Implicações da União Econômica e Monetária Europeia sobre a política econômica dos PIGS: uma análise sobre a crise das dívidas soberanas

The present work intends to analyze the impacts of the European Economic and Monetary Union in the economic policies of the countries named PIGS, with an analysis about the sovereign debt crisis, in view of the autonomy loss to adopt own monetary and exchange rate policies of countries with different levels of development

Die Schuldenkrise und die Unterstützung der Europäischen Union

Die Unterstützung der EU durch ihre Bürger ist spätestens seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht Gegenstand einer Vielzahl von Beiträgen in der Einstellungsforschung. Eine zentrale Annahme der bisherigen Forschung war die große Distanz der EU zur Alltagswirklichkeit der Bürger. Nach dieser werden Einstellungen zur EU nur aufwendig oder mit Rückgriff auf Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat gebildet. Mit der Euro-Schuldenkrise, deren wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen für die Bürger und einer Vielzahl von EU-Krisengipfeln erfuhr die europäische Politik seit 2010 eine enorme Aufmerksamkeit in der Öffentlichkeit. In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung der EU-Unterstützung vergleichend in Deutschland und Griechenland vor und während der Schuldenkrise untersucht: 1) Zunächst wird diskutiert, inwieweit die Schuldenkrise mit den etablierten Determinanten der Unterstützungsforschung theoretisch zusammenhängt. Im Mittelpunkt stehen wirtschaftliche und demokratische Performanz, europäische und nationale Identität sowie Heuristiken zum Nationalstaat. 2) Der Fokus auf Deutschland und Griechenland ermöglicht einen Vergleich der Determinanten vor und während der Krise, da beide Länder substanziell völlig unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichzeitig betroffen waren. Während die Bürger in Griechenland spürbare Wohlstandsverluste erleiden, stellt sich in Deutschland die Frage nach der Solidarität mit den europäischen Nachbarn. 3) Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass die etablierten Determinanten in der Schuldenkrise ihre Relevanz behalten. Das individuelle wirtschaftliche Schicksal ist in Griechenland ein stärkerer Einflussfaktor als vor der Krise. Es bestätigt sich die Erwartung, dass die größere Präsenz der EU in der Krise mit einer geringeren Bedeutung der Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat einhergeht.

Credibility for sale

We develop a model where a sovereign’s incentive to repay its debt depends on the identity of its creditors. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives and thus credibility, for instance, because default would jeopardize the benefits from membership in a club (such as EU or EMU). But higher exposure also carries costs, because of reduced flexibility ex post and because official lenders may collude to extract rents. We characterize the equilibrium composition of debt across creditor groups as well as equilibrium debt prices. Our model can account for an important— and still unexplained—feature of sovereign debt crises: Official lending to sovereigns takes place only in times of debt distress and carries a favorable rate. It also offers a novel perspective on the interaction between deficits, debt overhang and the availability of official funds in determining default risk.

Populist Communication in the Context of European Parliament Elections 2014

Over the last decade European democracies have been facing a challenge by the rising force of new populist movements. The emergence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe created new fertile soil for the strengthening of old-established – and the development of new – populist parties in several EU-member states. José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, emphasized his increased unease concerning these developments when he was speaking at the annual Brussels Think Tank Forum on 22. April 2013: “I am deeply concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis; […]” (Barroso 2013). Indeed, European elites seem to be increasingly worried by these recent developments which are perceived as an impending stress test of the Union and the project of European integration as a whole (Hartleb 2013). Sure enough, the results of the recent European Parliament Elections 2014 revealed a great support for populist political parties in many societies of EU-member countries. To understand the success of populist parties in Europe it is crucial to first shed light on the nature of populist party communication itself. Significant communicative differences may explain the varying success of populist parties between and within countries, while a pure demand-side approach (i.e. a focus on the preferences of the electorate) often fails to do so (Mudde 2010). The aim of this study is therefore to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerge during the EP election campaign 2014 and under which conditions populist communication styles are selected by political parties. So far, the empirical measurement of populism has received only scarce attention (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Besides, most of the existing empirical investigations of populism are single case studies (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008) and scholars have not yet developed systematic methods to measure populism in a comparative way (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). This is a consequence of a lack of conceptual clarity which goes along with populism (Taggart 2000; Barr 2009; Canovan 1999) due to its contextual sensitivity. Hence, populism in Europe should be analysed in a way that clarifies the concept of populism and moreover takes into account that the Europeanization of politics has an influence on the type of populist party communication, which is intended in the course of that study.

