Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family Firms, Monitoring.

New strength : independent television companies in China’s television industry

As most of people know that all of mass media are state-owned in China, television stations are not exceptional to belong to the enormous state-owned system. But to date, with the economic reform in the broadcasting system and China entering into WTO, the television industry has increased greatly and the television market has matured with more and more competition. The players in China’s television industry have changed from the monologue of TV stations to multi roles of TV stations, production companies and overseas television companies, although TV stations are still the majority of China’s TV market. Especially, private television production companies are becoming more and more active in this market. In this paper, I will describe the development process and challenges of this group in China and ask whether the emergence of this group means for the whole China’s TV industry?

Private television production companies in China : new strength in the market

As most people know, all mass media, including television stations, are state-owned in China. However, with the economic reform in the broadcasting system and China entering the World Trade Organization (WTO), the television industry has expanded greatly and the television market has evolved, with an ensuing growth of competition. The players in China’s television industry have changed from a monologue of TV stations to stations that hold multiple roles and a growth of production companies and overseas television companies although the TV stations still dominate China’s television market. Private television production companies are, however, becoming increasingly active in this market.

Are East Asian companies benefiting from western board practices?

Since the Asian crisis, East Asian nations have strived to introduce corporate governance codes, directing companies how to best improve their corporate governance practices. However, these codes have not been universally accepted by East Asian companies. This study examines the adoption of major board-related corporate governance recommendations by large nonfinancial companies in seven East Asian nations and investigates whether improvements in these board governance mechanisms have been associated with increased operating performance and market value. The results indicate that family-owned companies started with worse board governance and have been least likely to improve their board governance since the crisis. Overall, bigger, faster growing, non-family-owned companies with less concentrated ownership have been more likely to improve their board governance. Splitting of the positions of Chairman and CEO, creation of audit and nomination committees and improvements in overall board governance were found to have a positive relationship with subsequent operating performance and/or market value.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

The 2006 CSRC guidelines for articles of Association of Chinese listed companies : critiquing from an Australian perspective

Compares the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission's guidelines for articles of association of listed companies issued in 2006 with 'replaceable' rules in the Australian Corporations Act 2001. Discusses the provisions of the Chinese guidelines and the Australian rules on corporate constitution, interpretation, a company's representative, object clauses, shareholders' powers and meetings and directors. Questions whether the Chinese guidelines facilitate effective corporate governance.

In search of good governance for Asian family listed companies : a case study on Hong Kong

Discusses the importation of Western concepts of corporate governance into Hong Kong where many companies are family companies to which Asian culture is more familiar. Considers different models of corporate governance and questions the application of Western structures to family owned companies. Examines the weaknesses inherent in the typical structure of Asian companies, particularly from the point of view of minority shareholders. Suggests that a system of governance based on Confucian philosophy may be more effective in Hong Kong.

The relationship between implied and realized volatility : evidence from the Australian stock index option market

This paper examines the relationship between the volatility implied in option prices and the subsequently realized volatility by using the S&P/ASX 200 index options (XJO) traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) during a period of 5 years. Unlike stock index options such as the S&P 100 index options in the US market, the S&P/ASX 200 index options are traded infrequently and in low volumes, and have a long maturity cycle. Thus an errors-in-variables problem for measurement of implied volatility is more likely to exist. After accounting for this problem by instrumental variable method, it is found that both call and put implied volatilities are superior to historical volatility in forecasting future realized volatility. Moreover, implied call volatility is nearly an unbiased forecast of future volatility.

Is there timing ability in currency markets? Evidence from ADR issuances

Is there timing ability in the exchange rate markets? We address this question by examining foreign firms' decisions to issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Specifically, we test whether foreign firms consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions and, in doing so, display some ability to time their local exchange rate market. We study ADR issuances in the U.S. stock market between 1976 and 2003. We find that foreign firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar and before their local currency becomes abnormally weak. This evidence is statistically significant even after controlling for local and U.S. past and future stock market performance and predicable exchange rate movements. Currency market timing is especially significant i) for value companies, relatively small (yet absolutely large) companies issuing relatively large amounts of ADRs, companies with higher currency exposure, manufacturing companies, and emerging market companies, ii) during currency crises (when mispricings are rife) and after the integration of the issuer's local financial market with the world capital markets, iii) when the ADR issue raises capital for the issuing firm (Level III ADR), and iv) regardless of the identity of the underwriting investment bank. Currency market timing is also economically significant since it translates into total savings for the issuing firms of about $646 million (or 1.86% of the total capital-raising ADR issue volume). In contrast, we find no evidence of currency timing ability in a control sample made of non-capital raising ADRs (Level II ADRs). These findings suggest that some companies may have, at least occasionally, private information about foreign exchange.

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.