Nuclear relaxation contribution to static and dynamic (infinite frequency approximation) nonlinear optical properties by means of electrical property expansions: Application to HF, CH4, CF4, and SF6

Electrical property derivative expressions are presented for the nuclear relaxation contribution to static and dynamic (infinite frequency approximation) nonlinear optical properties. For CF4 and SF6, as opposed to HF and CH4, a term that is quadratic in the vibrational anharmonicity (and not previously evaluated for any molecule) makes an important contribution to the static second vibrational hyperpolarizability of CF4 and SF6. A comparison between calculated and experimental values for the difference between the (anisotropic) Kerr effect and electric field induced second-harmonic generation shows that, at the Hartree-Fock level, the nuclear relaxation/infinite frequency approximation gives the correct trend (in the series CH4, CF4, SF6) but is of the order of 50% too small

Parallel Research, Multiple Intellectual Property Right Protection Instruments, and the Correlation among R&D Projects, September 2005

The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant component of firms’ R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a competitive market setting, firms’ noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a context in which firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property rights (IPR) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in an R&D race toward the social optimum.

Silver space-time trellis-coded modulation

Silver Code (SilC) was originally discovered in [1–4] for 2×2 multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) transmission. It has non-vanishing minimum determinant 1/7, slightly lower than Golden code, but is fast-decodable, i.e., it allows reduced-complexity maximum likelihood decoding [5–7]. In this paper, we present a multidimensional trellis-coded modulation scheme for MIMO systems [11] based on set partitioning of the Silver Code, named Silver Space-Time Trellis Coded Modulation (SST-TCM). This lattice set partitioning is designed specifically to increase the minimum determinant. The branches of the outer trellis code are labeled with these partitions. Viterbi algorithm is applied for trellis decoding, while the branch metrics are computed by using a sphere-decoding algorithm. It is shown that the proposed SST-TCM performs very closely to the Golden Space-Time Trellis Coded Modulation (GST-TCM) scheme, yetwith a much reduced decoding complexity thanks to its fast-decoding property.

On the use of the likelihood ratio for forensic evaluation: response to Fenton et al.

This letter to the Editor comments on the article When 'neutral' evidence still has probative value (with implications from the Barry George Case) by N. Fenton et al. [[1], 2014].

Uniform Manual Real Property Acquisition and Relocation Assistance Section II - Chapter 111 Uniform Rules and Procedures April, 2006

The purpose of this chapter is to implement Iowa Code chapter 316 and sections 6B.42, 6B.45, 6B.54 and 6B.55, as required by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-646, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 100-17 , Sec. 104, Pub. L. 105-117, and federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Aitchison Geometry for Probability and Likelihood as a new approach to mathematical statistics

The Aitchison vector space structure for the simplex is generalized to a Hilbert space structure A2(P) for distributions and likelihoods on arbitrary spaces. Centralnotations of statistics, such as Information or Likelihood, can be identified in the algebraical structure of A2(P) and their corresponding notions in compositional data analysis, such as Aitchison distance or centered log ratio transform.In this way very elaborated aspects of mathematical statistics can be understoodeasily in the light of a simple vector space structure and of compositional data analysis. E.g. combination of statistical information such as Bayesian updating,combination of likelihood and robust M-estimation functions are simple additions/perturbations in A2(Pprior). Weighting observations corresponds to a weightedaddition of the corresponding evidence.Likelihood based statistics for general exponential families turns out to have aparticularly easy interpretation in terms of A2(P). Regular exponential families formfinite dimensional linear subspaces of A2(P) and they correspond to finite dimensionalsubspaces formed by their posterior in the dual information space A2(Pprior).The Aitchison norm can identified with mean Fisher information. The closing constant itself is identified with a generalization of the cummulant function and shown to be Kullback Leiblers directed information. Fisher information is the local geometry of the manifold induced by the A2(P) derivative of the Kullback Leibler information and the space A2(P) can therefore be seen as the tangential geometry of statistical inference at the distribution P.The discussion of A2(P) valued random variables, such as estimation functionsor likelihoods, give a further interpretation of Fisher information as the expected squared norm of evidence and a scale free understanding of unbiased reasoning

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

On money as a medium of exchange when goods vary by supply and demand

Models of the exchange process based on search theory can be usedto analyze the features of objects that make them more or less likely toemerge as ``money'' in equilibrium. These models illustrate the trade--offbetween endogenous acceptability (an equilibrium property) and intrinsiccharacteristics of goods, such as storability, recognizability, etc. Inthis paper, we look at how the relative supply and demand for various goodsaffect their likelihood of becoming money. Intuitively, goods in highdemand and/or low supply are more likely to appear as commodity money,subject to the qualification that which object ends up circulating as amedium of exchange depends at least partly on convention. Welfare propertiesare discussed.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Property titling and conveyancing

This chapter analyzes titling institutions and the regulation of supporting conveyancingservices. After examining the tradeoff of enforcement benefits and consent costs posed byproperty rights, it explains how different public titling systems (privacy, recording andregistration) try to solve this tradeoff, and what the consequences are for the nature andregulation of private conveyancing services. The chapter ends with a discussion of someempirical issues and data which are useful for comparing, designing and managing titlingand conveyancing systems.

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.