On trust, knowledge, sharing and innovation

Organisations continuously innovate, create, and are competitive if they improve their performance through continuous intellectual capital development, a key resource for value creation and organisational performance driver. Apart from sustaining competitive advantage, intellectual capital is increasingly important due to its ability to increase shareholder value, especially in public organisations. Employee learning, talent development, and knowledge creation allow the organisation to generate innovative ideas due to the quickness of knowledge obsolescence. The organisation's dynamic capabilities create and re-ignite organisational competencies for business sustainability being co-ordinated by well-structured organisational strategic routines ensuring continuous value creation streams into the business. This chapter focuses on the relationship between notions of knowledge sharing and trust in organisations. Lack of trust can impact negatively organisational knowledge sharing, dependent on trust, openness, and communication. The research sample included graduates and postgraduate students from two universities in Portugal. The findings revealed different perceptions according to the age group.

From perfect strangers to research partners: a study of relationships, resource sharing and perceived benefits within R&D cooperation networks

Doctoral thesis in Marketing and Strategy.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Marx's analysis of the falling rate of profit on the first version of volume III of capital

The paper provides a description and analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that Marx thought that the rate of profit must fall and even in the 1870s hoped to be able to provide a demonstration of this. However the main conclusions are: 1. Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section. 2. Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. 3. Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.

A Descriptive and analytic look at Marx's own explanations of the falling rate of profit (second version)

This paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marx's arguments for the falling rate of profit from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, The General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. The conclusions are as follows: First, Marx realised that his main attempt to give an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit, which occurred in the General Law section, had failed; but he still hoped that he would be able to demonstrate it in the future. Second, the Hodgskin and General Law sections contain a number of subsidiary explanations, mostly related to resource scarcity, some of which are correct. Third, Part III of volume III does not contain a demonstration of the falling rate of profit, but a description of the role of the falling rate of profit in capitalist development. Forth, it also contains suppressed references to resource scarcity. And finally, in Chapter 3 of Volume III, Marx says that it is resource scarcity that causes the fall in the rate of profit described in Part III of the same volume. The key to all these conclusions in the careful analysis of the General Law section.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism (Long version)

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism.

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.

A descriptive and analytic look at Marxs own explanations for the falling rate of profit (Long Version)

Marxs conclusions about the falling rate of profit have been analysed exhaustively. Usually this has been done by building models which broadly conform to Marxs views and then showing that his conclusions are either correct or, more frequently, that they can not be sustained. By contrast, this paper examines, both descriptively and analytically, Marxs arguments from the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value, the General Law section of the recently published Volume 33 of the Collected Works and Chapter 3 of Volume III of Capital. It also gives a new interpretation of Part III of this last work. The main conclusions are first, that Marx had an intrinsic explanation of the falling rate of profit but was unable to give it a satisfactory demonstration and second, that he had a number of subsidiary explanations of which the most important was resource scarcity. The paper closes with an assessment of the pedigree of various currents of Marxian thought on this issue.

Land, technical progress and the falling rate of profit

The paper sets out a one sector growth model with a neoclassical production function in land and a capital-labour aggregate. Capital accumulates through capitalist saving, the labour supply is infinitely elastic at a subsistence wage and all factors may experience factor augmenting technical progress. The main result is that, if the elasticity of substitution between land and the capital-labour aggregate is less than one and if the rate of caital augmenting technical progress is strictly positive, then the rate of profit will fall to zero. The surprise is that this result holds regardless of the rate of land augmenting technical progress; that is, no amount of technical advance in agriculture can stop the fall in the rate of profit. The paper also discusses the relation of this result to the classical and Marxist literature and sets out the path of the relative price of land.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

The Importance of Revenue Sharing for the Local Economic Impacts of a Renewable Energy Project: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach

As demand for electricity from renewable energy sources grows, there is increasing interest, and public and financial support, for local communities to become involved in the development of renewable energy projects. In the UK, “Community Benefit” payments are the most common financial link between renewable energy projects and local communities. These are “goodwill” payments from the project developer for the community to spend as it wishes. However, if an ownership stake in the renewable energy project were possible, receipts to the local community would potentially be considerably higher. The local economic impacts of these receipts are difficult to quantify using traditional Input-Output techniques, but can be more appropriately handled within a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework where income flows between agents can be traced in detail. We use a SAM for the Shetland Islands to evaluate the potential local economic and employment impact of a large onshore wind energy project proposed for the Islands. Sensitivity analysis is used to show how the local impact varies with: the level of Community Benefit payments; the portion of intermediate inputs being sourced from within the local economy; and the level of any local community ownership of the project. By a substantial margin, local ownership confers the greatest economic impacts for the local community.