Yoruba nationalist movements, ethnic politics and violence : a creation from historical consciousness and socio-political space in South-western Nigeria /// Arbeitspapiere / Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien ; 105

Since 1900, the Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria have put its ethnic history at work in the construction of its identity in Nigeria. The exercise resulted in the creation of ethno-nationalist movements and the practice of ethnic politics, often expressed through violent attacks on the Nigerian State and some ethnic groups in Nigeria. Relying on mythological attachment to its traditions and subjective creation of cultural pride, the people created a sense of history that established a common interest among different Yoruba sub-groups in form of pan-Yoruba interest which forms the basis for the people’s imagination of nation. Through this, historical consciousness and socio-political space in which Yoruba people are located acted as instrumental forces employed by Yoruba political elites, both at colonial and post-colonial periods to demand for increasing access to political and economic resources in Nigeria. In form of nationalism, nationalist movements and ethnic politics continued in South-western Nigeria since 1900, yet without resulting to actual creation of an independent Yoruba State up to 2009. Through ethnographic data, the part played by history, tradition and modernity is examined in this paper. While it is concluded that ethno-nationalist movement and ethnic politics in Yoruba society are constructive agenda dated back to pre-colonial period, it continues to transform both in structure and function. Thus, Yoruba ethno-nationalist movement and ethnic politics is ambiguous, dynamic and complex, to the extent that it remains a challenge to State actions in Nigeria.

Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation

This article explores the role of political context in shaping economic biases in representation-the degree to which wealthy citizens' views are more strongly represented than poorer citizens' views in the choices of policymakers. I develop a general model that explains why poorer citizens will be better represented relative to the rich in certain political contexts than others, arguing that the relative representation of the poor will be stronger in contexts that make the views of the poor relevant and accessible to policymakers. I then derive several specific hypotheses that flow from this model and test these hypotheses through a study of the dyadic relationships between citizens and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The results show that poorer citizens are better represented relative to the rich in Congressional districts that are electorally competitive, have low median incomes, have relatively equal distributions of incomes, have a significant organized labor presence, and are represented by Democrats.

Personality and Current Political Beliefs | Comparative Study of Polish and Belgian Samples)"

This project had a threefold aim and sought to provide answers to several different questions. Kossowska first focused on the relationship between Openness to Experience and ideological variables such as authoritarianism and conservatism. The main questions here were (1) whether there are differences between the Polish and Belgian samples studied with respect to the relationship between political ideology and Openness to Experience, and (2) whether this relationship applies to all facets of Openness to Experience. The study showed significant negative correlations between Openness and right-wing ideology in both adult samples, and that Fantasy and Actions were the most robust correlates of political ideology. A second problem examined concerned the relationship between ideology and cognitive functioning. The important questions here were about the conceptualisation and measurement of cognitive variables such as rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, or the need for closure, which determine individuals' attitudes to politics. The results confirmed the significance of the need for closure construct in both samples for understanding the process of formulating and holding political beliefs. The last aspect of the study was the differences in political beliefs between the Polish and Belgian samples in relation to the social, political and economic situation in the two countries. The most important question here was the changes in the political mentality of Poles during the period of system transition. Kossowska expected to find differences between Poles and Belgians with respect to the level of conservatism and authoritarianism, but in fact both samples showed comparable levels of right-wing political beliefs.

Towards a Variety of Family Models: Economic Contributions of Spouses and Family Power

