Higher education as a portfolio investment: students’ choices about studying, term time employment, leisure, and loans

Recent UK changes in the number of students entering higher education, and in the nature of financial support, highlight the complexity of students’ choices about human capital investments. Today’s students have to focus not on the relatively narrow issue of how much academic effort to invest, but instead on the more complicated issue of how to invest effort in pursuit of ‘employability skills’, and how to signal such acquisitions in the context of a highly competitive graduate jobs market. We propose a framework aimed specifically at students’ investment decisions, which encompasses corner solutions for both borrowing and employment while studying.

Human rights and mortgage repossession: beyond property law using Article 8

Following the Supreme Court decisions in Manchester CC v Pinnock and Hounslow CC v Powell, this article examines the possible impact of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms upon protection of the home in creditor repossession proceedings. The central argument advanced is that, although occupiers may not all be protected through property law, they may enjoy an independent right to respect for their home under Article 8, which should be acknowledged in the legal frameworks governing creditor's enforcement rights against the home. The article suggests that the most common creditor enforcement route, through mortgage repossession proceedings, falls short in this regard. It takes as its primary focus the treatment of children in such proceedings to provide an example of the potential for a human rights-based property protection heralded by these two Supreme Court decisions.

Are Good or Bad Borrowers Discouraged From Applying for Loans?

This paper takes the concept of a discouraged borrower originally formulated by Kon and Storey [Kon, Y., Storey, D.J., 2003. A theory of discouraged borrowers. Small Business Economics 21, 37–49] and examines whether discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. Using US data it finds riskier borrowers have higher probabilities of discouragement, which increase with longer financial relationships, suggesting discouragement is an efficient self-rationing mechanism. It also finds low risk borrowers are less likely to be discouraged in concentrated markets than in competitive markets and that, in concentrated markets, high risk borrowers are more likely to be discouraged the longer their financial relationships. We conclude discouragement is more efficient in concentrated, than in competitive, markets.

State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.

Are mortgage lenders guilty of the housing bubble? A UK perspective

Existing theoretical models of house prices and credit rely on continuous rationality of consumers, an assumption that has been frequently questioned in recent years. Meanwhile, empirical investigations of the relationship between prices and credit are often based on national-level data, which is then tested for structural breaks and asymmetric responses, usually with subsamples. Earlier author argues that local markets are structurally different from one another and so the coefficients of any estimated housing market model should vary from region to region. We investigate differences in the price–credit relationship for 12 regions of the UK. Markov-switching is introduced to capture asymmetric market behaviours and turning points. Results show that credit abundance had a large impact on house prices in Greater London and nearby regions alongside a strong positive feedback effect from past house price movements. This impact is even larger in Greater London and the South East of England when house prices are falling, which are the only instances where the credit effect is more prominent than the positive feedback effect. A strong positive feedback effect from past lending activity is also present in the loan dynamics. Furthermore, bubble probabilities extracted using a discrete Kalman filter neatly capture market turning points.

Mercado brasileiro de non-performing loans (NPL): uma abordagem teórica e prática na precificação de ativos

O estudo objetiva dar os primeiros passos em direção ao desenvolvimento do campo de distress credit no Brasil via a estimação da taxa de recuperação (liquidação) e sua respectiva precificação. Para isso, foi selecionado o segmento de crédito para pessoa física, inadimplido, com atraso superior a trezentos e sessenta dias que não possuam garantia; ou seja, crédito direto ao consumidor não performado (NPL). No estudo será analisada a dinâmica do ativo e as variáveis que impactam no valor do mesmo, visando a proposição de metodologias e arcabouço teórico para sua precificação.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Creditor's protection and bank loans: lack of competition hamprers bankruptcy reform's effects

