onto circuits has led to robots on Mars, desktop computers and smartphones. But these devices are not yet able to do some of the things that life takes for granted: repair a scratch, reproduce, regenerate, or grow exponentially fast–all while remaining functional.

This thesis explores and develops algorithms, molecular implementations, and theoretical proofs in the context of “active self-assembly” of molecular systems. The long-term vision of active self-assembly is the theoretical and physical implementation of materials that are composed of reconfigurable units with the programmability and adaptability of biology’s numerous molecular machines. En route to this goal, we must first find a way to overcome the memory limitations of molecular systems, and to discover the limits of complexity that can be achieved with individual molecules.

One of the main thrusts in molecular programming is to use computer science as a tool for figuring out what can be achieved. While molecular systems that are Turing-complete have been demonstrated [Winfree, 1996], these systems still cannot achieve some of the feats biology has achieved.

One might think that because a system is Turing-complete, capable of computing “anything,” that it can do any arbitrary task. But while it can simulate any digital computational problem, there are many behaviors that are not “computations” in a classical sense, and cannot be directly implemented. Examples include exponential growth and molecular motion relative to a surface.

Passive self-assembly systems cannot implement these behaviors because (a) molecular motion relative to a surface requires a source of fuel that is external to the system, and (b) passive systems are too slow to assemble exponentially-fast-growing structures. We call these behaviors “energetically incomplete” programmable behaviors. This class of behaviors includes any behavior where a passive physical system simply does not have enough physical energy to perform the specified tasks in the requisite amount of time.

As we will demonstrate and prove, a sufficiently expressive implementation of an “active” molecular self-assembly approach can achieve these behaviors. Using an external source of fuel solves part of the the problem, so the system is not “energetically incomplete.” But the programmable system also needs to have sufficient expressive power to achieve the specified behaviors. Perhaps surprisingly, some of these systems do not even require Turing completeness to be sufficiently expressive.

Building on a large variety of work by other scientists in the fields of DNA nanotechnology, chemistry and reconfigurable robotics, this thesis introduces several research contributions in the context of active self-assembly.

We show that simple primitives such as insertion and deletion are able to generate complex and interesting results such as the growth of a linear polymer in logarithmic time and the ability of a linear polymer to treadmill. To this end we developed a formal model for active-self assembly that is directly implementable with DNA molecules. We show that this model is computationally equivalent to a machine capable of producing strings that are stronger than regular languages and, at most, as strong as context-free grammars. This is a great advance in the theory of active self- assembly as prior models were either entirely theoretical or only implementable in the context of macro-scale robotics.

We developed a chain reaction method for the autonomous exponential growth of a linear DNA polymer. Our method is based on the insertion of molecules into the assembly, which generates two new insertion sites for every initial one employed. The building of a line in logarithmic time is a first step toward building a shape in logarithmic time. We demonstrate the first construction of a synthetic linear polymer that grows exponentially fast via insertion. We show that monomer molecules are converted into the polymer in logarithmic time via spectrofluorimetry and gel electrophoresis experiments. We also demonstrate the division of these polymers via the addition of a single DNA complex that competes with the insertion mechanism. This shows the growth of a population of polymers in logarithmic time. We characterize the DNA insertion mechanism that we utilize in Chapter 4. We experimentally demonstrate that we can control the kinetics of this re- action over at least seven orders of magnitude, by programming the sequences of DNA that initiate the reaction.

In addition, we review co-authored work on programming molecular robots using prescriptive landscapes of DNA origami; this was the first microscopic demonstration of programming a molec- ular robot to walk on a 2-dimensional surface. We developed a snapshot method for imaging these random walking molecular robots and a CAPTCHA-like analysis method for difficult-to-interpret imaging data.

Tissue engineering active biological machines : bio-inspired design, directed self-assembly, and characterization of muscular pumps simulating the embryonic heart

Biological machines are active devices that are comprised of cells and other biological components. These functional devices are best suited for physiological environments that support cellular function and survival. Biological machines have the potential to revolutionize the engineering of biomedical devices intended for implantation, where the human body can provide the required physiological environment. For engineering such cell-based machines, bio-inspired design can serve as a guiding platform as it provides functionally proven designs that are attainable by living cells. In the present work, a systematic approach was used to tissue engineer one such machine by exclusively using biological building blocks and by employing a bio-inspired design. Valveless impedance pumps were constructed based on the working principles of the embryonic vertebrate heart and by using cells and tissue derived from rats. The function of these tissue-engineered muscular pumps was characterized by exploring their spatiotemporal and flow behavior in order to better understand the capabilities and limitations of cells when used as the engines of biological machines.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.

At Your Convenience: Facilitating Voting and Registration

This work proposes answers to methodological and substantive questions related to convenience voting. The first analytical chapter surveys the various research designs that have been proposed within this literature, and concludes that the field benefits from using all in conjunction. The next chapter uses matching to identify the relationship between disability status and political participation, and considers whether any forms of convenience voting mediate in the relationship. The final two analytical chapters examine how online voter registration, one of the most recent policy innovations, affects participation and vote share in American elections. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings presented herein, and briefly discusses the natural extensions of this work.