Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?

Article 260(2) TFEU (ex 228(2) EC) enables the European Court of Justice to enforce compliance with its judgements. This article analyses its use in doing so and questions whether it could be applied more effectively. It commences by highlighting the principally economic and environmental context of the case-law, and by examining the initiatives taken to tackle delays in bringing these cases before the Court. The article then critically evaluates the effectiveness of the financial sanctions available to the Court. In doing so, it aims to fill a gap in present research by looking beyond the procedural measures through which the Court and the Commission operate to examine the practical impact of Article 260(2) itself.

The Rank of Queen's Counsel: Judicial Perspectives

The rank of queen's counsel, granted under the royal prerogative, has been part of the architecture of the legal profession and legal system since 1594 but has undergone many changes in that time, including most recently the adoption of new selection procedures. Recent cases in Northern Ireland have raised the question - what is the legal position of queen's counsel? By examining decided cases in context, this paper aims to explain judicial perspectives on what it means to be a QC.

Rewarding Merit in Judicial Appointments?: A research project undertaken by the School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast for the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission

This research involved carrying out an online survey using a number of vignettes/scenarios to explore understandings and attitudes to judicial appointments. This sort of survey is relatively novel in this context and provided a useful way of understanding how a range of factors such as merit and seniority, career paths and connections, as well as gender and visibility, are perceived as operating within the appointments system. The research also involved a series of focus group interviews with a number of individuals with various professional backgrounds and at different levels of seniority. These, and a limited number of individual interviews, afforded an opportunity to explore more closely some of the themes arising from the scenarios as well as a chance to look in some depth at some of the views and concerns of a range of members of the legal professions.

Building upon the previous research project, this work was less concerned with revisiting earlier themes and more interested in exploring how the idea of “merit” as a governing factor in judicial appointment is seen as working in practice, and whether it is perceived as being most likely to be found within particular career profiles. We also investigated issues such as the possible development of formal and informal pathways to a judicial career and practical problems such as how an applicant might become known to the senior judiciary, and the importance of this. Overall our interest was primarily in developing an understanding of how gender is perceived to operate in the appointments process and how any barriers to recruiting women, particularly to the senior judiciary, could be further broken down.

Ethical dilemmas for clinical psychologists in conducting qualitative research

Clinical psychologists often use qualitative methods to explore sensitive topics with vulnerable individuals, yet there has been little discussion of the specific ethical issues involved. For clinicians conducting qualitative research, there are likely to be ethical dilemmas associated with being both a researcher and a practitioner. We argue that this overarching issue frames all other ethical issues raised. This article provides an overview of the range of ethical issues that have been discussed in general in relation to qualitative research and considers the specific nature of these in relation to the discipline of clinical psychology. Such issues will be exemplified by reference to some of our own research and practice and the extant literature. We conclude with some suggestions for good practice, although our aim is to trigger debate rather than to establish prescriptive guidelines.