Let's (not) talk about sex: The effect of information provision on gender differences in performance under competition

We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.

Does privatising public service provision reduce accountability?

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractualobligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government s cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The semi-presidential system of Cape Verde: the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers = O sistema semi-presidencialista caboverdiano: a relação entre os poderes executivo e legislativo

e article analyses the relationship established between the executive and legislative powers in the Cape Verdean government system where researchers seek to understand it, taking into account their theoretical and constitutional setting practice. It should be noted the prominence of the debate and studies undertaken to understand how the scienti c academy seeks to eradicate this problem. Two issues are relevant in this debate: the rst reporting to the theoretical and constitutional con guration of Cape Verdean government system and the other to its policy and legislative practice. Keywords: Cape Verde. Semi-presidential System. Systems of Government. Legislative and Executive Powers.

Final Report: Legislative Property Tax Study Committee, January 2009

The Committee was authorized to meet three days during the 2007 Legislative Interim and two days during the 2008 Legislative Interim. The Committee met on September 12, 2007; November 7, 2007; December 5, 2007; November 14, 2008; and January 7, 2009, at the State Capitol, Des Moines, Iowa. In 2008, the Committee retained consultants from the Institute for Public Policy at George Washington University to study property taxation and other forms of revenue generation used by local governments in Iowa and other states.

House File 811 Legislative Report, December 14, 2009

The department of Human Services provides child protective and child welfare services to eligible families in the state of Iowa. Children ages 0-17 may receive services that include child protective assessments, child in need of assistance, safety plan services, family safety, risk and permanency services, foster care and case management. A confirmed child abuse assessment may lead to involvement with juvenile court via an adjudication hearing. The court provides oversight and support to the family to increase safety for the children. Al child abuse assessments, regardless of disposition, are sent to juvenile court for review and information.

Building World-Class Schools for Iowa: A Legislative Brief, January 14, 2013

The Iowa Department of Education has joined the Office of the Governor to prepare a set of legislative proposals that will bring Iowa closer to its goal of providing a world-class education to all children, no mater where they live. This legislative brief serves as an overview of the legislation, which I encourage you to read and discuss in greater detail. the goals behind these policies are straightforward: Comprehensive and systematically raise and support the teaching profession while expanding efforts to customize instruction to every student's passion and talents. Iowa's children deserve the best education can provide so they leave our schools with the knowledge and skills necessary for successful and rewarding lives. Iowa has many good schools with hard-working, talented educators who deserves our respect and appreciation. While we honor the past work of generations of Iowans who built a strong foundation, it is our responsibility - and our turn - to make a focused, dedicated effort to improve Iowa's schools. We stand at a pivotal moment in Iowa storied education history, in which we have the opportunity and will as community to make the transition from being "good" to being "great".

2013 Legislative Reception Expenditures report

This report discloses the total amount expended on the reception held for all members of the general assembly, hosted by the Iowa DOT.

Legislative Information, January 25, 2012

The Legislative Information Office (LIO) provides information concerning the Iowa General Assembly. As part of the nonpartisan Legislative Services Agency (LSA), the Legislature’s legal, fiscal, and computer services agency, the LIO has access to the most current information on the actions and procedures of the Iowa Legislature. The LIO responds to inquiries from the general public, private and public agencies, and business interests with nonpartisan information about the Iowa General Assembly. The office includes two public access computer terminals, for any member of the public to access legislative information using the Iowa General Assembly web site: www.legis.iowa.gov

Legislative Terminology, September 18, 2008

The Legislative Information Office (LIO) provides an document that gives the legislative terminology for the citizens of Iowa.