Cases and other materials on judicial remedies, from the forms of actions and the classical equity practice to the Federal rules of civil procedure,

"Tables of cases": p. 1295-1301. "Table of statutes, constitutional provisions and rules of court": p. 1303-1309

Code practice and remedies : in courts of record in civil cases in the western states, with forms, compiled for use in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wyoming /

On spine: Bancroft's code practice and remedies, with forms.

Code pleading, practice and remedies in courts of record in civil cases in the western states, with forms. Ten-year supplement to Bancroft's Code pleading and Bancroft's Code practice and remedies, 1926-1936 ...

Compiled by J. O. Tucker, O. L. Huff, M. L. Kittredge and E. H. Stetson of the publisher's editorial staff. cf. Pref.

The Practical medicine. A medical journal for the busy practitioner, specially devoted to practical diagnosis and treatment of disease by improved methods and new remedies.

Editor: 1909-10. Ram Narain.

A treatise on the police of the metropolis; containing a detail of the various crimes and misdemeanors by which public and private property and security are, at present, injured and endangered: and suggesting remedies for their prevention.

Mode of access: Internet.

Reasserting the distinctive character of share-holder remedies in Scotland - Wilson v Inverness Retail and Business Park Ltd

Juridical Review. Looks at the question of whether an individual shareholder has title to bring an action on the company's behalf in exceptional circumstances, as considered in the cases of Anderson v Hogg and Wilson v Inverness Retail & Business Park Ltd. Examines the difference between English and Scottish law in this area, notwithstanding the reliance on English case law in Scotland due to the small number of Scottish cases decided. Looks at progress towards the reform of company law and the impact it will have on a shareholder's title to sue.

Effect of poor curing conditions and remedies on the durability of steel in concrete

An investigation was undertaken to study the effect of poor curing simulating hot climatic conditions and remedies on the durability of steel in concrete. Three different curing environments were used i.e. (1) Saturated Ca(OH)2 solution at 20°C, (2) Saturated Ca(OH)2 solution at 50°C and (3) Air at 50°C at 30% relative humidity. The third curing condition corresponding to the temperature and relative humidity typical of Middle Eastern Countries. The nature of the hardened cement paste matrix, cured under the above conditions was studied by means of Mercury Intrusion Porosimetry for measuring pore size distribution. The results were represented as total pore volume and initial pore entry diameter. The Scanning Electron Microscope was used to look at morphological changes during hydration, which were compared to the Mercury Intrusion Porosimetry results. X-ray defraction and Differential Thermal Analysis techniques were also employed for looking at any phase transformations. Polymer impregnation was used to reduce the porosity of the hardened cement pastes, especially in the case of the poorly cured samples. Carbonation rates of unimpregnated and impregnated cements were determined. Chloride diffusion studies were also undertaken to establish the effect of polymer impregnation and blending of the cements. Finally the corrosion behaviour of embedded steel bars was determined by the technique of Linear Polarisation. The steel was embedded in both untreated and polymer impregnated hardened cement pastes placed in either a solution containing NaCl or an environmental cabinet which provided carbonation at 40°C and 50% relative humidity.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Previous empirical assessments of the effectiveness of structural merger remedies have focused mainly on the subsequent viability of the divested assets. Here, we take a different approach by examining how competitive are the market structures which result from the divestments. We employ a tightly specified sample of markets in which the European Commission (EC) has imposed structural merger remedies. It has two key features: (i) it includes all mergers in which the EC appears to have seriously considered, simultaneously, the possibility of collective dominance, as well as single dominance; (ii) in a previous paper, for the same sample, we estimated a model which proved very successful in predicting the Commission’s merger decisions, in terms of the market shares of the leading firms. The former allows us to explore the choices between alternative theories of harm, and the latter provides a yardstick for evaluating whether markets are competitive or not – at least in the eyes of the Commission. Running the hypothetical post-remedy market shares through the model, we can predict whether the EC would have judged the markets concerned to be competitive, had they been the result of a merger rather than a remedy. We find that a significant proportion were not competitive in this sense. One explanation is that the EC has simply been inconsistent – using different criteria for assessing remedies from those for assessing the mergers in the first place. However, a more sympathetic – and in our opinion, more likely – explanation is that the Commission is severely constrained by the pre-merger market structures in many markets. We show that, typically, divestment remedies return the market to the same structure as existed before the proposed merger. Indeed, one can argue that any competition authority should never do more than this. Crucially, however, we find that this pre-merger structure is often itself not competitive. We also observe an analogous picture in a number of markets where the Commission chose not to intervene: while the post-merger structure was not competitive, nor was the pre-merger structure. In those cases, however, the Commission preferred the former to the latter. In effect, in both scenarios, the EC was faced with a no-win decision. This immediately raises a follow-up question: why did the EC intervene for some, but not for others – given that in all these cases, some sort of anticompetitive structure would prevail? We show that, in this sample at least, the answer is often tied to the prospective rank of the merged firm post-merger. In particular, in those markets where the merged firm would not be the largest post-merger, we find a reluctance to intervene even where the resulting market structure is likely to be conducive to collective dominance. We explain this by a willingness to tolerate an outcome which may be conducive to tacit collusion if the alternative is the possibility of an enhanced position of single dominance by the market leader. Finally, because the sample is confined to cases brought under the ‘old’ EC Merger Regulation, we go on to consider how, if at all, these conclusions require qualification following the 2004 revisions, which, amongst other things, made interventions for non-coordinated behaviour possible without requiring that the merged firm be a dominant market leader. Our main conclusions here are that the Commission appears to have been less inclined to intervene in general, but particularly for Collective Dominance (or ‘coordinated effects’ as it is now known in Europe as well as the US.) Moreover, perhaps contrary to expectation, where the merged firm is #2, the Commission has to date rarely made a unilateral effects decision and never made a coordinated effects decision.