Experiencia y absoluto : La respuesta de G.F.W Hegel en la Introducción a la fenomenología del espíritu a los desafíos del escepticismo de G. Schulze

Los estudios de esta tesis doctoral muestran la relación estrecha que existe en la Fenomenología del Espíritu entre el concepto hegeliano de experiencia, su concepción del absoluto y el impacto que tiene en ambos el desafío del escepticismo. La tesis general sostenida es que la confrontación de Hegel con el escepticismo es la clave de lectura más importante para la comprensión de la Introducción a la Fenomenología y por lo tanto del programa original de la obra. Más específicamente, se sostiene que la Introducción a la Fenomenología del Espíritu se encuentra filosóficamente constituida en atenta referencia a las objeciones que Gottlob Schulze había dirigido al incipiente idealismo de Jena en sus escritos de 1803 (Aforismos sobre lo Absoluto) y de 1805 (Los momentos principales del modo escéptico de pensar acerca del conocimiento humano). Se afirma aquí que Hegel revalorizó el escepticismo de Schulze, a tal punto que: a) los desafíos de Schulze son la principal provocación para un cambio de rumbo en los planes filosóficos de Hegel, esto es, el de comenzar por el problema del conocimiento antes de presentar su Lógica; b) las objeciones de Schulze constituyen los motivos decisivos que generan la ruptura entre Schelling y Hegel; c) a raíz de tales objeciones, Hegel relativiza en la Fenomenología la distinción tajante que había establecido entre antiguo y nuevo escepticismo en su escrito de 1802 (Relación del escepticismo con la filosofía); d) Hegel no sólo considera las objeciones del escéptico sino que se apropia y reformula algunas de sus ideas.En síntesis: los estudios que se exponen en esta tesis reconstruyen una polémica entre Hegel y Schulze. Esta reconstrucción puede aclarar la teoría de la experiencia que se encuentra en el texto de la Introducción a la Fenomenología.En cuanto al orden de la exposición, este trabajo doctoral comienza con una presentación de la concepción de Kant acerca de la experiencia, del límite del conocimiento humano y del absoluto, tal como aparecen en la Crítica de la Razón Pura, mostrando cómo ya en aquella obra el escepticismo juega un rol determinante (capítulo 1). A continuación, se exponen las ideas y los argumentos fundamentales del escrito hegeliano de 1802 sobre el escepticismo (capítulo 2). En el tercer capítulo se muestra la incertidumbre que tuvieron los lectores académicos, entre ellos Schulze, acerca de la autoría de la Revista Crítica de Filosofía, la cual era editada por Schelling y Hegel sin especificar la autoría de cada artículo, y en la que había sido publicado el escrito de Hegel. A esta situación se debe -según la presente tesis- que Schulze haya dirigido sus críticas a Schelling y no a Hegel. En los capítulos cuarto y quinto se exponen las tesis fundamentales que Schulze sostiene en los escritos mencionados de 1803 y 1805. El capítulo central, el sexto, consiste en un comentario de toda la Introducción a la Fenomenología a la luz del debate velado con Schulze y en atención particular al concepto hegeliano de experiencia. El último capítulo examina a grandes rasgos, a partir de lo demostrado, la concepción de Hegel sobre el escepticismo y sobre el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la Fenomenología del Espíritu. Se distingue un escepticismo estructural, que forma parte de la dinámica de la experiencia, de un escepticismo histórico que constituye una figura puntual del itinerario de la experiencia que hace la conciencia. En el mismo capítulo se considera el destino que tuvo el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la obra de Hegel y se concluye que sigue de cerca el destino de la Fenomenología y se indagan los motivos. También se examina sucintamente el papel del escepticismo en la Ciencia de la Lógica y en las Lecciones de Historia de la Filosofía. En las Conclusiones Finales de este trabajo doctoral se retoman en forma comparada y sintética las concepciones de Kant, de Schulze y de Hegel acerca de la experiencia, el límite, el absoluto y la libertad.

