Number comparison and number ordering as predictors of arithmetic performance in adults: Exploring the link between the two skills, and investigating the question of domain-specificity.

Recent evidence has highlighted the important role that number ordering skills play in arithmetic abilities (e.g., Lyons & Beilock, 2011). In fact, Lyons et al. (2014) demonstrated that although at the start of formal mathematics education number comparison skills are the best predictors of arithmetic performance, from around the age of 10, number ordering skills become the strongest numerical predictors of arithmetic abilities. In the current study we demonstrated that number comparison and ordering skills were both significantly related to arithmetic performance in adults, and the effect size was greater in the case of ordering skills. Additionally, we found that the effect of number comparison skills on arithmetic performance was partially mediated by number ordering skills. Moreover, performance on comparison and ordering tasks involving the months of the year was also strongly correlated with arithmetic skills, and participants displayed similar (canonical or reverse) distance effects on the comparison and ordering tasks involving months as when the tasks included numbers. This suggests that the processes responsible for the link between comparison and ordering skills and arithmetic performance are not specific to the domain of numbers. Finally, a factor analysis indicated that performance on comparison and ordering tasks loaded on a factor which included performance on a number line task and self-reported spatial thinking styles. These results substantially extend previous research on the role of order processing abilities in mental arithmetic.

Teaching boys in neoliberal and postfeminist times: Feminization and the question of re-masculinization in the education system and policy field

This paper focuses on teaching boys, male teachers and the question of gendered pedagogies in neoliberal and postfeminist times of the proliferation of new forms of capitalism, multi-mediated technologies and the influence of globalization. It illustrates how a politics of re-masculinization and its reconstitution needs to be understood as set against changing economic and social conditions in which gender equity comes to be re-focused on boys as the ‚new disadvantaged‘. This re-framing of gender equity, it is argued, has been fuelled by both a media-inspired backlash discourse about ‚failing boys‘ and a neo-positivist emphasis on numbers derived primarily from standardized testing regimes at both global and national levels. A media-focused analysis of the proliferation of discourses about ‚failing boys‘ vis-a-vis the problem of encroaching feminization in the school system is provided to illuminate how certain truths about the influence of male teachers come to define how the terms of ensuring gender equity are delimited and reduced to a question of gendered pedagogies as grounded in sexed bodies. Historical accounts of the feminization of teaching in the North American context are also provided as a basis for building a more informed understanding of the present, particularly as it relates to the contextualization of policy articulation and enactment regarding the problem of teaching boys. In light of such historically informed and critical media analysis, it is argued that what is needed is a more informed, evidenced based policy articulation of the problem of teaching boys and a more gender sensitive reflection on the politics of masculinities in postfeminist times. (DIPF/Orig.)

The Strange Case of Eugenics: A Subject’s Ontogeny in a Long-Lived Classification Scheme and the Question of Collocative Integrity

Classification schemes are built at a particular point in time; at inception, they reflect a worldview indicative of that time. This is their strength, but results in potential weak- nesses as worldviews change. For example, if a scheme of mathematics is not updated even though the state of the art has changed, then it is not a very useful scheme to users for the purposes of information retrieval. However, change in schemes is a good thing. Changing allows designers of schemes to update their model and serves as a responsible mediator between resources and users. But change does come at a cost. In the print world, we revise universal clas- sification schemes—sometimes in drastic ways—and this means that over time, the power of a classification scheme to collocate is compromised if we do not account for scheme change in the organization of affected physical resources. If we understand this phenomenon in the print world, we can design ameliorations for the digital world.

Weak reasoning argumentative theory. A dialogical approach for the discovery of philosophy in high schools

In the literature on philosophical practices, despite the crucial role that argumentation plays in these activities, no specific argumentative theories have ever been proposed to assist the figure of the facilitator in conducting philosophical dialogue and to enhance student’s critical thinking skills. The dissertation starts from a cognitive perspective that challenges the classic Cartesian notion of rationality by focusing on limits and biases of human reasoning. An argumentative model (WRAT – Weak Reasoning Argumentative Theory) is then outlined in order to respond to the needs of philosophical dialogue. After justifying the claim that this learning activity, among other inductive methodologies, is the most suitable for critical thinking education, I inquired into the specific goal of ‘arguing’ within this context by means of the tools provided by Speech Act Theory: the speaker’s intention is to construct new knowledge by questioning her own and other’s beliefs. The model proposed has been theorized on this assumption, starting from which the goals, and, in turn, the related norms, have been pinpointed. In order to include all the epistemic attitudes required to accomplish the complex task of arguing in philosophical dialogue, I needed to integrate two opposed cognitive accounts, Dual Process Theory and Evolutionary Approach, that, although they provide incompatible descriptions of reasoning, can be integrated to provide a normative account of argumentation. The model, apart from offering a theoretical contribution to argumentation studies, is designed to be applied to the Italian educational system, in particular to classes in technical and professional high schools belonging to the newly created network Inventio. This initiative is one of the outcomes of the research project by the same name, which also includes an original Syllabus, research seminars, a monitoring action and publications focused on introducing philosophy, in the form of workshop activities, into technical and professional schools.

