Norm enforcement in the city revisited: An international field experiment of altruistic punishment, norm maintenance, and broken windows

In laboratory experiments, people are willing to sanction norms at a cost—a behavioral tendency called altruistic punishment. However, the degree to which these findings can be generalized to real-world interactions is still debated. Only a small number of field experiments have been conducted, and initial results suggest that punishment is less frequent outside of the lab. This study replicates one of the first field experiments on altruistic punishment and builds ties to research on norm compliance and the broken windows theory. The original study addressed the enforcement of the anti-littering norm in Athens. We replicate this study in Bern, Zurich, and New York City. As an extension, we investigate how the experimental context (clean vs littered) impacts social norm enforcement. As a second extension, we investigate how opportunity structure impacts the maintenance of the anti-littering norm. Findings indicate that norms are universally enforced, although significantly less than in the standard laboratory experiment,and that enforcement is significantly more common in Switzerland than in New York. Moreover, individuals prefer more subtle forms of enforcement to direct punishment. We also find that enforcement is less frequent in littered than in clean contexts, suggesting that broken windows might not only foster deviant behavior but also weaken informal social control. Finally, we find that opportunity structure can encourage people to maintain norms, as indicated by the fact that people are more likely to voluntarily pick up litter when it is closer to a trash bin.

A.A.V.V.: Reason, morality, and law. The philosophy of John Finnis, J. Keown & R.P. George (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, 616 pp.

Fil: Massini Correas, Carlos I.. Universidad de Mendoza

The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement. Bruegel Working Paper 2016/02, February 2016

The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of

The effect of the speed enforcement program in Massachusetts.

Mode of access: Internet.

Investigation of crime and law enforcement in the District of Columbia.

Mode of access: Internet.

Enforcement of the national maximum speed limit enforcement practices and procedures. Final technical report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

The breakdown of IRS tax enforcement regarding multinational corporations : revenue losses, excessive litigation, and unfair burdens for U.S. producers : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, March 25, 1993.

Shipping list no.: 93-0404-P.