Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

Human height since 1820

Average height is an important indicator of people’s well-being. It is also a relatively undistorted and easy-to-measure indicator, which makes it particularly suitable for comparisons across time and space. Drawing upon an extensive body of research, the chapter describes the strengths and weaknesses of this indicator. It finds that during the 19th century, average height in Western Offshoots was much higher than elsewhere. Differences between Western Europe and the rest of the world (Eastern Europe, East Asia) were marginal, in spite of the much higher real incomes in the former region. This changed after about 1870, when people’s height began to increase in Western Europe, whereas this lagged behind elsewhere. Africans were relatively tall during much of the period studied, but experienced declining height in many countries after the 1960s. People in Southeast Asia stayed relatively short throughout the period.

Religion, anti-slavery, and identity: Irish Presbyterians, the United States, and transatlantic evangelicalism, c. 1820-1914

Scholars have devoted much attention to the causes and consequences of Presbyterian emigration from Ulster to the thirteen colonies before 1776. This article moves beyond the eighteenth century to examine the continued religious links between Presbyterians in Ireland and the United States in the nineteenth century. It begins with an examination of the influence of evangelicalism on both sides of the Atlantic and how this promoted unity in denominational identity, missionary activity to convert Catholics, and revivalist religion during the first half of the century. Though Irish Presbyterians had great affection for their American co-religionists, they were not uncritical, and significant tensions did develop over slavery. The article then examines the religious character of Scotch-Irish or Ulster-Scots identity in the late nineteenth century, which was articulated in response to the alleged demoralising influence of large-scale Irish immigration during and after the Famine of the 1840s, the so-called Romanisation of Catholicism, and the threat of Home Rule in Ireland. The importance of identity politics should not obscure religious developments, and the article ends with a consideration of the origins and character of fundamentalism, perhaps one of the most important cultural connections between Protestants in Northern Ireland and the United States in the twentieth century.

Teoria e prática do baixo contínuo em Portugal (1735-1820)

Este projecto de investigação constitui-se por um levantamento e análise da produção teórica (Morato, Pedroso, Gomes da Silva, Solano, Silva Leite, Varela, Fonseca, Marques e Silva e Totti) e de métodos de cariz prático (Mazza, Perez, J. J Santos, Sousa Carvalho, Solano, Policarpo e Marcos Portugal) relacionados ao baixo contínuo em Portugal entre 1735 e 1820. Contextualizando a produção teórica nacional com as influências espanholas, italianas e francesas, e a grande produção portuguesa de partimentos e solfejos com acompanhamento, que é contextualizada com a matriz napolitana.

Letter, Chesterfield, SC, to Rebecca Spencer Powe, Chesterfield, SC, 1823 January 3

This letter is from H. May to Rebecca Spencer Powe.

L. T. hobhouse’s new liberalism and the reformulation of ideology

Tese de doutoramento, Estudos de Literatura e de Cultura (Estudos Ingleses), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, 2014

Cultura política, actores e discursos nos alvores do Liberalismo : revisitar a revolução de 1821 nos Açores

O presente estudo consiste numa análise da cultura política no início do Liberalismo em Portugal, centrada sobre os deputados micaelenses nas Cortes Portuguesas que emergiram da revolução liberal de 1820 e, por outro lado, numa revisitação da revolução de 1821 em Ponta Delgada. Nesse contexto, a proposta de projecto apresentada por um dos deputados que visava a abolição dos vínculos na ilha de São Miguel e nos Açores foi o mote para esta dissertação. Visitamos a conjuntura de outro espaço atlântico na mesma época, a Madeira, de modo a conduzirmos uma avaliação comparativa, mantendo o quadro atlântico em perspectiva. Recorremos, por fim, à biografia de um deputado para obtermos uma escala de observação mais próxima da dinâmica política.

Res Publica: Citizenship and Political Representation in Portugal, 1820-1926

The term res publica (literally “thing of the people”) was coined by the Romans to translate the Greek word politeia, which, as we know, referred to a political community organised in accordance with certain principles, amongst which the notion of the “good life” (as against exclusively private interests) was paramount. This ideal also came to be known as political virtue. To achieve it, it was necessary to combine the best of each “constitutional” type and avoid their worst aspects (tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy). Hence, the term acquired from the Greeks a sense of being a “mixed” and “balanced” system. Anyone that was entitled to citizenship could participate in the governance of the “public thing”. This implied the institutionalization of open debate and confrontation between interested parties as a way of achieving the consensus necessary to ensure that man the political animal, who fought with words and reason, prevailed over his “natural” counterpart. These premises lie at the heart of the project which is now being presented under the title of Res Publica: Citizenship and Political Representation in Portugal, 1820-1926. The fact that it is integrated into the centenary commemorations of the establishment of the Republic in Portugal is significant, as it was the idea of revolution – with its promise of rupture and change – that inspired it. However, it has also sought to explore events that could be considered the precursor of democratization in the history of Portugal, namely the vintista, setembrista and patuleia revolutions. It is true that the republican regime was opposed to the monarchic. However, although the thesis that monarchy would inevitably lead to tyranny had held sway for centuries, it had also been long believed that the monarchic system could be as “politically virtuous” as a republic (in the strict sense of the word) provided that power was not concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Moreover, various historical experiments had shown that republics could also degenerate into Caesarism and different kinds of despotism. Thus, when absolutism began to be overturned in continental Europe in the name of the natural rights of man and the new social pact theories, initiating the difficult process of (written) constitutionalization, the monarchic principle began to be qualified as a “monarchy hedged by republican institutions”, a situation in which not even the king was exempt from isonomy. This context justifies the time frame chosen here, as it captures the various changes and continuities that run through it. Having rejected the imperative mandate and the reinstatement of the model of corporative representation (which did not mean that, in new contexts, this might not be revived, or that the second chamber established by the Constitutional Charter of 1826 might not be given another lease of life), a new power base was convened: national sovereignty, a precept that would be shared by the monarchic constitutions of 1822 and 1838, and by the republican one of 1911. This followed the French example (manifested in the monarchic constitution of 1791 and in the Spanish constitution of 1812), as not even republicans entertained a tradition of republicanism based upon popular sovereignty. This enables us to better understand the rejection of direct democracy and universal suffrage, and also the long incapacitation (concerning voting and standing for office) of the vast body of “passive” citizens, justified by “enlightened”, property- and gender-based criteria. Although the republicans had promised in the propaganda phase to alter this situation, they ultimately failed to do so. Indeed, throughout the whole period under analysis, the realisation of the potential of national sovereignty was mediated above all by the individual citizen through his choice of representatives. However, this representation was indirect and took place at national level, in the hope that action would be motivated not by particular local interests but by the common good, as dictated by reason. This was considered the only way for the law to be virtuous, a requirement that was also manifested in the separation and balance of powers. As sovereignty was postulated as single and indivisible, so would be the nation that gave it soul and the State that embodied it. Although these characteristics were common to foreign paradigms of reference, in Portugal, the constitutionalization process also sought to nationalise the idea of Empire. Indeed, this had been the overriding purpose of the 1822 Constitution, and it persisted, even after the loss of Brazil, until decolonization. Then, the dream of a single nation stretching from the Minho to Timor finally came to an end.