'O que é o "subalterno" da filosofia da religião? / What Is the “Subaltern” of the Philosophy of Religion?

The The 18th-19th centuries orientalist preoccupations with mythology and ancient perennis lacked both a critical-theoretical sensitivity to historiography anchored in radical historical consciousness and a deep sense of philosophical argumentation, as distinct from discerning mythic patterns of textual (intra-textual or internal) disputation and its interpretative ramifications from another felicitous perspective, usually theology mitigated by whatever remains ‘modern’ in the arts. Philosophy of Religion on the other hand remained heavily straddled in the rigors of logic, reason, analysis, dialectic, reason, reductio, aggressive refutation, within established frameworks drawing from the other branches of philosophy, namely, again, logic, epistemology, ontology and metaphyics. This paper presents a view 'from below' to demonstrate and argue how philosophy o religion must change in the post-colonial era and pay more attention to indigenous patterns of theological thinking and critiquing of Western enlightenment-centred philosophy of religion. It is in Portuguese though.

Killing the father, Parmenides: on Lacan’s anti-philosophy

This paper examines the historical claims about philosophy, dating back to Parmenides, that we argue underlie Jacques Lacan’s polemical provocations in the mid-1970s that his position was an “anti-philosophie”. Following an introduction surveying the existing literature on the subject, in part ii, we systematically present the account of classical philosophy Lacan has in mind when he declares psychoanalysis to be an antiphilosophy after 1975, assembling his claims about the history of ideas in Seminars XVII and XX in ways earlier contributions of this subject have not systematically done. In part iii, focusing upon Lacan’s remarkable reading of Descartes’ break with premodern philosophy—but touching on Lacan’s readings of Hegel and (in a remarkable confirmation of Lacan’s “Parmenidean” conception of philosophy) the early Wittgenstein—we examine Lacan’s positioning of psychoanalysis as a legatee of the Cartesian moment in the history of western ideas, nearly-contemporary with Galileo’s mathematization of physics and carried forwards by Kant’s critical philosophy and account of the substanceless subject of apperception. In different terms than Slavoj Žižek, we propose that it is Lacan’s famous avowal that the subject of the psychoanalysis is the subject first essayed by Descartes in The Meditations on First Philosophy as confronting an other capable of deceit (as against mere illusion or falsity) that decisively measures the distance between Lacan’s unique “antiphilosophy” and the forms of later modern linguistic and cultural relativism whose hegemony Alain Badiou has decried, at the same time as it sets Lacan’s antiphilosophy apart from the Parmenidean legacy for which thinking and being could be the same.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.

Hard times and the "fact" and "fancy" of modern labour management

Dickens believed that, played out in practical terms, the pursuit of a totally rationalised society devoid of ‘Fancy’ only served to benefit those in power to the impoverishment of those in their charge. He was appalled by a selfish and self-interested philosophy that combined with laissez-faire capitalism to reduce human effort to mere numbers for the sole purpose of determining its monetary worth. His story thus provides a rebuke to the dehumanising effects of utilitarianism and the way it is used to calculate workers in the manner of machines; reducing them to little more than a resource that is no more or less important any other resource used in industrial enterprise. Their modern-day counterparts live in similar Hard Times in being in the grip of laissez-fair economics of global proportions, which visits upon them similar conceptions of their worth, as evidenced by the current precariousness of their employment and their present exposure to the vicissitudes of arbitrary power exercised by managements still wedded to utilitarian principles. As a result, the ‘light of Fancy’ that at one time would periodically burst through in earnest storms of protest, is now refracted into cynical asides directed at rational systems that continue to standardise and homogenise all that ‘counts’ in working life.

The objectives of the US Exploring Expedition's circumnavigation (1838-1842): longitude, nautical charting and the establishment of modern geographic coordinates

This article analyzes the main objectives of the scientific voyage to circumnavigate the earth, undertaken by the United States from 1838 to 1842. Charting was one of the most important of the scientific and strategic goals of the exploratory voyage. The initiative for the undertaking was the search for exact positioning on the high seas after the establishment of the longitude system, when nautical charts and maps from various countries were compared, and other, new ones were drawn. The United States participated in this international effort, leading to the creation of its own cartographic system.

Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought: Murakami Senshō and Critical Buddhism

Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.

Dramas of Recognition: Philosophy as Literary History

Offers a critique of the concept of recognition (Honneth, Fraser), arguing that, from a literary-historical perspective, it connstitutes a step back behing modernism toward the agenda of Realism.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 657 - "The Philosophy of Western Society", "Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver", "Über die Tätigkeit des Instituts für Sozialforschung", "Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte", "Research Projects of the International Institut of Social Research" (p. IX 56-IX 59.2)

