The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

Ulysses contracts in medicine

Ulysses contracts are a method by which one person binds himself by agreeing to be bound by others. In medicine such contracts have primarily been discussed as ways of treating people with episodic mental illnesses, where the features of the illness are such that they now judge that they will refuse treatment at the time it is needed. Enforcing Ulysses contracts in these circumstances would require medical professionals to override the express refusal of the patient at the time treatment is required, something that is generally problematic both ethically and legally. In this paper I will argue that despite appearances Ulysses contracts can make it the case that treating a patient in such circumstances is an instance of treating him with his consent, although safeguards are needed to ensure that this is the case. Given the potential benefits to patients I further argue that modified Ulysses contracts should be made legally enforceable.

Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: An empirical study

Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

'It Is Not as Easy as ABC': Examining Practitioners' Views on Using Behavioural Contracts to Encourage Young People to Accept Responsibility for their Anti-Social Behaviour

This article examines the use of acceptable behavioural contracts as a tool for engendering the voluntary acceptance of responsibility in children and young people perceived to be engaging in anti-social behaviour and low-level criminality. Based on the results of a qualitative empirical analysis with local government and social housing anti-social behaviour teams, the article explores the attitudes of practitioners to the use of this unregulated but commonly utilised intervention. Practitioners' views are contrasted with the ideals of voluntary responsibilisation upon which the contracts are supposedly based. It is argued that there is a spectrum of differing approaches among practitioners, with some using the contracts more to encourage the voluntary acceptance of responsibility, whilst others use them more coercively to hold individuals responsible for their behaviour. The implications of these differing approaches are examined.

Contracts for the Sale of Land: Understanding the Impecuniosity Defence

Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.

In Protection of Whose “Wellbeing”? Considerations of “Clauses and A/Effects” in Athlete Contracts

Contractual agreements have become an accepted part of participation processes for athletes in a variety of sport contexts. Closer readings of these contracts,however, pose several questions regarding organizational intentions and motivations,the conceptualization of athletes as “workers,” and representation parity. In this article, we draw on four types of athlete contractual documents from both select international “amateur” and “professional” sport settings. Our key considerations include athletes’ ownership over their image and identities; medical and health disclosures; lifestyle, behavioral and body choices, and restrictions beyond sport; adherence to organizational philosophy and commitments; and social media and publicity constraints. Our exegesis here encourages sport researchers to deliberate whose “wellbeing” matters most when signing that seductive dotted line.

Determination of total petroleum hydrocarbons in soil from different locations using infrared spectrophotometry and gas chromatography

Total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) are important environmental contaminants which are toxic to human and environmental receptors. Several analytical methods have been used to quantify TPH levels in contaminated soils, specifically through infrared spectrometry (IR) and gas chromatography (GC). Despite being two of the most used techniques, some issues remain that have been inadequately studied: a) applicability of both techniques to soils contaminated with two distinct types of fuel (petrol and diesel), b) influence of the soil natural organic matter content on the results achieved by various analytical methods, and c) evaluation of the performance of both techniques in analyses of soils with different levels of contamination (presumably non-contaminated and potentially contaminated). The main objectives of this work were to answer these questions and to provide more complete information about the potentials and limitations of GC and IR techniques. The results led us to the following conclusions: a) IR analysis of soils contaminated with petrol is not suitable due to volatilisation losses, b) there is a significant influence of organic matter in IR analysis, and c) both techniques demonstrated the capacity to accurately quantify TPH in soils, irrespective of their contamination levels.

What hides behind the fixed-term contracts wage gap?

In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012 period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones, by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.

Contingent contracts

International businesses bring with them additional negotiation complexities and extra risks, thus calling for negotiation integrative solutions and additional legal protection. The recent economic crisis forced, companies, including SMEs, to look for international markets and face these additional complexities and issues. In the search for a practical and simplified solution, to serve less sophisticated companies, this paper brings insights from the negotiation literature to a specific legal issue. Specifically, I investigate the negotiation and use of contingent agreements as a tool for facilitating the negotiation process and managing risk in international deals. Looking into an international sale of goods from Portugal to Brazil, this paper proposes the structuring of two contingent contracts related to two category of products in order to demonstrate the potential benefits of some of its relevant features, specifically the creation of incentives and identification and allocation of future risks. In general, the structuring of contingent agreements is likely to provide positive results in mitigating the issues of lack of trust and dealing with the additional risks derived from international deals, therefore facilitating and improving the overall quality of the deal.