Risk sharing with Multilateral Financial Institutions in infrastructure and energy project financing : effect on capital relief for commercial banks

(Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analyse the main instruments for risk mitigation in infrastructure financing with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). Their review coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and is highly relevant in current times considering the sovereign debt crisis, the lack of available capital and the increases in bank regulation in Western economies. The current macroeconomic environment has seen a slowdown in the level of finance for infrastructure projects, as they pose a higher credit risk given their requirements for long term investments. The rationale for this work is to look for innovative solutions that are focused on the credit risk mitigation of infrastructure and energy projects whilst optimizing the economic capital allocation for commercial banks. This objective is achieved through risk-sharing with MFIs and looking for capital relief in project finance transactions. This research finds out the answer to the main question: "What is the impact of risk-sharing with MFIs on project finance transactions to increase their efficiency and viability?", and is developed from the perspective of a commercial bank assessing the economic capital used and analysing the relevant variables for it: Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). An overview of project finance for the infrastructure and energy sectors in terms of the volume of transactions worldwide is outlined, along with a summary of risk-sharing financing with MFIs. A review of the current regulatory framework beneath risk-sharing in structured finance with MFIs is also analysed. From here, the impact of risk-sharing and the diversification effect in infrastructure and energy projects is assessed, from the perspective of economic capital allocation for a commercial bank. CreditMetrics (J. P. Morgan, 1997) is applied over an existing well diversified portfolio of project finance infrastructure and energy investments, working with the main risk capital measures: economic capital, RAROC, and EVA. The conclusions of this research show that economic capital allocation on a portfolio of project finance along with risk-sharing with MFIs have a huge impact on capital relief whilst increasing performance profitability for commercial banks. There is an outstanding diversification effect due to the portfolio, which is combined with risk mitigation and an improvement in recovery rates through Partial Credit Guarantees issued by MFIs. A stress test scenario analysis is applied to the current assumptions and credit risk model, considering a downgrade in the rating for the commercial bank (lender) and an increase of default in emerging countries, presenting a direct impact on economic capital, through an increase in expected loss and a decrease in performance profitability. Getting capital relief through risk-sharing makes it more viable for commercial banks to finance infrastructure and energy projects, with the beneficial effect of a direct impact of these investments on GDP growth and employment. The main contribution of this work is to promote a strategic economic capital allocation in infrastructure and energy financing through innovative risk-sharing with MFIs and economic pricing to create economic value added for banks, and to allow the financing of more infrastructure and energy projects. This work suggests several topics for further research in relation to issues analysed. (Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analizan los principales instrumentos de mitigación de riesgos en las Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales (IFMs) para la financiación de infraestructuras. Su presentación coincidió con el inicio de la crisis financiera en Agosto de 2007, y sus consecuencias persisten en la actualidad, destacando la deuda soberana en economías desarrolladas y los problemas capitalización de los bancos. Este entorno macroeconómico ha ralentizado la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras. El actual trabajo de investigación tiene su motivación en la búsqueda de soluciones para la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, mitigando los riesgos inherentes, con el objeto de reducir el consumo de capital económico en los bancos financiadores. Este objetivo se alcanza compartiendo el riesgo de la financiación con IFMs, a través de estructuras de risk-sharing. La investigación responde la pregunta: "Cuál es el impacto de risk-sharing con IFMs, en la financiación de proyectos para aumentar su eficiencia y viabilidad?". El trabajo se desarrolla desde el enfoque de un banco comercial, estimando el consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos y analizando las principales variables del riesgo de crédito, Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). La investigación presenta las cifras globales de Project Finance en los sectores de infraestructuras y de energía, y analiza el marco regulatorio internacional en relación al consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos en los que participan IFMs. A continuación, el trabajo modeliza una cartera real, bien diversificada, de Project Finance de infraestructuras y de energía, aplicando la metodología CreditMet- rics (J. P. Morgan, 1997). Su objeto es estimar el consumo de capital económico y la rentabilidad de la cartera de proyectos a través del RAROC y EVA. La modelización permite estimar el efecto diversificación y la liberación de capital económico consecuencia del risk-sharing. Los resultados muestran el enorme impacto del efecto diversificación de la cartera, así como de las garantías parciales de las IFMs que mitigan riesgos, mejoran el recovery rate de los proyectos y reducen el consumo de capital económico para el banco comercial, mientras aumentan la rentabilidad, RAROC, y crean valor económico, EVA. En escenarios económicos de inestabilidad, empeoramiento del rating de los bancos, aumentos de default en los proyectos y de correlación en las carteras, hay un impacto directo en el capital económico y en la pérdida de rentabilidad. La liberación de capital económico, como se plantea en la presente investigación, permitirá financiar más proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, lo que repercutirá en un mayor crecimiento económico y creación de empleo. La principal contribución de este trabajo es promover la gestión activa del capital económico en la financiación de infraestructuras y de proyectos energéticos, a través de estructuras innovadoras de risk-sharing con IFMs y de creación de valor económico en los bancos comerciales, lo que mejoraría su eficiencia y capitalización. La aportación metodológica del trabajo se convierte por su originalidad en una contribución, que sugiere y facilita nuevas líneas de investigación académica en las principales variables del riesgo de crédito que afectan al capital económico en la financiación de proyectos.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