Über das Forschungsprogramm: The Philosophy of Western Society. Teilstück des allgemeinen Forschungsprogramms, veröffentlicht unter dem Untertitel: "The Philosophy of Social Science", in: "International Institute of Social Research. A Report of Its History, Aims and Activites, 1933-1938", New York (1938?), S. 19, Typoskript mit eigenhändiger Korrektur, 2 Blatt; Bericht über die Aktivitäten des Instituts für Sozialforschung für Robert M. MacIver, 1938-39: 1. Bericht vom 7.12.1939; a) Typoskript, englisch, 9 Blatt; b) Typoskript, als Brief von Pollock an Robert M. MacIver, Typoskript 10 Blatt; c) Entwurf Typoskript, englisch, 15 Blatt; d) Entwurf Typoskript, deutsch, 17 Blatt; MacIver, Robert M.: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Friedrich Pollock, New York, 27.04.1938, 1 Blatt; "Some data on the Institut`s Staff and Activities", 11.03.1938, zwei Typoskripte, je 2 Blatt; Über die Tätigkeiten des Instituts für Sozialforschung. Verschiedene Berichte. 1939; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Instituts. Ohne Datum, Typoskript, 9 Blatt; Aufstellung der Forschungsgebiete verschiedener Mitarbeiter des Institutes, aus einem Bericht. Typoskript, 7 Blatt; Bericht an den Präsidenten des Columbia University. Typoskript, 2 Blatt; "Contribution of Dr. Franz Neumann to the Round Table Discussion, Chicago, Social Science Reaserach Building" Dezember 1939; a) Typoskript mit Handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 3 Blatt; b) Typoskript, 3 Blatt; "Statment on the objectives of the International Institut of Social Research". Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Stipendiaten des Instituts für Sozialforschung: Forschungsberichte, Ende 1939; Adorno, Theodor W.: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 4 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, 3 Blatt; Beck, Maximilian: "Geschichte des Begriffs der Vernunft von Platon bis Husserl (Outline)". Typoskript, englisch und deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 7 Blatt; Flechtheim, Ossip K.: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Ergänzungen, 1 Blatt; Fried, Hans Ernest: Typoskript, 1 Blatt, 16.11.1939; Grossmann, Henryk: "Capitalism in the 13th Century"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 6 Blatt; b) Typoskript, englisch, 6 Blatt; c) Typoskript, deutsch, 4 Blatt; Grossmann, Henryk: "The Classical Theory and Marxism"; a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Kirchheimer, Otto: Manuskript, 1 Blatt; Lauterbach, Albert: a) Typoskript, englisch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; b) Typoskript, deutsch, mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 1 Blatt; Marcuse, Herbert: Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 2 Blatt; Neumann, Franz L.: Typoskript, 2 Blatt; Wittfogel, Karl August: Typsokript, 2 Blatt; Zilsel, Edgar: Typoskript, 4 Blatt; Research Projects of the International Institute of Social Research. nicht vor 1939; Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte: Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosequences of a Prepardness Economy". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Rule of Law". Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weiman Republic". Kirchheimer,Otto: "Criminal Law and Social Structure". Marcuse, Herbert: " A Text and Source Book for the History of Philosophy". Fromm, Erich: "Character Structure of Modern Man". Neumann, Franz L.: "The Theory and Practice of European Labor Law". Wittfogel, Karl August; Wittfogel-Lang, Olga: "The Chinese Family"; Dasselbe wie in "Beschreibung der Forschungsprojekte", ausgenommen Pollock, Friedrich: "Economic and Social Cosquences of a Prepardness Economy" und Fromm, Erich: "The German Worker in the Weimar Republic", zusätzlich Kirchner, Otto; Weil, Felix: "Changes in Social Stratification, National Income, and Living Standards of Germany since 1933"; 1 Ordner, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 49 Blatt;

Human creation, imagination and autonomy: a brief introduction to Castoriadis’ social and psychoanalytical philosophy

During the last decade Castoriadis’ questioning has become a reference point in contemporary social theory. In this article I examine some of the key notions in Castoriadis’ work and explore how he strives to develop a theory on the irreducible creativity in the radical imagination of the individual and in the institution of the social-historical sphere. Firstly, I briefly discuss his conception of modern capitalism as bureaucratic capitalism, a view initiated by his criticism of the USSR regime. The following break up with Marxist theory and his psychoanalytic interests empowered him to criticize Lacan and read Freud in an imaginative, though unorthodox, fashion. I argue that this critical enterprise assisted greatly Castoriadis in his conception of the radical imaginary and in his unveiling of the political aspects of psychoanalysis. On the issue of the radical imaginary and its methodological repercussions, I’m focusing mainly on the radical imagination of the subject and its importance in the transition from the ‘‘psychic’’ to the ‘‘subject’’. Taking up the notion of “Being” as a starting point, I examine the notion of autonomy, seeking its roots in the ancient Greek world. By looking at notions such as “praxis”, “doing”, “project” and “elucidation”, I show how Castoriadis sought to redefine revolution as a means for social and individual autonomy. Finally I attempt to clarify the meaning of “democracy” and “democratic society” in the context of the social imaginary and its creations, the social imaginary significations.

The modern study of literature; an introduction to literary theory and interpretation by Richard Green Moulton ...

Introduction: Dominant ideas of modern study: unity, induction, evolution.--book I. Literary morphology: varieties of literature and their underlying principles.--book II. The field and scope of literary study.--book III. Literary evolution as reflected in the history of world literature.--book IV. Literary criticism: the traditional confusion and the modern reconstruction.--book V. Literature as a mode of philosophy.--book VI. Literature as a mode of art. Conclusion: the traditional and the modern study of literature. Syllabus. Works of the author. General index. Seventh impression, June, 1928