The grammar of psychosis

This thesis is concerned with the philosophical grammar of certain psychiatric concepts, which play a central role in delineating the field of psychiatric work. The concepts studied are ‘psychosis’, ‘delusion’, ‘person’, ‘understanding’ and ‘incomprehensibility’. The purpose of this conceptual analysis is to provide a more perspicuous view of the logic of these concepts, how psychiatric work is constituted in relation to them, and what this tells us about the relationships between the conceptual and the empirical in psychiatric concepts. The method used in the thesis is indebted primarily to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, where we are urged to look at language uses in relation to practices in order to obtain a clearer overview of practices of interest; this will enable us to resolve the conceptual problems related to these practices. This questioning takes as its starting point the concept of psychosis, a central psychiatric concept during the twentieth century. The conceptual analysis of ‘psychosis’ shows that the concept is logically dependent on the concepts of ‘understanding’ and ‘person’. Following the lead found in this analysis, the logic of person-concepts in psychiatric discourse is analysed by a detailed textual analysis of a psychiatric journal article. The main finding is the ambiguous uses of ‘person’, enabling a specifically psychiatric form of concern in human affairs. The grammar of ‘understanding’ is then tackled from the opposite end, by exploring the logic of the concept of ‘incomprehensibility’. First, by studying the DSM-IV definition of delusion it is shown that its ambiguities boil down to the question of whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of ‘incorrectness’ or ‘incomprehensibility’. Second, the grammar of ‘incomprehensibility’ is further focused on by introducing the distinction between positive and negative conceptions of ‘incomprehensibility’. The main finding is that this distinction has wide-ranging implications for our understanding of psychiatric concepts. Finally, some of the findings gained in these studies are ‘put into practice’ in studying the more practical question of the conceptual and ethical problems associated with the concept of ‘prodromal symptom of schizophrenia’ and the agenda of early detection and intervention in schizophrenia more generally.

The Concept of Betterness and Sport Competitions

It is common that people disagree on a question which athlete or team was the best in a particular sport competition. This thesis attempts to clarify these disputes by analysing the concept of betterness in the context of sport competitions. Betterness can be interpersonal, intrapersonal or a combination of the two. I focus on interpersonal betterness, that is, on superiority. For example, interpersonal betterness may be contested in a football match between the national teams of Germany and Argentina. My aim is to provide a philosophical account of interpersonal betterness. The account has two functions: descriptive and normative. It describes the shapes and forms in which superiority is instantiated in sport competitions. It also provides a consistent and accurate way to discuss superiority. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, I introduce, elaborate and illustrate my account, which in turn consists of three elements: (1) relations of superiority, (2) standards for the relations of superiority and (3) types of competition. I also discuss my account’s relevance to issues of sport ethics through the example of gender equity and women’s ski jumping. I conclude that this account will not end the disputes over which team or athlete was better in a particular competition. Instead, it provides tools for a more consistent discussion of the disputed issues. The second part of the thesis includes five reprinted original articles. The account presented in the first part is based on these publications.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Does Chance hide Necessity? : a reevaluation of the debate ‘determinism - indeterminism’ in the light of quantum mechanics and probability theory

Dans cette thèse l’ancienne question philosophique “tout événement a-t-il une cause ?” sera examinée à la lumière de la mécanique quantique et de la théorie des probabilités. Aussi bien en physique qu’en philosophie des sciences la position orthodoxe maintient que le monde physique est indéterministe. Au niveau fondamental de la réalité physique – au niveau quantique – les événements se passeraient sans causes, mais par chance, par hasard ‘irréductible’. Le théorème physique le plus précis qui mène à cette conclusion est le théorème de Bell. Ici les prémisses de ce théorème seront réexaminées. Il sera rappelé que d’autres solutions au théorème que l’indéterminisme sont envisageables, dont certaines sont connues mais négligées, comme le ‘superdéterminisme’. Mais il sera argué que d’autres solutions compatibles avec le déterminisme existent, notamment en étudiant des systèmes physiques modèles. Une des conclusions générales de cette thèse est que l’interprétation du théorème de Bell et de la mécanique quantique dépend crucialement des prémisses philosophiques desquelles on part. Par exemple, au sein de la vision d’un Spinoza, le monde quantique peut bien être compris comme étant déterministe. Mais il est argué qu’aussi un déterminisme nettement moins radical que celui de Spinoza n’est pas éliminé par les expériences physiques. Si cela est vrai, le débat ‘déterminisme – indéterminisme’ n’est pas décidé au laboratoire : il reste philosophique et ouvert – contrairement à ce que l’on pense souvent. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse un modèle pour l’interprétation de la probabilité sera proposé. Une étude conceptuelle de la notion de probabilité indique que l’hypothèse du déterminisme aide à mieux comprendre ce que c’est qu’un ‘système probabiliste’. Il semble que le déterminisme peut répondre à certaines questions pour lesquelles l’indéterminisme n’a pas de réponses. Pour cette raison nous conclurons que la conjecture de Laplace – à savoir que la théorie des probabilités présuppose une réalité déterministe sous-jacente – garde toute sa légitimité. Dans cette thèse aussi bien les méthodes de la philosophie que de la physique seront utilisées. Il apparaît que les deux domaines sont ici solidement reliés, et qu’ils offrent un vaste potentiel de fertilisation croisée – donc bidirectionnelle.

