A prisão provisória em face da morosidade judicial e da razoável duração do processo

Este estudo trata da realidade da prisão provisória dentro do contexto processual brasileiro e da consagração do direito fundamental à razoável duração do processo. A morosidade judicial faz parte do cotidiano de quem lida com o poder judiciário no Brasil. Uma questão, porém, sobressai-se no momento atual: o que fazer com os milhares de presos que dependem de uma resposta jurisdicional, os chamados presos provisórios “permanentes”? E o que fazer quando as prisões provisórias estão sendo aplicadas de uma forma completamente arbitrária, sem respeitar nenhum critério a não ser o de um termo vago e impreciso denominado “ordem pública”? Processos arrastam-se por anos, às vezes décadas, enquanto isso sujeitos ficam esquecidos dentro de estabelecimentos prisionais, tendo violados direitos constitucionais como a presunção de inocência, o devido processo legal, a razoável duração do processo e a liberdade de ir e vir. Foi feita uma análise do estigma que esses presos carregam, mais especificamente as presas, bem como dos prejuízos que advêm desse tipo de prisão. Atualmente, condena-se, antes mesmo de julgar, segregando de todas as formas essas mulheres do convívio familiar e social.

A legitimidade democrática do Supremo Tribunal Federal: contribuições para a prática do ativismo judicial

Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS

The Supreme Court Confirmation Process and Its Implications

In recent history, there has been a trend of increasing partisan polarization throughout most of the American political system. Some of the impacts of this polarization are obvious; however, there is reason to believe that we miss some of the indirect effects of polarization. Accompanying the trend of increased polarization has been an increase in the contentiousness of the Supreme Court confirmation process. I believe that these two trends are related. Furthermore, I argue that these trends have an impact on judicial behavior. This is an issue worth exploring, since the Supreme Court is the most isolated branch of the federal government. The Constitution structured the Supreme Court to ensure that it was as isolated as possible from short-term political pressures and interests. This study attempts to show how it may be possible that those goals are no longer being fully achieved. My first hypothesis in this study is that increases in partisan polarization are a direct cause of the increase in the level of contention during the confirmation process. I then hypothesize that the more contention a justice faces during his or her confirmation process, the more ideologically extreme that justice will then vote on the bench. This means that a nominee appointed by a Republican president will tend to vote even more conservatively than was anticipated following a contentious confirmation process, and vice versa for Democratic appointees. In order to test these hypotheses, I developed a data set for every Supreme Court nominee dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt¿s appointments (1937). With this data set, I ran a series of regression models to analyze these relationships. Statistically speaking, the results support my first hypothesis in a fairly robust manner. My regression results for my second hypothesis indicate that the trend I am looking for is present for Republican nominees. For Democratic nominees, the impacts are less robust. Nonetheless, as the results will show, contention during the confirmation process does seem to have some impact on judicial behavior. Following my quantitative analysis, I analyze a series of case studies. These case studies serve to provide tangible examples of these statistical trends as well as to explore what else may be going on during the confirmation process and subsequent judicial decision-making. I use Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Alito as the subjects for these case studies. These cases will show that the trends described above do seem to be identifiable at the level of an individual case. These studies further help to indicate other potential impacts on judicial behavior. For example, following Justice Rehnquist¿s move from Associate to Chief Justice, we see a marked change in his behavior. Overall, this study serves as a means of analyzing some of the more indirect impacts of partisan polarization in modern politics. Further, the study offers a means of exploring some of the possible constraints (both conscious and subconscious) that Supreme Court justices may feel while they decide how to cast a vote in a particular case. Given the wide-reaching implications of Supreme Court decisions, it is important to try to grasp a full view of how these decisions are made.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values

This paper studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the optimal degree of judicial discretion, given the sequential nature of the process and the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The enactment of sentencing reform in the 1970s and 80s provides both a context for the model and an opportunity to evaluate its conclusions.

Quien puede querer, quiso? El consentimiento sexual como problema en el tratamiento judicial de los delitos sexuales, Bs. As. 1863-1921

En los últimos años, los delitos sexuales se han convertido en objeto de preocupación para la sociedad; esto se vio reforzado por las nuevas formas de pensar y vivir las relaciones humanas inter e intra-género-s y especialmente las elecciones sexuales. En este trabajo propongo volver a poner en debate algunas cuestiones que hacen al problema de la definición jurídico-social y a la comprensión del "consentimiento" en el contexto específico de los expedientes seguidos por delitos sexuales en el ámbito de la provincia de Buenos Aires, entre 1863 y 1921, teniendo en cuenta la importancia que este concepto tiene para la definición de los delitos sexuales como tales. También se tomarán en cuenta algunos escritos de la época que permiten conocer la circulación de ideas en el ámbito específico del derecho y la medicina legal. Al mismo tiempo, pretendo poner en tensión las ideas sociales y culturales que aparezcan reflejadas en las fuentes respecto de qué es, cómo se otorga y cuándo puede hablarse de un efectivo consentimiento, así como de su contrario. Poniendo en juego las subjetividades propias de los participantes en el proceso. Resaltando la centralidad de esta cuestión en el mismo tanto para la definición de una víctima como para la caracterización de los acusados

