Computational representations for multi state design tasks and enumeration of mechanical device behaviour

The role of a computer emerged from modeling and analyzing concepts (ideas) to generate concepts. Research into methods for supporting conceptual design using automated synthesis had attracted much attention in the past decades. To find out how designers synthesize solution concepts for multi-state mechanical devices, ten experimental studies were conducted. Observations from these empirical studies would be used as the basis to develop knowledge involved in the multi-state design synthesis process. In this paper, we propose a computational representation for expressing the multi-state design task and for enumerating multi-state behaviors of kinematic pairs and mechanisms. This computational representation would be used to formulate computational methods for the synthesis process to develop a system for supporting design synthesis of multiple state mechanical devices by generating a comprehensive variety of solution alternatives.

Use of Exocentric and Egocentric Representations in the Concurrent Planning of Sequential Saccades

The concurrent planning of sequential saccades offers a simple model to study the nature of visuomotor transformations since the second saccade vector needs to be remapped to foveate the second target following the first saccade. Remapping is thought to occur through egocentric mechanisms involving an efference copy of the first saccade that is available around the time of its onset. In contrast, an exocentric representation of the second target relative to the first target, if available, can be used to directly code the second saccade vector. While human volunteers performed a modified double-step task, we examined the role of exocentric encoding in concurrent saccade planning by shifting the first target location well before the efference copy could be used by the oculomotor system. The impact of the first target shift on concurrent processing was tested by examining the end-points of second saccades following a shift of the second target during the first saccade. The frequency of second saccades to the old versus new location of the second target, as well as the propagation of first saccade localization errors, both indices of concurrent processing, were found to be significantly reduced in trials with the first target shift compared to those without it. A similar decrease in concurrent processing was obtained when we shifted the first target but kept constant the second saccade vector. Overall, these results suggest that the brain can use relatively stable visual landmarks, independent of efference copy-based egocentric mechanisms, for concurrent planning of sequential saccades.

Flexible representations of dynamics are used in object manipulation.

To manipulate an object skillfully, the brain must learn its dynamics, specifying the mapping between applied force and motion. A fundamental issue in sensorimotor control is whether such dynamics are represented in an extrinsic frame of reference tied to the object or an intrinsic frame of reference linked to the arm. Although previous studies have suggested that objects are represented in arm-centered coordinates [1-6], all of these studies have used objects with unusual and complex dynamics. Thus, it is not known how objects with natural dynamics are represented. Here we show that objects with simple (or familiar) dynamics and those with complex (or unfamiliar) dynamics are represented in object- and arm-centered coordinates, respectively. We also show that objects with simple dynamics are represented with an intermediate coordinate frame when vision of the object is removed. These results indicate that object dynamics can be flexibly represented in different coordinate frames by the brain. We suggest that with experience, the representation of the dynamics of a manipulated object may shift from a coordinate frame tied to the arm toward one that is linked to the object. The additional complexity required to represent dynamics in object-centered coordinates would be economical for familiar objects because such a representation allows object use regardless of the orientation of the object in hand.

Neural routing circuits for forming invariant representations of visual objects

This thesis presents a biologically plausible model of an attentional mechanism for forming position- and scale-invariant representations of objects in the visual world. The model relies on a set of control neurons to dynamically modify the synaptic strengths of intra-cortical connections so that information from a windowed region of primary visual cortex (Vl) is selectively routed to higher cortical areas. Local spatial relationships (i.e., topography) within the attentional window are preserved as information is routed through the cortex, thus enabling attended objects to be represented in higher cortical areas within an object-centered reference frame that is position and scale invariant. The representation in V1 is modeled as a multiscale stack of sample nodes with progressively lower resolution at higher eccentricities. Large changes in the size of the attentional window are accomplished by switching between different levels of the multiscale stack, while positional shifts and small changes in scale are accomplished by translating and rescaling the window within a single level of the stack. The control signals for setting the position and size of the attentional window are hypothesized to originate from neurons in the pulvinar and in the deep layers of visual cortex. The dynamics of these control neurons are governed by simple differential equations that can be realized by neurobiologically plausible circuits. In pre-attentive mode, the control neurons receive their input from a low-level "saliency map" representing potentially interesting regions of a scene. During the pattern recognition phase, control neurons are driven by the interaction between top-down (memory) and bottom-up (retinal input) sources. The model respects key neurophysiological, neuroanatomical, and psychophysical data relating to attention, and it makes a variety of experimentally testable predictions.

