The Propagation Characteristics of Microwave in a Non-Equilibrium Plasma Layer

The influence of non-equilibrium plasma layer pressure and thickness on the transmission of microwave is considered when the incidence of wave is at an arbitrary angle. The plasma is cold, weakly ionized, and steady-state. It is assumed that it is a layered media with a kind of distribution of electron number density and the microwave is a plane wave. The results show that the pressure of plasma affects the absorption of microwave deeply, and the thickness relatively weakly in a non-equilibrium plasma slab.

Chemical equilibrium analysis and CFD simulation of coal combustion and NOx formation

A full two-fluid model of reacting gas-particle flows with an algebraic unified second-order moment (AUSM) turbulence-chemistry model is used to simulate Beijing coal combustion and NOx formation. The sub-models are the k-epsilon-kp two-phase turbulence model, the EBU-Arrhenius volatile and CO combustion model, the six-flux radiation model, coal devolatilization model and char combustion model. The blocking effect on NOx formation is discussed. In addition, the chemical equilibrium analysis is used to predict NOx concentration at different temperature. Results of CID simulation and chemical equilibrium analysis show that, optimizing air dynamic parameters can delay the NOx formation and decrease NOx emission, but it is effective only in a restricted range. In order to decrease NOx emission near to zero, the re-burning or other chemical methods must be used.

The Convective Instabilities in a Liquid-Vapor System with a Non-equilibrium Evaporation Interface

Rayleigh-Marangoni-B,nard instability in a system consisting of a horizontal liquid layer and its own vapor has been investigated. The two layers are separated by a deformable evaporation interface. A linear stability analysis is carried out to study the convective instability during evaporation. In previous works, the interface is assumed to be under equilibrium state. In contrast with previous works, we give up the equilibrium assumption and use Hertz-Knudsen's relation to describe the phase change under non-equilibrium state. The influence of Marangoni effect, gravitational effect, degree of non-equilibrium and the dynamics of the vapor on the instability are discussed.

Equilibrium in dynamic economic models

The main theme running through these three chapters is that economic agents are often forced to respond to events that are not a direct result of their actions or other agents actions. The optimal response to these shocks will necessarily depend on agents' understanding of how these shocks arise. The economic environment in the first two chapters is analogous to the classic chain store game. In this setting, the addition of unintended trembles by the agents creates an environment better suited to reputation building. The third chapter considers the competitive equilibrium price dynamics in an overlapping generations environment when there are supply and demand shocks.

The first chapter is a game theoretic investigation of a reputation building game. A sequential equilibrium model, called the "error prone agents" model, is developed. In this model, agents believe that all actions are potentially subjected to an error process. Inclusion of this belief into the equilibrium calculation provides for a richer class of reputation building possibilities than when perfect implementation is assumed.

In the second chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is employed to test the consistency of this new model and other models with data from experiments run by other researchers that served as the basis for prominent papers in this field. The alternate models considered are essentially modifications to the standard sequential equilibrium. While some models perform quite well in that the nature of the modification seems to explain deviations from the sequential equilibrium quite well, the degree to which these modifications must be applied shows no consistency across different experimental designs.

The third chapter is a study of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model. It establishes the existence of a unique perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium price path in a pure exchange economy with a finite time horizon when there are arbitrarily many shocks to supply or demand. One main reason for the interest in this equilibrium is that overlapping generations environments are very fruitful for the study of price dynamics, especially in experimental settings. The perfect foresight assumption is an important place to start when examining these environments because it will produce the ex post socially efficient allocation of goods. This characteristic makes this a natural baseline to which other models of price dynamics could be compared.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Market Instruments and CO2 Mitigation: A General Equilibrium Analysis for Spain

25 p.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

I. The effect of N,N,N',N' -tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk Equilibrium. II. The nature of the Di-Grignard reagent

I. The influence of N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine on the Schlenk equilibrium

The equilibrium between ethylmagnesium bromide, diethylmagnesium, and magnesium bromide has been studied by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. The interconversion of the species is very fast on the nmr time scale, and only an averaged spectrum is observed for the ethyl species. When N,N,N’,N’-tetramethylethylenediamine is added to solutions of these reagents in tetrahydrofuran, the rate of interconversion is reduced. At temperatures near -50°, two ethylmagnesium species have been observed. These are attributed to the different ethyl groups in ethylmagnesium bromide and diethylmagnesium, two of the species involved in the Schlenk equilibrium of Grignard reagents.

II. The nature of di-Grignard reagents

Di-Grignard reagents have been examined by nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy in an attempt to prove that dialkylmagnesium reagents are in equilibrium with alkylmagnesium halides. The di-Grignard reagents of compounds such as 1,4-dibromobutane have been investigated. The dialkylmagnesium form of this di-Grignard reagent can exist as an intramolecular cyclic species, tetramethylene-magnesium. This cyclic form would give an nmr spectrum different from that of the classical alkylmagnesium halide di-Grignard reagent. In dimethyl ether-tetrahydrofuran solutions of di-Grignard reagents containing N N,N,N’,N’-Tetramethylethylenediamine, evidence has been found for the existence of an intramolecular dialkylmagnesium species. This species is rapidly equilibrating with other forms, but at low temperatures, the rates of interconversion are reduced. Two species can be seen in the nmr spectrum at -50°. One is the cyclic species; the other is an open form.

Inversion of the carbon at the carbon-magnesium bond in di-Grignard reagents has also been studied. This process is much faster than in corresponding monofunctional Grignard reagents.