Loads and loads and loads: the influence of prospective load, retrospective load, and ongoing task load in prospective memory

In prospective memory tasks different kinds of load can occur. Adding a prospective memory task can impose a load on ongoing task performance. Adding ongoing task load (OTL) can affect prospective memory performance. The existence of multiple target events increases prospective load (PL) and adding complexity to the to-be-remembered action increases retrospective load (RL). In two experiments, we systematically examined the effects of these different types of load on prospective memory performance. Results showed an effect of PL on costs in the ongoing task for categorical targets (Experiment 2), but not for specific targets (Experiment 1). RL and OTL both affected remembering the retrospective component of the prospective memory task. We suggest that PL can enhance costs in the ongoing task due to additional monitoring requirements. RL and OTL seem to impact the division of resources between the ongoing task and retrieval of the retrospective component, which may affect disengagement from the ongoing task. In general, the results demonstrate that the different types of load affect prospective memory differentially.

The formalization fix? Land titling and land concessions in Cambodia

Issuing land titles to smallholder farmers has long been embraced as a way to promote lending and land markets, but is increasingly being reframed as a way to protect smallholders from irresponsible agricultural investment. This brief examines the case of Cambodia, where over the last decade extensive land titling efforts have occurred alongside a wave of large-scale land concessions. The problem, however, is that titling has failed to live up to the rhetoric of systematic coverage, and has often focused on areas where tenure was already relatively secure. Areas outside the titling zone, in contrast, have become formalized de facto through the process of granting land concessions to investors. This undermines pro-poor development significantly.

Flare-up reactions in severe drug hypersensitivity: infection or ongoing T-cell hyperresponsiveness

"Flare-up" reactions are late manifestations of severe T-cell-mediated drug hypersensitivity reactions. Management is anti-inflammatory treatment and avoiding unnecessary medicines. Symptoms like fever, lymph node swelling, and blood count abnormalities may lead to confusion with bacterial infections. For prompt recognition it is important to keep the differential diagnosis in mind.

How to measure Narcissism – an ongoing discussion

Over the last decades, research on narcissism was dominated with a focus on grandiose narcissism as measured by the NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988), however, recent discussions emphasize the broad range of manifestations of narcissism, in particular more vulnerable aspects. As a result, new questionnaires were developed to cover the full range of these aspects. One example is the Pathological Narcissism Scale (PNI, Pincus et al. 2009), a 52 item questionnaire with seven subscales covering both grandiose and vulnerable aspects. Validation studies show that narcissism as measured with the PNI differs substantially from narcissism as measured with the NPI. Moreover, a discussion concerning the composition of grandiose and vulnerable narcissism has evolved from these data. In our study we demonstrate how scores on narcissism and narcissism subtypes are associated with a broad variety of personality and clinical measures. In a sample of 1837 participants (1240 female, 597 male; mean age 26.8 years) we investigated the correlation patterns of both PNI and NPI subscales with constructs like FFM, aggression, emotions, clinical symptoms, and well-being. Results show that the assignment of subscales to grandiose and vulnerable subtypes are not unambiguous. We therefore conclude that the decision of how to measure narcissism needs further investigation.

Trading monopolies in West Africa : a protest against territorial concessions

by E. D. M.

Impact of the Economic Recession on Toll Highway Concessions in Spain

After joining the European Union in 1986, Spain experienced steady economic growth that enabled the country to grow at a greater pace than other European countries. During this period, the government of Spain opted for major investments in public infrastructure by taking advantage both of the funding provided by the European Union and of several types of public-private-partnership (PPP) approaches. Within this framework, the government of Spain between 1996 and 2004 procured a series of toll highway concessions. These concessions entered into operation a few years before the global economic recession made itself felt in Spain. The concession contracts signed between the government and some private consortia allocated most of the risks (expropriation, construction, and traffic) to the private sector. In this paper the impact that the economic recession has had on the business performance of the concessionaires is assessed, and the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the government to help the concessionaire to avoid bankruptcy is analyzed. It was found that some of the guarantees offered by the legal framework to the concessionaires in case of bankruptcy are prompting an outcome that could negatively affect the users. In addition to that, some suggestions as to how to better allocate risk in toll highway concessions in the future are provided.

