Use of tea tree oil against buffalo flies in cattle

Testing tea tree oil against buffalo flies on cattle.

Six unidentified, youngest members of a traditional Küfer guild posing in front of their wine barrels holding the tools of their trade and glasses of wine; Bad Dürkheim Portraits Men

Handwritten description on verso addressed to Herr u. Frau Ernst Weill

Bioactivity of tea tree oil from Melaleuca alternifolia against sheep lice (Bovicola ovis Schrank) in vitro

Tea tree oil (TTO) from the Australian native plant Melaleuca alternifolia has wide ranging bio-active properties, including insecticidal and repellent activity against arthropods. Furthermore, composition of commercially available Australian TTO is specified under an International Organization for Standardization standard (ISO 4730), reducing the potential for variable effects often noted with botanical pesticides. The effect of TTO, meeting the ISO standard for terpinen-4-ol chemotype, was tested against sheep lice (Bovicola ovis Schrank) in a series of laboratory studies. Immersion of wool for 60s in formulations containing concentrations of 1% TTO and above caused 100% mortality of adult lice and eggs. Exposure to vapours from TTO, delivered as droplets in fumigation chambers and when applied to wool also caused high mortality in both lice and eggs. The main active component of TTO in the fumigant tests was terpinen-4-ol. Treated surface assays and tests with wool where the formulation was allowed to dry before exposure of lice indicated low persistence. These studies demonstrate that TTO is highly toxic to sheep lice and active at concentrations that suggest potential for the development of TTO-based ovine lousicides. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Dipping and jetting with tea tree (Melaleuca alternifolia) oil formulations control lice (Bovicola ovis) on sheep

The in vivo pediculicidal effectiveness of 1% and 2% formulations of tea tree (Melaleuca alternifolia) oil (TTO) against sheep chewing lice (Bovicola ovis) was tested in two pen studies. Immersion dipping of sheep shorn two weeks before treatment in both 1% and 2% formulations reduced lice to non detectable levels. No lice were found on any of the treated sheep despite careful inspection of at least 40 fleece partings per animal at 2, 6, 12 and 20 weeks after treatment. In the untreated sheep louse numbers increased from a mean (+/- SE) of 2.4 (+/- 0.7) per 10 cm fleece part at 2 weeks to 12.3 (+/- 4.2) per part at 20 weeks. Treatment of sheep with 6 months wool by jetting (high pressure spraying into the fleece) reduced louse numbers by 94% in comparison to controls at two weeks after treatment with both 1% and 2% TTO formulations. At 6 and 12 weeks after treatment reductions were 94% and 91% respectively with the 1% formulation and 78% and 84% respectively with the 2% formulation. TTO treatment also appeared to reduce wool damage in infested sheep. Laboratory studies indicated that tea tree oil 'stripped' from solution with a progressive reduction in concentration as well as volume as more wool was dipped, indicating that reinforcement of active ingredient would be required to maintain effectiveness when large numbers of sheep are treated. The results of these studies suggest significant potential for the development of ovine lousicides incorporating TTO. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

On trade-off solution pairs in a special type of transportation problem

Abstract is not available.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.