Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Note from William Croswell to President Kirkland and the Corporation of Harvard College, 1817-1821

This folder contains six documents: three drafts of a brief March 10, 1817, note to Harvard President John Kirkland, with two of the drafts followed by an October 25, 1819, note to the Harvard College Corporation concerning Croswell's work on Harvard's Library Catalogue.

Letters to the Corporation of Harvard College, 1819-1829

Paper notebook containing copies of letters sent by Croswell to the Harvard Corporation in relation to his work on the Harvard Library Catalogue.

Memorials to the Harvard Corporation, 1819 October-1821 June

Six documents containing drafts and copies of eleven letters.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1821 November

Three drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1824 March 31

Two drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1824 June 24

One draft of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1824 November 10

Three drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1825 April 30

Two drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1825 December 12

One draft of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1827 September 17

Two drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1827 December 19

Four drafts of a letter.

Memorial to the Harvard Corporation, 1828 June 7

Two drafts of a letter.

Harvard Corporation votes, 1819; 1821

One page containing handwritten copies of two Harvard Corporation votes related to Croswell's employment at Harvard.

Petition of John Wyeth to the Harvard Corporation, 1780 August 23

In this brief petition of John Wyeth to the Harvard Corporation, he requests the ability to borrow books from the "Publick Library" of the College.