Las leyes sobre vagancia : Control policial y práctica judicial en el ocaso de la frontera (Tandil 1872-1881)

A fines de la década de 1870, el gobierno provincial, con el objeto de lograr mayor control social sobre la población rural, implementó una reestructuración policial en la campaña bonaerense. La misma tenía por objetivo afianzar la propiedad privada y contribuir al mercado de trabajo, asimismo perseguía un fuerte interés en satisfacer la necesidad del estado de hombres en plena etapa de expansión de la frontera. La presión reclutadora del estado se reflejará en un aumento de detenidos por vagancia, dado que las leyes de represión de la vagancia del Código Rural permitían su penalización al servicio de las armas. El Código Rural sancionado en 1865 estipulaba dos normas procesales a cumplir en los acusados: formación de un sumario y constitución de un jury para su juzgamiento. Disposiciones que raramente se pusieron en práctica por los jueces de paz desde que esta legislación entró en vigencia. Será a fines de la década de 1870 cuando el gobierno exigirá más firmemente no solo la persecución de la vagancia sino también la aplicación de estas normas procesales en los acusados. Aún así, el análisis de la práctica judicial revelará que continuará existiendo una constante manipulación normativa sobre la base de dos valores que se intentaban afianzar, el trabajo y la propiedad. En los perjudiciales que atentaran contra estos dos valores, será en quienes se manipulará la normativa sancionada y se canalizará la presión reclutadora.

Voces y miradas. Agentes sociales indígenas en el entramado judicial : Ciudad y campaña de Buenos Aires en el período tardocolonial

Este trabajo se ocupa de examinar el accionar de los agentes sociales indígenas atrapados en el entramado judicial, ya sea en calidad de damnificados o sospechados de un delito, en la campaña y a ciudad de Buenos Aires hacia fines del período colonial. El objetivo es indagar en la configuración y resolución de los conflictos que involucren a indígenas, observando tanto su posicionamiento como el de los agentes judiciales, eclesiásticos o particulares con cierto poder en el ámbito local que se encuentren involucrados en estas causas. Este análisis nos facilitará la entrada al entretejido social de la época, proporcionándonos claves para comprenderlo, a la vez que develará una diversidad de voces y miradas implicadas en el proceso de configuración y judicialización de los delitos

La penalidad de la ebriedad en el código penal y en la praxis judicial bonaerense 1878-1888

La sanción del código penal en la provincia de Buenos Aires en el año 1877, fijó en el homicidio la penalidad y determinó las circunstancias del delito mediante la enumeración de los atenuantes y agravantes. El objetivo era contemplar todas las posibilidades del delito para reducir el "arbitrio judicial". Sin embargo, deteniéndonos en los cambios operados en cuanto a la ebriedad en la normativa legal y en la práctica judicial, se puede observar que la función del juez no se redujo únicamente a computar la pena según el delito. A su cargo quedó la apreciación de las pruebas y la interpretación legal. En este sentido, la ley dejó márgenes para considerar a la ebriedad como atenuante o no de la penalidad. Sin embargo, los jueces le negaron tal beneficio al imputado, lo cual marcó una ruptura con respecto al período anterior. Interpretación que estuvo determinada no por un cambio en la percepción sobre el efecto del alcohol como perturbador de la conciencia, sino por ciertos prejuicios que otorgaron una jerarquía y un valor a los motivos que pudieran cegar al trasgresor. Considerada aun como un vicio y no una patología, revelaron la condena a esta práctica social determinando que hechos ya no quedaban comprendidos como circunstancias atenuantes. En definitiva, la ebriedad posibilita apreciar el complejo proceso de codificación que consistió no únicamente en la aplicación literal de la ley sino también en la interpretación que de ella se hiciera.

