Public, Private and University Collaboration: Applying a Retrospective Study of the Central Massachusetts Bio-Medical Cluster, Cluster Project Summary for Mosakowski Institute

Three Clark faculty members are studying the development of the Worcester Biotechnology Cluster for any lessons it might hold for current efforts to catalyze the growth of a sustainable energy/green jobs cluster in Worcester or elsewhere. Mary Ellen Boyle (GSOM), Jennie Stephens (IDCE/ESP), and Jing Zhang (GSOM) have conducted extensive in-depth interviews and combed the literature of cluster development to produce several articles and working papers.

Productivity Growth and Efficiency in Indian Banking: A Comparison of Public, Private, and Foreign Banks

India's public sector banks (PSBs) are compared unfavorably with their private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign. This comparison rests, for the most part, on financial measures of performance, and such a comparison provides much of the rationale for privatization of PSBs.In this paper, we attempt a comparison between PSBs and their private sector counterparts based on measures of productivity that use quantities of outputs and inputs. We employ two measures of productivity: Tornqvist and Malmquist total factor productivity growth. We attempt these comparisons over the period 1992-2000, comparing PSBs with both domestic private and foreign banks. Out of a total of four comparisons we have made, there are no differences in three cases, PSBs do better in two, and foreign banks in one. To put it differently, PSBs are seen to be at a disadvantage in only one out of six comparisons. It is difficult, therefore, to sustain the proposition that efficiency and productivity have been lower in public sector banks relative to their peers in the private sector.

Implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): an empirical analysis for the case of Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented to circumvent budgetary constraints, and to encourage efficiency and quality in the provision of public infrastructure in order to reach social welfare. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater larger will be the economic reward to the contractor. The main aim of this paper is to identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To that end, Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information of motorways of the Spanish network of 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Effectiveness of safety-based incentives in Public Private Partnerships: Evidence from the case of Spain

Many countries around the world are implementing Public?Private?Partnership (PPP) contacts to manage road infrastructure. In some of these contracts the public sector introduces economic incentives to the private operator to foster the accomplishment of social goals. One of the incentives that have been introduced in some PPP contracts is related to safety in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater will be the economic reward to the contractor. The aim of this paper is at identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in highway PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios. To this end Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from highway sections in Spain. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Public Private Partnerships in the Humanitarian Aid

This master thesis is intended to perform an exploratory approach for the potential to Public-Private Partnerships as a tool for advanced collaboration between businesses and the cooperation system in the specific context of humanitarian action. It intends to conduct a case study analysis of representative interactions between the public and private actors in the humanitarian aid, and in conjunction with a profound revision of the existing literature, creates a set of conclusions and recommendations that can serve as a prototype for possible inclusion guide the private sector in humanitarian action through new paradigms that go beyond the classical donor-recipient model.

EU support mechanisms to promote public private partnerships for financing Trans-European transport infrastructure

Since the mid 80ies the Trans ‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) policy has been setting the framework for the development of infrastructure for the smooth functioning of the internal market within the European Union (EU). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have always been regarded by the EU as a key instrument to promote the TEN‐T.

Analysis of safety-based incentives in public private partnerships. The case of Spain

OUTLINE: • Introduction • Experimental Setup • Experimental Procedure • Experimental Results - Surface Roughness - Residual Stresses - Friction - Wear - EDX • Conclusions

Analysis of alternative tendering mechanisms for transportation Public-Private Partnerships

This paper describes a theoretical model based primarily on transaction costs, for comparing the various tendering mechanisms used for transportation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. In particular, the model contrasts negotiated procedures with the open procedure, as defined by the current European Union legislation on public tendering. The model includes both ex ante transaction costs (borne during the tendering stage) and ex post transaction costs (such as enforcement costs, re-negotiation costs, and costs arising from litigation between partners), explaining the trade-off between them. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the open procedure implies lower transaction costs ex ante, while the negotiated procedure reduces the probability of the appearance of new contingencies not foreseen in the contract, hence diminishing the expected value of transaction costs ex post. Therefore, the balance between ex ante and ex post transaction costs is the main criterion for deciding whether the open or negotiated procedure would be optimal. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence currently exists only on ex ante transaction costs in transportation infrastructure projects. This evidence has shown a relevant difference between the two procedures as far as ex ante costs are concerned, favouring the open procedure. The model developed in this paper also demonstrates that a larger degree of complexity in a contract does not unequivocally favour the use of a negotiated procedure. Only in those cases dealing with very innovative projects, where important dimensions of the quality of the asset or service are not verifiable, may we observe an advantage in favour of the negotiated procedure. The bottom line is that we find it difficult to justify the employment of negotiated procedures in most transportation PPP contracts, especially in the field of roads. Nevertheless, the field remains open for future empirical work and research on the levels of transaction costs borne ex post in PPP contracts, as well as on the probabilities of such costs appearing under any of the procurement procedures.

Application of Public Private Partnerships to the Spanish Airport System

The current deficit situation of the Spanish airport system suggests the need to manage this in a more efficient and profitable way. One of the possible options is through private management and being able to do this through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This study analyzes the situation of the sector and its economic importance and the different possibilities for introducing private management in a public company, specifying the situation in the case of airports, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of these possibilities, and aiming at results obtained in other places where it has been applied. It is proposed that the ideal model for the introduction of private management would be through PPP models tailored to each airport, but having common characteristics according to the group they belong to. Finally, we observe that not all airports are commercially attractive, so that the PPP concept does not apply to all of them. In some cases even the operability itself is not viable at all, and that should be considered separately in order to avoid creating a private monopoly while trying to enhance competition among them.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

The role of private sector in development: The relation between public-private investment in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries

Increasing foreign private investment in developing countries explains why the Public-Private Investment (PPI) is becoming a key tool to reach the development goal. This article analyzes the relation between PPI in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries. We use the panel data approach (52 countries and 17 years). Results show that PPI in infrastructure has a positive impact on agricultural exports of developing countries. The impact is greater in developing countries with higher income rates. This suggests that the lower income countries require the intervention of public sector without which private investment cannot help to economic development.