The Politics of Privacy

In 'Privacy and Politics', Kieron O'Hara discusses the relation of the political philosophy of privacy to technical aspects in Web development. Despite a vigorous debate, the concept remains ambiguous, and a series of types of privacy is defined: epistemological, spatial, ideological, decisional and economic. Each of these has a different meaning in the online environment, and will be defended by different measures. The question of whether privacy is a right is raised, and generational differences in attitude discussed, alongside the issue of whether privacy should be protected in advance, via a consent model, or retrospectively via increased transparency and accountability. Finally, reasons both theoretical and practical for ranking privacy below other values (such as security, efficiency or benefits for the wider community) are discussed.

The Schwarmgeister: The Development of Ecclesiastical Doctrine Through Schismatic Movements

Throughout the Christian story, Church doctrine and ecclesiology have been shrouded in controversy. From the Council of Nicea in 325, when are early Church fathers debated about the Trinity of Christ all the way to the modern day with Vatican II theological controversies have been important in the molding of Christian doctrine on the structure, role, and function of the Church. What makes those controversies different from the ones I treat in my thesis is that the previously mentioned controversies did not lead to schismatic divisions in the Church. The Donatist controversy and Luther's theological battle with Karlstadt were major movements that endangered the unity of the Church. These controversies propagated crucial writings and teachings in two major areas. The first area is the spiritual power and validity of the sacraments. Second is the role, function, and ecclesiology of the Church, with particular attention to the authority of the ministry. I want to demonstrate that these controversies refined the Church's thinking on sacramental issues such as baptism and Eucharist, as well as address the question of who has the power in the Church? And to what extent do they have the power to press reforms?

Good just isn't Good enough. Best System Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics

Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two strategies, viz. a globalist as suggested by Loewer, and a localist as advocated by Frigg and Hoefer. Both strategies fail because the system they are part of have rivals that are roughly equally good, while ontic probabilities should be part of a clearly winning system. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.

What Is behind God’s Name? Martin Buber’s and Franz Rosenzweig’s Reflections on the Name of God

What meaning does God’s name convey? This was a question Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig had to answer when working on their translation of the Bible. They noticed that, as certain crucial biblical verses suggest, there is indeed a meaning behind God’s name in the Bible. Thus, an important moment in their joint translation was their account of the self-revelation of God in Exod. III, together with the question of how best to translate the tetragrammaton YHWH— the name of God. This article will explore their decisions, based both on their dialogue concerning the translation of the Bible, and on their papers, especially Rosenzweig’s well-known article ‘Der Ewige’ (‘The Eternal’) and Buber’s response to it. Less well known is the fact that there exist two unpublished typescripts by Martin Buber reflecting on the name of God, which will also be taken into consideration. Contrary to the received view that the choice of the personal pronoun to transliterate the name of God in the Bible translation was mainly Rosenzweig’s, I will show that it was actually a joint decision in which both thinkers’ philosophies,1 and a question that had haunted Buber since his youth, played an important part. The choice of the personal pronoun is an answer to this question, addressing the omnipresent God, the eternal Thou, in a kind of cultic acclamation.

The Rueter-Hess Dam and Reservoir Project: A Question of Sustainable Water

Water in sufficient quantities throughout the Colorado Front Range is becoming increasingly limited. This paper examines the consequences for continued unsustainable use of water for communities of the Denver metropolitan area. This paper also looks at the effect that water law in the West has for otherwise optimum distributions of water. In addition, four regional and state water studies are reviewed for their contribution to sustainable water. Finally, the Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Rueter-Hess dam and reservoir project in Parker, Colorado is explored. Key findings conclude that the Rueter-Hess project may not, by itself, provide sustainable water for Parker; but the project will create incentive and opportunity for communities throughout the region to address the question of sustainable water.