Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Human capital and regional development

We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world s surface and 97 percent of its GDP. We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand establishments located in these regions. To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model of human capital externalities. The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and possibly human capital externalities help understand the data.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

What comes to mind

We present a model of intuitive inference, called local thinking, in which anagent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved frommemory to evaluate a hypothesis. In this model, selected and limited recall ofinformation follows a version of the respresentativeness heuristic. The model canaccount for some of the evidence on judgment biases, including conjunction anddisjunction fallacies, but also for several anomalies related to demand for insurance.

Learning of courtship components in Drosophila mercatorum (Paterson & Wheller) (Diptera, Drosophilidae)

In Drosophila, courtship is an elaborate sequence of behavioural patterns that enables the flies to identify conspecific mates from those of closely related species. This is important because drosophilids usually gather in feeding sites, where males of various species court females vigorously. We investigated the effects of previous experience on D. mercatorum courtship, by testing if virgin males learn to improve their courtship by observing other flies (social learning), or by adjusting their pre-existent behaviour based on previous experiences (facilitation). Behaviours recorded in a controlled environment were courtship latency, courtship (orientation, tapping and wing vibration), mating and other behaviours not related to sexual activities. This study demonstrated that males of D. mercatorum were capable of improving their mating ability based on prior experiences, but they had no social learning on the development of courtship.

Salience and consumer choice

We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer's attention is drawnto salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when itstands out among the good's attributes, relative to that attribute's average level in the choice set (orgenerally, the evoked set). Consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributesand their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts fora variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects, context-dependent willingness to pay, andlarge shifts in demand in response to price shocks.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Baerveldt aqueous shunt implantation into the ciliary sulcus

Purpose: Aqueous shunt implantation into the anterior chamber is associated with corneal decompensation in up to a third of eyes. Intracameral tube position may affect corneal endothelial cell loss. The authors set out to examine the efficacy and safety of Baerveldt shunt implantation into the ciliary sulcus combined with surgical peripheral iridectomy (SPI). Methods: One hundred eyes prospectively underwent Baerveldt shunt implantation into the cilliary sulcus combined with SPI, leaving a short intracameral tube length (1-2mm). Pre and post operative measures recorded included patient demographics, visual acuity, IOP, number of glaucoma medications (GMs) and all complications. Pre-existing corneal decompensation was recorded. Success was defined as IOP≤21mmHg and 20% reduction in IOP from baseline with or without GMs. Results: Mean age was 65.4 years (±20.4years). Mean follow-up was 10.8 months. Preoperatively IOP was 25.7mmHg (± 9.9mmHg), GMs were 2.9 (±1.2) and VA was 0.4 (±0.3). At one year postoperatively there was a significant drop in IOP (mean= 13.3mmHg (± 5.0mmHg); p<0.001) and number of GMs (mean= 1.3 (±1.4); p<0.001); and no significant change in VA (mean= 0.4 (±0.3); p=0.93). The success rate at one year was 83%. Complications were minor and non sight threatening (10%), there were no cases of postoperative corneal decompensation, tube blockage or iris/corneal-tube contact. Conclusions: The results demonstrate that placement of Baerveldt shunts into the ciliary sulcus with SPI is a safe and efficacious method of IOP reduction in comparison with standard shunt positioning in the anterior chamber. The intracameral tube position combined with SPI avoided tube-iris contact and corneal decompensation. Sulcus placement of aqueous shunts should be considered in pseudophakic eyes.

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Kauko Pirinen