Ordinary mod p representations of the metaplectic cover of p-adic SL_2

We classify the genuine ordinary mod p representations of the metaplectic group SL(2,F)-tilde, where F is a p-adic field, and compute its genuine mod p spherical and Iwahori Hecke algebras. The motivation is an interest in a possible correspondence between genuine mod p representations of SL(2,F)-tilde and mod p representations of the dual group PGL(2,F), so we also compare the two Hecke algebras to the mod p spherical and Iwahori Hecke algebras of PGL(2,F). We show that the genuine mod p spherical Hecke algebra of SL(2,F)-tilde is isomorphic to the mod p spherical Hecke algebra of PGL(2,F), and that one can choose an isomorphism which is compatible with a natural, though partial, correspondence of unramified ordinary representations via the Hecke action on their spherical vectors. We then show that the genuine mod p Iwahori Hecke algebra of SL(2,F)-tilde is a subquotient of the mod p Iwahori Hecke algebra of PGL(2,F), but that the two algebras are not isomorphic. This is in contrast to the situation in characteristic 0, where by work of Savin one can recover the local Shimura correspondence for representations generated by their Iwahori fixed vectors from an isomorphism of Iwahori Hecke algebras.

Neural and computational representations of decision variables

These studies explore how, where, and when representations of variables critical to decision-making are represented in the brain. In order to produce a decision, humans must first determine the relevant stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes before applying an algorithm that will select an action from those available. When choosing amongst alternative stimuli, the framework of value-based decision-making proposes that values are assigned to the stimuli and that these values are then compared in an abstract “value space” in order to produce a decision. Despite much progress, in particular regarding the pinpointing of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as a region that encodes the value, many basic questions remain. In Chapter 2, I show that distributed BOLD signaling in vmPFC represents the value of stimuli under consideration in a manner that is independent of the type of stimulus it is. Thus the open question of whether value is represented in abstraction, a key tenet of value-based decision-making, is confirmed. However, I also show that stimulus-dependent value representations are also present in the brain during decision-making and suggest a potential neural pathway for stimulus-to-value transformations that integrates these two results.

More broadly speaking, there is both neural and behavioral evidence that two distinct control systems are at work during action selection. These two systems compose the “goal-directed system”, which selects actions based on an internal model of the environment, and the “habitual” system, which generates responses based on antecedent stimuli only. Computational characterizations of these two systems imply that they have different informational requirements in terms of input stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes. Associative learning theory predicts that the habitual system should utilize stimulus and action information only, while goal-directed behavior requires that outcomes as well as stimuli and actions be processed. In Chapter 3, I test whether areas of the brain hypothesized to be involved in habitual versus goal-directed control represent the corresponding theorized variables.

The question of whether one or both of these neural systems drives Pavlovian conditioning is less well-studied. Chapter 4 describes an experiment in which subjects were scanned while engaged in a Pavlovian task with a simple non-trivial structure. After comparing a variety of model-based and model-free learning algorithms (thought to underpin goal-directed and habitual decision-making, respectively), it was found that subjects’ reaction times were better explained by a model-based system. In addition, neural signaling of precision, a variable based on a representation of a world model, was found in the amygdala. These data indicate that the influence of model-based representations of the environment can extend even to the most basic learning processes.

Knowledge of the state of hidden variables in an environment is required for optimal inference regarding the abstract decision structure of a given environment and therefore can be crucial to decision-making in a wide range of situations. Inferring the state of an abstract variable requires the generation and manipulation of an internal representation of beliefs over the values of the hidden variable. In Chapter 5, I describe behavioral and neural results regarding the learning strategies employed by human subjects in a hierarchical state-estimation task. In particular, a comprehensive model fit and comparison process pointed to the use of "belief thresholding". This implies that subjects tended to eliminate low-probability hypotheses regarding the state of the environment from their internal model and ceased to update the corresponding variables. Thus, in concert with incremental Bayesian learning, humans explicitly manipulate their internal model of the generative process during hierarchical inference consistent with a serial hypothesis testing strategy.