The Context-integrity of the global carbon regime: The relevance and impact of the World Trade Organization

In the study of the integrity of the global carbon regime there are a number of institutions that must be considered for their impacts on this system. In particular, the subject matter of this chapter is concerned with the main international institution for trade, the World Trade Organization (the WTO). Otherwise stated, this chapter is concerned with how the institutional integrity of the global carbon regime aligns with the values and policy objectives of the WTO. This is done with a view to consider whether the global carbon regime aligns with these values and objectives in a way demonstrative of context-integrity. This alignment is not a single-sided undertaking and, therefore, it is essential that the underlying values of the WTO themselves align with the global carbon regime. I suggest this is particularly crucial given the importance of the objectives of the climate change regime, and the scientific predictions of the current climate projections.

Modelling the nitrogen-driven trade-off between nitrogen utilisation efficiency and water use efficiency of wheat in eastern Australia.

The nitrogen-driven trade-off between nitrogen utilisation efficiency (yield per unit nitrogen uptake) and water use efficiency (yield per unit evapotranspiration) is widespread and results from well established, multiple effects of nitrogen availability on the water, carbon and nitrogen economy of crops. Here we used a crop model (APSIM) to simulate the yield, evapotranspiration, soil evaporation and nitrogen uptake of wheat, and analysed yield responses to water, nitrogen and climate using a framework analogous to the rate-duration model of determinate growth. The relationship between modelled grain yield (Y) and evapotranspiration (ET) was fitted to a linear-plateau function to derive three parameters: maximum yield (Ymax), the ET break-point when yield reaches its maximum (ET#), and the rate of yield response in the linear phase ([Delta]Y/[Delta]ET). Against this framework, we tested the hypothesis that nitrogen deficit reduces maximum yield by reducing both the rate ([Delta]Y/[Delta]ET) and the range of yield response to evapotranspiration, i.e. ET# - Es, where Es is modelled median soil evaporation. Modelled data reproduced the nitrogen-driven trade-off between nitrogen utilisation efficiency and water use efficiency in a transect from Horsham (36°S) to Emerald (23°S) in eastern Australia. Increasing nitrogen supply from 50 to 250 kg N ha-1 reduced yield per unit nitrogen uptake from 29 to 12 kg grain kg-1 N and increased yield per unit evapotranspiration from 6 to 15 kg grain ha-1 mm-1 at Emerald. The same increment in nitrogen supply reduced yield per unit nitrogen uptake from 30 to 25 kg grain kg-1 N and increased yield per unit evapotranspiration from 6 to 25 kg grain ha-1 mm-1 at Horsham. Maximum yield ranged from 0.9 to 6.4 t ha-1. Consistent with our working hypothesis, reductions in maximum yield with nitrogen deficit were associated with both reduction in the rate of yield response to ET and compression of the range of yield response to ET. Against the notion of managing crops to maximise water use efficiency in low rainfall environments, we emphasise the trade-off between water use efficiency and nitrogen utilisation efficiency, particularly under conditions of high nitrogen-to-grain price ratio. The rate-range framework to characterise the relationship between yield and evapotranspiration is useful to capture this trade-off as the parameters were responsive to both nitrogen supply and climatic factors.

Six unidentified, youngest members of a traditional Küfer guild posing in front of their wine barrels holding the tools of their trade and glasses of wine; Bad Dürkheim Portraits Men

Handwritten description on verso addressed to Herr u. Frau Ernst Weill

On trade-off solution pairs in a special type of transportation problem

Abstract is not available.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.