Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

Regional trade agreements and the world trade organization

A Década de 1990 foi Marcada por uma Considerável Proliferação de Acordos Regionais de Comercio (Arcs). Esses Acordos, que em Princípio Teriam Caráter Excepcional no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, Espalharam-Se por Várias Partes do Mundo E, Atualmente, são Raros os Casos de Países que não Participam de Pelo Menos um Acordo Preferencial. este Artigo tem como Objetivo Analisar os Acordos Preferenciais e suas Implicações no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio E, para Tanto, são Considerados os Aspectos Normativos e Econômicos Relacionados ao Tema. Além Disso, Apresenta-Se a Sistematização das Principais Questões Alusivas À Interpretação das Regras da Omc Relativas Aos Acordos Regionais de Comércio. Finalmente, com o Intuito de Fornecer Elementos Adicionais para a Avaliação do dos Acordos Preferenciais Serão Analisados os Impactos Econômicos de Alguns dos Principais Acordos para o Mercosul.

Medidas de desempenho para hedge funds no Brasil com destaque para a medida Ômega

A avaliação de desempenho de fundos de investimentos é, tradicionalmente, realizada utilizando-se o Índice de Sharpe, que leva em consideração apenas os dois primeiros momentos da distribuição de retornos (média e variância), assumindo as premissas de normalidade da distribuição de retornos e função quadrática de utilidade do investidor. Entretanto, é sabido que uma função de utilidade quadrática é inconsistente com o comportamento do investidor e que as distribuições de retornos de determinados fundos, como os hedge funds, estão longe de serem uma distribuição normal. Keating e Shadwick (2002a, 2002b) introduziram uma nova medida denominada Ômega que incorpora todos os momentos da distribuição, e tem a vantagem de não ser necessário fazer premissas sobre a distribuição dos retornos nem da função de utilidade de um investidor avesso ao risco. O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se esta medida Ômega tem um poder de previsibilidade maior que outras medidas de avaliação de desempenho, como o Índice de Sharpe e o Índice de Sortino. O estudo empírico indicou que a medida Ômega gera um ranqueamento, na maioria das vezes, relativamente diferente das outras medidas testadas. Apesar das carteiras formadas com base na medida Ômega terem gerado um retorno médio maior que o retorno médio das carteiras formadas pelas outras medidas em praticamente todos os testes, esta diferença entre as médias dos retornos só foi significativa em alguns casos. Mesmo assim, há uma leve indicação de que a medida Ômega é a mais apropriada para utilização do investidor ao fazer a avaliação de desempenho dos fundos de investimentos.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Agreements and disputes over non-tariff measures

In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.

The Panama canal expansion mega project : a case study and stakeholder´s analysis

As globalization increases integration, a new playing field is emerging which is driving the need for operational efficiencies and alignment of complementary capabilities among countries to build sustainable models and integrated offerings. As demands increase, companies are turning to effective project management as means to control operations and countries are increasing the amount of mega projects to boost their competitiveness and global footprint. Given the scale, complexity, political nature, multicultural makeup, and high level of visibility; mega projects rely on successful stakeholder management to effectively manage its operational, tactical, and strategic levels to execute their mission. This paper examines the success drivers of mega projects and presents an in depth stakeholder assessment of the Panama Canal Expansion mega project to identify the perceived value to its stakeholder community. The stakeholder categories include: the Panama Canal Authority, subcontractors executing the expansion project, customers of the canal in Panama and U.S., as well as the communities surrounding the Panama Canal and ports in the U.S. East Coast. The conclusion of this paper captures the relationship between the effective stakeholder engagement from the Panama Canal Authority, the perceived value of the Panamanian stakeholders, and compares it to U.S. based mega projects being executed simultaneously to allow the U.S. East Coast ports to accommodate increased cargo volumes.

Acordos preferenciais de comércio: da multiplicação de novas regras aos mega acordos comerciais

O trabalho visa levantar informações para os interessados na negociação de novos APCs para o Brasil, bem como definir um modelo brasileiro para futuras negociações preferenciais que compreendam os diversos temas abordados nos acordos considerados de última geração. Em outras palavras, dar elementos para o Brasil passar de um rule taker para um rule maker no comércio internacional

The not so generalized effects of nonreciprocal trade agreements

This dissertation uses an empirical gravity equation approach to study the relationship between nonreciprocal trade agreements (NRTAs) and members’ trade flows. Estimations relate bilateral imports to trade policy variables using a very comprehensive dataset with over fifty years of data. Results show that meager average trade effects exist only if members are excluded from the world trading system or if they are very poor. As trade flows between NRTA members are already rising before their creation, results also suggest a strong endogeneity concerning their formation. Moreover, estimations show that uncertainty and discretion tend to critically hinder NRTA’s performance. On the other hand, reciprocal trade agreements show the opposite pattern regardless of members’ income status.Encouraging developing countries’ openness to trade through reciprocal liberalization emerges consequently as a possible policy implication.