In Western societies the increase in female employment (especially among married women) is seen as having brought about the crisis of the traditional model of the family, reinforcing the position of the "modern" model - the egalitarian family with two working spouses and a "dual-career" family. In contrast, the transitional situation in the post-communist countries during the 1990s is producing a crisis of the family with two working spouses (the basic type of the communist period) and leading to new power relations within the family. While the growth of dual-earner households in this century has implied modification of family models towards greater symmetry of responsibility for breadwinning and homemaking, there is considerable evidence that women's increased employment does not necessarily lead to a more egalitarian approach to gender roles within the family. The group set out to investigate the economic situation of families and economic power within the fame as a crucial factor in the transformation of families with two working spouses in order to reveal the specific patterns of gender contracts and power relations within the family that are emerging in response to the current political and economic transformation. They opted for a comparative approach, selecting the Czech Republic as a country where the very similar tendencies of a few years ago (almost 100% of women employed and the family as a realm of considerable private freedom where both women's and men's gender identities and the traditional distribution of family responsibilities were largely preserved) are combined with a very different experience in terms of economic inequalities during the 1990s to that of Russia. In the first stage of the study they surveyed 300 married couples (150 in each country) on the question of breadwinning. They then carried out in-depth interviews with 10 couples from each country (selected from among the educated layers of the population), focusing on the process of the social construction of gender, using breadwinning and homemaking as gender boundaries which distinguish men from women. By analysing changes in social position and the type of interpersonal interaction of spouses they distinguished two main types of family contracts: the neo-traditional "communal sharing" (with male breadwinner, traditional distribution of family chores and negotiated family power) and the modern one based on negotiated agreement. The most important pre-conditions of husband-wife agreement about breadwinning seemed to imply their overall gender ideology rather than the economic and/or family circumstances. In general, wives were more likely to express egalitarian views, supporting the blurring or even elimination of many gender boundaries. Husbands, on the other hand, more often gave responses calling for the continued maintenance of gender boundaries. The analysis showed that breadwinning is still an important gender boundary in these cultures, one that is assumed unless it is explicitly questioned and that is seen as part of what makes a man a "real man". The majority of respondents seemed to be committed to egalitarian ideology on gender roles and the distribution of family tasks, including decision making, but this is contradicted by the persistent idea of the husband as the breadwinner. This contradiction is more characteristic of the Russian situation than of the Czech. The quantitative study showed a difference in prevailing family models between the two countries, with a clearer shift towards the traditional family contract in the Russian case. The Czechs were more likely to consider their partnerships as based on negotiated agreement, while the Russians saw theirs as based on egalitarian contract, in both cases seeing this as the norm. The majority of couples said they felt satisfied with their marriage, although in both countries wives seemed to be less satisfied. There was however a difference in the issues that aroused dissatisfaction, with Czech women being more sensitive to issues such as self-realisation, personal independence, understanding and recognition in the family, and Russians to issues of love, understanding and recognition. The most disputed area for the majority of families was chores in the home, presumably because in many families both husband and wife were working hard outside the home and because a number of partners had differing views as to the ideal distribution of chores within the family. The distribution of power in the family seems to be linked to the level of well being. The analysis showed that in the dominant democratic model there is still an inverse connection between family leadership and well being: the more prominent the wife's position as head of the family is, the lower the level of family income. This may reflect both the husband's refusal to play the leading role in the family and even his rejection of any involvement in family issues in such a family. The qualitative research revealed that both men and women see the breadwinning role to be an essential part of masculine identity, a role which the female partner would take on temporarily to assist the male but not permanently since this would threaten the gender boundaries and the man's identity. At the same time, few breadwinners expressed a sense of job satisfaction and all considered their choice as imposed on them by the circumstances (i.e. having a family in difficult times). The group feel that family orientation and some loss of personal involvement in their profession is partly reflected in the fact that many of the men felt more comfortable and self-confident at home than at work. Women's work, on the other hand, was largely seen as a source of personal and self-realisation and social life. Eight out of ten of the Russian women interviewed were employed, although only two on a full-time basis, but none saw their jobs as adding substantially to the family budget. Both partners see the most important factor as the wife's wish to work or stay at home, and do not think it wise for the wife to work at the expense of her part of the "family contract", although husbands from the "egalitarian" relationships expressed more willingness to compromise. The analysis showed clearly that wives and husbands did not construct gender boundaries in isolation, with the interviews providing clear evidence of negotiation. At the same time, husbands' interpretations of their wives' employment were less susceptible to the influence of negotiation than were their gender attitudes and norms about breadwinning. One of the most interesting aspects of the spouses' negotiations was the extent to which they disagreed about what they seemed to have agreed upon. Most disagreements about the breadwinning boundaries, however, were over norms and were settled by changes in norms rather than in behavioural interpretation. Changes in norms were often a form of peace offering or were in response in changes in circumstances. The study did show, however, that many of the efforts at cooperation and compensation were more symbolic than real and the group found the plasticity of expressed gender ideology to be one of the most striking findings of their work. They conclude that the shift towards more traditional gednder distributions of incomes and domestic chores does not automatically mean the reestablishment of a patriarchal model of family power. On the contrary, it seems to be a compromise formation, relatively unstable, temporary and containing self-defeating forces as the split between the personal and professional value of work and its social value expressed in a money equivalent cannot be maintained for generations.