Las leyes sobre vagancia : Control policial y práctica judicial en el ocaso de la frontera (Tandil 1872-1881)

A fines de la década de 1870, el gobierno provincial, con el objeto de lograr mayor control social sobre la población rural, implementó una reestructuración policial en la campaña bonaerense. La misma tenía por objetivo afianzar la propiedad privada y contribuir al mercado de trabajo, asimismo perseguía un fuerte interés en satisfacer la necesidad del estado de hombres en plena etapa de expansión de la frontera. La presión reclutadora del estado se reflejará en un aumento de detenidos por vagancia, dado que las leyes de represión de la vagancia del Código Rural permitían su penalización al servicio de las armas. El Código Rural sancionado en 1865 estipulaba dos normas procesales a cumplir en los acusados: formación de un sumario y constitución de un jury para su juzgamiento. Disposiciones que raramente se pusieron en práctica por los jueces de paz desde que esta legislación entró en vigencia. Será a fines de la década de 1870 cuando el gobierno exigirá más firmemente no solo la persecución de la vagancia sino también la aplicación de estas normas procesales en los acusados. Aún así, el análisis de la práctica judicial revelará que continuará existiendo una constante manipulación normativa sobre la base de dos valores que se intentaban afianzar, el trabajo y la propiedad. En los perjudiciales que atentaran contra estos dos valores, será en quienes se manipulará la normativa sancionada y se canalizará la presión reclutadora.

Voces y miradas. Agentes sociales indígenas en el entramado judicial : Ciudad y campaña de Buenos Aires en el período tardocolonial

Este trabajo se ocupa de examinar el accionar de los agentes sociales indígenas atrapados en el entramado judicial, ya sea en calidad de damnificados o sospechados de un delito, en la campaña y a ciudad de Buenos Aires hacia fines del período colonial. El objetivo es indagar en la configuración y resolución de los conflictos que involucren a indígenas, observando tanto su posicionamiento como el de los agentes judiciales, eclesiásticos o particulares con cierto poder en el ámbito local que se encuentren involucrados en estas causas. Este análisis nos facilitará la entrada al entretejido social de la época, proporcionándonos claves para comprenderlo, a la vez que develará una diversidad de voces y miradas implicadas en el proceso de configuración y judicialización de los delitos

La penalidad de la ebriedad en el código penal y en la praxis judicial bonaerense 1878-1888

La sanción del código penal en la provincia de Buenos Aires en el año 1877, fijó en el homicidio la penalidad y determinó las circunstancias del delito mediante la enumeración de los atenuantes y agravantes. El objetivo era contemplar todas las posibilidades del delito para reducir el "arbitrio judicial". Sin embargo, deteniéndonos en los cambios operados en cuanto a la ebriedad en la normativa legal y en la práctica judicial, se puede observar que la función del juez no se redujo únicamente a computar la pena según el delito. A su cargo quedó la apreciación de las pruebas y la interpretación legal. En este sentido, la ley dejó márgenes para considerar a la ebriedad como atenuante o no de la penalidad. Sin embargo, los jueces le negaron tal beneficio al imputado, lo cual marcó una ruptura con respecto al período anterior. Interpretación que estuvo determinada no por un cambio en la percepción sobre el efecto del alcohol como perturbador de la conciencia, sino por ciertos prejuicios que otorgaron una jerarquía y un valor a los motivos que pudieran cegar al trasgresor. Considerada aun como un vicio y no una patología, revelaron la condena a esta práctica social determinando que hechos ya no quedaban comprendidos como circunstancias atenuantes. En definitiva, la ebriedad posibilita apreciar el complejo proceso de codificación que consistió no únicamente en la aplicación literal de la ley sino también en la interpretación que de ella se hiciera.

Quien puede querer, quiso? El consentimiento sexual como problema en el tratamiento judicial de los delitos sexuales, Bs. As. 1863-1921

En los últimos años, los delitos sexuales se han convertido en objeto de preocupación para la sociedad; esto se vio reforzado por las nuevas formas de pensar y vivir las relaciones humanas inter e intra-género-s y especialmente las elecciones sexuales. En este trabajo propongo volver a poner en debate algunas cuestiones que hacen al problema de la definición jurídico-social y a la comprensión del "consentimiento" en el contexto específico de los expedientes seguidos por delitos sexuales en el ámbito de la provincia de Buenos Aires, entre 1863 y 1921, teniendo en cuenta la importancia que este concepto tiene para la definición de los delitos sexuales como tales. También se tomarán en cuenta algunos escritos de la época que permiten conocer la circulación de ideas en el ámbito específico del derecho y la medicina legal. Al mismo tiempo, pretendo poner en tensión las ideas sociales y culturales que aparezcan reflejadas en las fuentes respecto de qué es, cómo se otorga y cuándo puede hablarse de un efectivo consentimiento, así como de su contrario. Poniendo en juego las subjetividades propias de los participantes en el proceso. Resaltando la centralidad de esta cuestión en el mismo tanto para la definición de una víctima como para la caracterización de los acusados