Reglas y conciencia de las reglas : Significado, ontología y escepticismo

La tesis analiza dos objeciones corrientes a la interpretación del problema de las reglas por el Wittgenstein de Kripke: el PROBLEMA DE LA OBJETIVIDAD DE LA REGLA, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el PROBLEMA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERNAS entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol de la noción de acuerdo en la misma. La estrategia general de la tesis es examinar las vías de ataque al lenguaje privado (LP) previas a la de Kripke. El contraste con las mismas permite conceptualizar adecuadamente la propuesta de Kripke, para mostrar que las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. En el marco de la tesis, comprendemos por LP a cualquier tesis que sostenga que las condiciones de significatividad del lenguaje pueden ser provistas por estados mentales subjetivos, p.e. creencias, de ahí el solapamiento de la tesis del lenguaje privado con el escepticismo epistemológico y con posiciones solipsistas, y la convicción de que la refutación del LP acarrea la ruina del escepticismo epistemológico. Hay dos versiones clásicas del argumento del LP. Las versiones epistemológicas (Malcom, Fogelin son los representantes que examinamos) derivan la imposibilidad del LP de la imposibilidad de establecer la verdad/corrección de un uso en el contexto de privacidad. La crítica a estas versiones (Ayer, thomson) muestra un círculo justificatorio entre oraciones subjetivas y objetivas. Las versiones semánticas (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) intentan evitar el círculo, elucidando las presuposiciones que le subyacen. Esta respuesta no es satisfactoria ya que o bien regenera el círculo en un nuevo nivel, o bien no logran derrocar al círculo de la justificación. Con Stroud identificamos el fallo común de estas estrategias en el hecho de que en su intento de derrotar al escéptico-privatista, requieren o bien una PREMISA FÁCTICA que indica que conocemos, o bien la especificación del conocimiento como una NOTA DEFINICIONAL de los criterios/condiciones de significatividad que el argumento trascendental elucida en la pregunta del escéptico. Kripke impone un cambio de rumbo en el argumento, al plantear el desafío como una forma de ESCEPTICISMO SEMÁNTICO ONTOLÓGICO, el cual ya no se basa en las limitaciones cognitivas de la privacidad, sino justamente en las presuntas ventajas que presenta. El desafío de Kripke pregunta por las razones que podemos aportar para sostener que no ha ocurrido un cambio en el uso, lo cual equivale a preguntar ¿cómo sabes que tu uso actual CORRESPONDE con tu intención/significado previo? De la imposibilidad de responder a la cuestión clave del realismo clásico (correspondencia) en el caso del significado, Kripke concluye que no puede haber condiciones de verdad para las oraciones semánticas. Esto motiva una paradoja escéptica y una SOLUCIÓN ESCÉPTICA de la paradoja en términos de condiciones de aseverabilidad. Tener en cuenta el abandono de las condiciones de verdad es la clave para responder al problema de la objetividad, mientras que la forma del desafío y el funcionamiento de la concordancia en los juicios como base de atribución, es la clave para la solución del problema de las relaciones internas.

Max Aub y Triunfo (más, con la venia, alguna evocación personal)

Cuando Max Aub visita España por primera vez después de más de un cuarto de siglo de exilio, el periodista Emilio Romero publica un texto crítico y descalificador sobre el escritor. Para canalizar su respuesta, Aub se dirige a Triunfo, revista que en la época se distinguía por su posición antifranquista, que le provocó numerosos problemas con la censura. A partir de esta circunstancia, y durante el segundo y último viaje que Aub realiza a España, el director de Triunfo ofrece al escritor la posibilidad de publicar el Discurso apócrifo, escrito con motivo de su imaginario ingreso en la Academia Española. A pesar del escepticismo de Aub sobre el éxito de este proyecto, la revista consigue editar en junio de 1972 un suplemento especial con el texto íntegro del discurso aubiano, documento que se reproduce en este número de Olivar.

The dogmatist, Moore's proof and transmission failure

Peer reviewed

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Europe is still standing. CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2014

Despite the fact that anti-establishment, mostly euro-sceptic parties won about one-fifth of the vote in the European Parliament elections last month, Daniel Gros insists that it is not quite accurate (or fair) to characterise the result as a rejection of Europe. He argues that the deeper roots of the surge of euro-sceptic and other protest parties originate with the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and dysfunctional national political systems. Tinkering with austerity or the fundamental right of free movement within the EU will not make much of a difference and, in his view, only reform at home, in national capitals, will stem the tide of euro-scepticism.

Shale gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania. Political context - legal status - outlook. OSW Report, September 2012

Despite their initial interest in shale gas exploration, over the past year Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have become increasingly sceptical about the development of unconventional gas resources. In January of this year Bulgaria introduced an indefinite ban on the exploration and production of shale gas and Romania followed suit in May by introducing a six-month moratorium on exploration work, which it plans to extend by another two years following the country’s parliamentary elections scheduled for December. Similar measures are being planned by the government in Prague. The aim of this report is to explore the reasons why countries which claim to want to improve their energy security have been showing increasing scepticism towards shale gas.

Europe's economic challenges and the importance of ideas and innovation. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

How will we Europeans earn our living in 20 or 30 years' time? And how can it be done, while remaining true to our values of fairness, freedom and solidarity? These fundamental questions predate the financial crisis and will still be with us once we have fully overcome it. Of all the groups in society, business leaders are probably most keenly aware of the challenge posed by globalisation. They have their finger on the pulse of global economic activity and keep alerting me that Europe is losing out. The trade unions, generally more focused on the economy's demand side, regularly call for more (public) investment. Their leadership remains highly committed to Europe but they can sense a rise of Euro-scepticism among their members. We must, and can bring these two narratives together. Yes, global change is relentless and our societies must adapt, but we can also preserve what makes Europe such a special place: a unique combination of relative prosperity, solidarity, individual freedoms, and security. This challenge was always on my mind.

Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions. OSW Commentary No. 59, 2011-07-26

Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited. The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisation of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolutions, and its stance was reactive. The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes.