Technical Efficiency of State Owned Enterprises in China (1980-1989): An Assessment of the Economic Reforms

This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis to examine changes in levels of technical efficiency over time in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during 1980-1989. Our paper adds to the growing body of literature in this area by obtaining measures of technical efficiency of individual SOEs over years and by identifying how different aspects of the reforms have affected efficiency. We estimate a Tobit regression model, using the technical efficiency score as the dependent variable and a set of reform variables and firm attributes as regressors. We find that specific aspects of the reforms were very effective in improving technical efficiency.

Institutional Infrastructure to Support 'Super Growth' in Kenya: Governance Thresholds, Reversion Rates and Economic Development

Kenya Growth Vision 2030 proposes policy and institutional reforms that make it possible for the country to achieve development status of a middle income country by 2030. This paper outlines the institutional framework necessary to achieve ÈSuper Growth,É which describes the character of growth required to meet targets stipulated in the Vision. The paper provides evidence confirming the importance of improving the quality of governance to the achievement of the Vision. The paper also demonstrates that the country is characterized by a high probability of reverting to poor governance. It is argued that, to achieve super growth, the country must attain an institutional tipping point which associates with low reversion rates to weaker institutions. The paper provides suggestions for institutional reforms that result in the achievement of an institutional tipping point and super growth.

Le contrôle européen des concentrations et les leçons à tirer de la crise financière et économique = European merger control and the lessons of the financial and economic crisis. Research Papers in Law, 06/2013

No abstract.

The beginning of a new political cycle: the results and consequences of a nomination summit. EPC Post-Summit Analysis, 30 June 2014

Despite a broader agenda, the June 2014 European Council was dominated by the decision of EU leaders – taken by qualified majority – to propose to the European Parliament Jean-Claude Juncker as the next Commission President. In this post-summit analysis Janis A. Emmanouilidis argues that recent developments could have four consequences: increasing politicisation at European level; opposition from the side of national governments to what they consider to be an unjustifiable shift of power; further complication, maybe even deterioration of the relationship between London and ‘Brussels; and ‘consolidation’ as the predominant political attitude in the beginning of a new political cycle. Aside from all this, the Summit adopted a Strategic Agenda for the years to come, agreed to new strategic guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, postponed the decision on a new energy and climate framework to October, concluded the fourth European Semester with the adoption of country-specific recommendations, and, last but not least, EU leaders finally signed the Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrating that the Union and these countries are ready to deepen political and economic ties.

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: unfrozen conflicts between Russia and the West. OSW Special Report, 9 July 2008

The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.

Changes in the political elite, economy and society of Belarus: Appearances and reality. OSW Study 30/2008

In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.

Egypt: Changes and Challenges of Political Transition. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 4/May 2011

Hosni Mubarak’s regime and its power system enjoyed remarkable stability for over 30 years. On 11 February 2011, after 18 days of mass protests, the Egyptian president was forced to step down, revealing the unsustainability of the political and economic system that had ensured his continuity for so long. While the revolution of January 25th led to a major success – the fall of Hosni Mubarak – Egypt’s political future is still opaque and exposed to a number of risks. This paper first highlights the factors underpinning the former stability of Mubarak’s regime; it then assesses the causes of its underlying unsustainability, leading to the anti-government popular mobilisation in January-February 2011 and the removal of Mubarak; finally the paper evaluates the prospects for a genuine democratic transition in Egypt, by looking at the main political and socio-economic challenges facing the country.

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

The economic and financial crisis in Russia – background, symptoms and prospects for the future. OSW Report 02/2015

The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.