Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of Taxation

Economic historians have recently emphasized the importance of integrating economic and historical approaches in studying institutions. The literature on the Ottoman system of taxation, however, has continued to adopt a primarily historical approach, using ad hoc categories of classification and explaining the system through its continuities with the historical precedent. This paper integrates economic and historical approaches to examine the structure, efficiency, and regional diversity of the tax system. The structure of the system made it possible for the Ottomans to economize on the transaction cost of measuring the tax base. Regional variations resulted from both efficient adaptations and institutional rigidities.

Ueber forstliche Taxation u. Betriebsregulirung : Referat an die Versammlung des schweizerischen Forstvereins in Frauenfeld im Juli 1856

von El. Landolt

Income taxation of emigrants and immigrants under Spanish law

Análisis de las consecuencias tributarias de los cambios de residencia de las personas físicas.

[Notes regarding academic taxation exemptions], ca. 1798

One-leaf folio-sized set of handwritten notes and extracts regarding New England academic institutions that received tax exemptions.

Sundry extracts on the subject of the taxation of College &c., ca. 1798-1801

Notebook with brown paper cover containing handwritten extracts from the charters and related legislation of New England academic, charitable, and commercial institutions regarding their ability to hold real estate and related tax exemptions. Most of the listed documents are dated in the 1780s and 1790s. The notebook also contains extracts from "Argument in the case of Poor's rate, charged on the College of Christ & Emmanuel in the University of Cambridge 1768." The item title is transcribed from a handwritten inscription on the back cover.

[Questions about taxation, 1799]

One leaf containing handwritten research questions regarding the taxation of the College and tax exemptions offered to ministers. The paper was originally folded in three sections and a portion of the third section is missing.

[Taxation research notes, 1799]

Folded leaf containing handwritten notes and figures related to tax acts, including a section of notes related to the use of "Sevill, Pillar, or Mexico" foreign silver coins. A section of the text is written in very faded pencil.

[Taxation research notes, 1794]

One leaf containing a handwritten incomplete text arguing for the creation of tables containing financial data found in government records and account books, as a means of comparing the value of real estate, silver, and salaries, in part to "ascertain how much of the present expense of supporting a family is to be attributed to the present mode of living." The page has the remnants of a red wax seal.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.