Sustainable Development and Collective Learning: Theory and a European Case Study. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 7/2004

Network governance of collective learning processes is an essential approach to sustainable development. The first section of the article briefly refers to recent theories about both market and government failures that express scepticism about the way framework conditions for market actors are set. For this reason, the development of networks for collective learning processes seems advantageous if new solutions are to be developed in policy areas concerned with long-term changes and a stepwise internalisation of externalities. With regard to corporate actors’ interests, the article shows recent insights from theories about the knowledge-based firm, where the creation of new knowledge is based on the absorption of societal views. This concept shifts the focus towards knowledge generation as an essential element in the evolution of sustainable markets. This involves at the same time the development of new policies. In this context innovation-inducing regulation is suggested and discussed. The evolution of the Swedish, German and Dutch wind turbine industries are analysed based on the approach of governance put forward in this article. We conclude that these coevolutionary mechanisms may take for granted some of the stabilising and orientating functions previously exercised by basic regulatory activities of the state. In this context, the main function of the governments is to facilitate learning processes that depart from the government functions suggested by welfare economics.

The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: An Imperfect Storm. CEPS Paperback, 17 August 2015

After five years of debates, consultations and negotiations, the European institutions reached an agreement in 2013 on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the 2014-2020 period. The outcome has major implications for the EU’s budget and farmers’ incomes but also for Europe’s environment, its contribution to global climate change and to food security in the EU and in the world. It was decided to spend more than €400 billion during the rest of the decade on the CAP.The official claims are that the new CAP will take better account of society's expectations and lead to far-reaching changes by making subsidies fairer and ‘greener’ and making the CAP more efficient. It is also asserted that the CAP will play a key part in achieving the overall objective of promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. However, there is significant scepticism about these claims and disappointment with the outcome of the decision-making, the first in which the European Parliament was involved under the co-decision procedure. In contrast to earlier reforms where more substantive changes were made to the CAP, the factors that induced the policy discussions in 2008-13 and those that influenced the decision-making did not reinforce each other. On the contrary, they sometimes counteracted one another, yielding an ‘imperfect storm’ as it were, resulting in more status quo and fewer changes. This book discusses the outcome of the decision-making and the factors that influenced the policy choices and decisions. It brings together contributions from leading academics from various disciplines and policy-makers, and key participants in the process from the European Commission and the European Parliament.

Brexit – lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted “NO” with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.

Georgian drift. The crisis of Georgia's way westwards. OSW POINT OF VIEW 57, 2016-02-22

For several years Georgia has been experiencing processes which may be interpreted as symptoms of a deepening, multidimensional social and political crisis. Reforms have lost momentum, stagnation has set in, and in some areas the situation has begun to revert to the pre-revolution status (including rising crime levels). The Georgian political system has found itself in a serious crisis, while society has become increasingly frustrated and apathetic, mainly because people’s standards of living have been stagnating. This political and social malaise has been breeding Euro-scepticism and disenchantment with the West. A country that had been firmly navigating westwards, Georgia has now started drifting and slipping into malaise. This risks reversing what the country has achieved so far in the internal dimension, increasing instability and triggering a crisis in the pro-Western vector of Tbilisi’s foreign policy. While that may not necessarily mean a turn towards Russia, in the present situation it has been easier for Moscow to pursue its own interests in the region. Should Tbilisi’s pro-Western course become reversed or permanently stagnant, that would entail grave consequences for the country itself and beyond. It would be a defeat for the West and would undermine the European aspirations of countries like Ukraine or Moldova.

The Portuguese Economic Crisis: Policies and Outcomes. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 19.02.2015

The financial and economic crisis in the aftermath of 2008 is unique for several reasons: its depth, its speed and its global entanglement. Simultaneous economic decline in many economies around the globe sent out political shockwaves. In Europe, the crisis served as a wake-up call. Policymakers responded to the social and political insecurity triggered by economically unsound practices with solidarity and with EU-scepticism. The recession confronted Euro zone countries with a number of similar problems, although each was embedded in its own set of country-specific challenges. The tools with which each began to counteract the financial and sovereign debt crisis differed. This policy brief examines the Portuguese path to recovery. It outlines some of the great recession’s main impacts on the country’s labour market, as well as analyses the path it has taken to restore sustainable jobs.

“Proximising” climate change reconsidered: A construal level theory perspective

Reducing the psychological distance of climate change has repeatedly been proposed as one strategy to increase individuals' motivation to respond to climate change. From the perspective of construal level theory, decreasing psychological distance should not itself influence people's willingness to act but change the processes that underlie individual decision-making. We conducted two experiments in which we manipulated the psychological distance of climate change. We found that participants with a distant focus relied more on scepticism to represent risks and make decisions about supporting climate change, whereas participants with a proximal perspective relied more on fear when making such judgements. However, the predicted Fear × Distance interaction was only found when self-reported fear rather than experimentally manipulated fear was used as a moderator. Our results suggest that simply proximising won't increase engagement and call for a more differentiated perspective on the effects of psychological distance in the context of climate change.