Student's cross-perception of the economic crises in the European Union and in Southeast Asia. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 11, December 2012

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Southeast Asia and the European Union’s financial crisis of 2008 followed by the sovereign debt crisis represented major policy events in the regions and beyond. The crises triggered policy adjustments with implications on economic and other policies. This paper aims at evaluating the perception of university students in the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia on the management of these crises. It strives to confirm several ex ante assumptions about the relationship between students’ background, their policy orientation and their knowledge of the European Union and ASEAN policies. It also provides an analysis of the students’ evaluation of the geopolitical importance of the global regions and the EU and ASEAN policies. The paper is based on opinion surveys conducted during the first part of 2012 at four universities, two in the EU and two in ASEAN countries. In the eyes of EU and ASEAN students, the EU crisis is not being managed appropriately. The citizens of the EU surveyed were even significantly more critical of the EU’s anti-crisis measures than any other surveyed group. Their ASEAN counterparts were generally more positive in their evaluations.

eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

Geopolitical shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Security Policy Brief No. 43, February 2013

Three major geopolitical events are putting the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Most of the region is in a deep monetary and economic crisis. The Arab Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not well managed, could further destabilise the region. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face of these challenges, the EU approaches the Greek sovereign debt crisis nearly exclusively from a financial and economic viewpoint. This brief argues that the EU has to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region, complementing its existing multilateral regional framework with bilateral agreements in order to secure its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: passing the point of no return for Europe's banking union. Egmont Paper No. 58, June 2013

From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.

Pool it, share it, use it: the European Council on defence. Security Policy Brief No. 44, March 2013

Three major geopolitical events are putting the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Most of the region is in a deep monetary and economic crisis. The Arab Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not well managed, could further destabilise the region. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face of these challenges, the EU approaches the Greek sovereign debt crisis nearly exclusively from a financial and economic viewpoint. This brief argues that the EU has to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region, complementing its existing multilateral regional framework with bilateral agreements in order to secure its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism: A Sound First Step in Europe’s Banking Union? Egmont European Affairs Paper, March 2013

The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join. Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully up and running in the first half of 2014. The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore shared risk. On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term. 1 These short-term gains should now be matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned road ahead (§7).

Strengthening the euro area. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.