Individual agency as explanation of alliance development and change : a case study

Alliances, with other inter-organisational forms, have become a strategy of choice and necessity for both the private and public sectors. From initial formation, alliances develop and change in different ways, with research suggesting that many alliances will be terminated without their potential value being realised. Alliance process theorists address this phenomenon, seeking explanations as to why alliances unfold the way they do. However, these explanations have generally focussed on economic and structural determinants: empirically, little is known about how and why the agency of alliance actors shapes the alliance path. Theorists have suggested that current alliance process theory has provided valuable, but partial accounts of alliance development, which could be usefully extended by considering social and individual factors. The purpose of this research therefore was to extend alliance process theory by exploring individual agency as an explanation of alliance events and in doing so, reveal the potential of a multi-frame approach for understanding alliance process. Through an historical study of a single, rich case of alliance process, this thesis provided three explanations for the sequence of alliance events, each informed by a different theoretical perspective. The explanatory contribution of the Individual Agency (IA) perspective was distilled through juxtaposition with the perspectives of Environmental Determinism (ED) and Indeterminacy/Chance (I/C). The research produced a number of findings. First, it provided empirical support for the tentative proposition that the choices and practices of alliance actors are partially explanatory of alliance change and that these practices are particular to the alliance context. Secondly, the study found that examining the case through three theoretical frames provided a more complete explanation. Two propositions were put forward as to how individual agency can be theorised within this three-perspective framework. Finally, the case explained which alliance actors were required to shape alliance decision making in this case and why.

The nature of juristic paradigms : exploring the theoretical and conceptual relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence

Problem solving courts appear to achieve outcomes which are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more “therapeutic” and “problem solving” practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is quite likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and, arguably, from outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, his work is tolerated but marginalized. But do therapeutic and problem solving functions have the potential to define, rather than complement, the role of judicial officers? The basic question addressed in this paper is, therefore, whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see--or are we seeing--a paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?

Problem-solving courts, therapeutic jurisprudence and the constitution : if two is company, is three a crowd?

Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most successful in administering an independent and impartial problem solving court.