This dissertation investigates how credit institutions’ market power limits the effects of creditor protection rules on the interest rate and the spread of bank loans. We use the Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform of June/2005 (BBR) as a legal event affecting the institutional environment of the Brazilian credit market. The law augments creditor protection and aims to improve the access of firms to the credit market and to reduce the cost of borrowing. Either access to credit or the credit cost are also determined by bank industry competition and the market power of suppliers of credit. We derive a simple economic model to study the effect of market power interacting with cost of lending. Using an accounting and operations dataset from July/2004 to December/2007 provided by the Brazilian Central Bank, we estimate that the lack of competition in the bank lending industry hinders the potential reducing effect of the BBR on the interest rate of corporate loans by approximately 30% and on the spread by approximately 23%. We also find no statistical evidence that the BBR affected the concentration level of the Brazilian credit market. We present a brief report on bankruptcy reforms around the world, the changes in the Brazilian legislation and on some recent related articles in our introductory chapter. The second chapter presents the economic model and the testable hypothesis on how the lack of competition in the lending market limits the effects of improved creditor protection. In this chapter, we introduce our empirical strategy using a differences-in-differences model and we estimate the limiting effect of market power on the BBR’s potential to reduce interest rates and on the spread of bank loans. We use the BBR as an exogenous event that affects collateralized corporate loans (treatment group) but that does not affect clean consumer loans (control group) to identify these effects, using different concentration measures. In Chapter 3, we propose a two-stage empirical strategy to handle the H–Statistics proposed by Panzar and Rosse as a measure of market competition. We estimate the limiting effects of the lack of competition in replacing the concentration statistics by the H–Statistics. Chapter 4 presents a structural break test of the concentration index and checks if the BBR affects the dynamic evolution of the concentration index.

Resolución 5: Préstamos del Banco Internacional = Resolution 5: Loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development = Résolution 5: Prêts de la Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement

El símbolo E/840/Rev.1 corresponde a la edición bilingüe inglés/francés publicada en 1953

Mortgage securitization and its credit risk control

This dissertation concentrate on the mortgage securitization and its credit risk, which are criticized as the main causes of the financial crisis. From the point of the veiw of mortgage's evolution, the nature, structure and function of mortgage has been radically changed, yet the mortgage law did not give appropriate response to this market change. Meanwhile, the U.S legilslations facilitating the mortgage securitization also have rotten the legal foundations for mortgage market self-regulation and sustained development. In contrast, the EU covered bond system has kept financial stability for 200 years' time, and their statutory approach has been proved to be able to control the credit risk and incentive problems very well, in combination of market self-regulation and public regulation. So the future reform should be directed to strengthen the market's capacity of self-regulation and improve the public regulation. For the development of mortgage securitization in China, it is suggested to introduce the EU covered bond system for the reason of the equilibrium between funding efficiency and financial stability.

Mortgage Lending in Chicago and Los Angeles: A Paired Testing Study of the Pre-Application Process

This paper analyzes data from a recently completed study of discrimination against African-American and Hispanic homebuyers when they visit mortgage lending institutions in two major metropolitan markets to make pre-application inquiries. It represents the first application of paired testing to rigorously measure discrimination in the mortgage lending process. The paired tests isolated significant levels of differential treatment on the basis of race and ethnicity in Chicago with African Americans and Hispanics receiving less information and assistance than comparable whites. Adverse treatment of African-Americans and Hispanics is also observed in Los Angeles for specific treatments, but the overall pattern of treatment observed did not differ statistically from equal treatment. Multivariate analyses for Chicago indicate that large lenders treat minorities more favorably than small lenders and that lenders with substantial numbers of applications from African-Americans treat African Americans more favorably than lenders with predominantly white application pools.

An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws

Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property following default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of non-transferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces the risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-state data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combination with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption laws.

An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws

Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property following default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of nontransferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces the risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-state data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combination with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption laws.

Redlining, the Community Reinvestment Act, and Private Mortgage Insurance

This paper examines whether neighborhood racial or income composition influences a lender's treatment of mortgage applications. Recent studies have found little evidence of differential treatment based on either the racial or income composition of the neighborhood, once the specification accounts for neighborhood risk factors. This paper suggests that lenders may favor applicants from CRA-protected neighborhoods if they obtain Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI) and that this behavior may mask lender redlining of low income and minority neighborhoods. For loan applicants who are not covered by PMI, this paper finds strong evidence that applications for units in low-income neighborhoods are less likely to be approved, and some evidence that applications for units in minority neighborhoods are less likey to be approved, regardless of the race of the applicant. This pattern is not visible in earlier studies because lenders appear to treat applications from these neighborhoods more favorably when the applicant obtains PMI.

Other Things Being Equal: A Paired Testing Study of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This article summarizes a recently completed study, funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and conducted by the Urban Institute, of discrimination against black and Hispanic homebuyers when they visit mortgage lending institutions in two major metropolitan markets to make pre-application inquiries. It represents the first application of paired testing to rigorously measure discrimination in the mortgage lending process. The paired tests disclosed significant levels of adverse treatment on the basis of race and ethnicity, with African Americans and Hispanics receiving less information and assistance than comparable whites, even at this very early stage in the application process.