Traffic uncertainty in toll motorway concessions in Spain

This study assessed the inaccuracy of the traffic estimates for toll motorway concessions in Spain. It was found that the estimates conducted by both the government and the concessionaire showed a significant bias towards overestimating traffic. The level of overestimation in Spain is even greater than that reported by other studies based on worldwide data. The notorious levels of overestimation entail severe burdens to the economics of the concessionaires that often prompt renegotiations of the contracts, which are often accepted by the government. These renegotiations usually end up with toll changes or extension of the concession terms, which have to be ultimately borne by future motorway users. It is postulated herein that the bias towards overestimating traffic in toll motorways in Spain is mostly caused by strategic issues rather than by modelling errors.

Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions in Spain: Lessons from Economic Recession

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

The influence of economic incentives linked to road safety indicators on accidents: The case of toll concessions in Spain

The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the incentives incorporated in toll highway concession contracts in order to encourage private operators to adopt measures to reduce accidents are actually effective at improving safety. To this end, we implemented negative binomial regression models using information about highway characteristics and accident data from toll highway concessions in Spain from 2007 to 2009. Our results show that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not managed by the contractor, such as the annual average daily traffic (AADT), the percentage of heavy vehicles on the highway, number of lanes, number of intersections and average speed; the implementation of these incentives has a positive influence on the reduction of accidents and injuries. Consequently, this measure seems to be an effective way of improving safety performance in road networks.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

Empirical analysis of traffic volume for the application of the options theory to highway concessions

*************************************************************************************** EL WCTR es un Congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte que hasta el 2010 publicaba sus libros de abstracts con ISBN. Por ello consideramos que debería seguir teníendose en cuenta para los indicadores de calidad ******************************************************************************************* Investment projects in the field of transportation infrastructures have a high degree of uncertainty and require an important amount of resources. In highway concessions in particular, the calculation of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project by means of the discount of cash flows, may lead to erroneous results when the project incorporates certain flexibility. In these cases, the theory of real options is an alternative tool for the valuation of concessions. When the variable that generates uncertainty (in our case, the traffic) follows a random walk (or Geometric Brownian Motion), we can calculate the value of the options embedded in the contract starting directly from the process followed by that variable. This procedure notably simplifies the calculation method. In order to test the hypothesis of the evolution of traffic as a Geometric Brownian Motion, we have used the available series of traffic in Spanish highways, and we have applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller approach, which is the most widely used test for this kind of study. The main result of the analysis is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that traffic follows a Geometric Brownian Motion in the majority of both toll highways and free highways in Spain.

Ongoing immunoglobulin somatic mutation in germinal center B cell-like but not in activated B cell-like diffuse large cell lymphomas

B cell diffuse large cell lymphoma (B-DLCL) is a heterogeneous group of tumors, based on significant variations in morphology, clinical presentation, and response to treatment. Gene expression profiling has revealed two distinct tumor subtypes of B-DLCL: germinal center B cell-like DLCL and activated B cell-like DLCL. In a separate study, we determined that B-DLCL can also be subdivided into two groups based on the presence or absence of ongoing Ig gene hypermutation. Here, we evaluated the correlation between these B-DLCL subtypes established by the two different methods. Fourteen primary B-DLCL cases were studied by gene expression profiling using DNA microarrays and for the presence of ongoing mutations in their Ig heavy chain gene. All seven cases classified as germinal center B cell-like DLCL by gene expression showed the presence of ongoing mutations in the Ig genes. Five of the seven cases classified by gene expression as activated B cell-like DLCL had no ongoing somatic mutations, whereas, in the remaining two cases, a single point mutation was observed in only 2 of 15 and 21 examined molecular clones of variable heavy (VH) chain gene, respectively. These two cases were distantly related to the rest of the activated B cell-like DLCL tumors by gene expression. Our findings validate the concept that lymphoid malignancies are derived from cells at discrete stages of normal lymphocyte maturation and that the malignant cells retain the genetic program of those normal cells.