927 resultados para Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973
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Includes index.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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ins Deutsche bertragen und kommentiert von Dr. M. Rawicz, Bezirks-Rabbiner in Offenburg (Baden)
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zum ersten Male bersetzt von Aug. Wnsche
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Objectives: The antiinflammatory effect of macrolide antibiotics has been well-established, as has their role in the treatment of certain disorders of chronic airway inflammation. Several studies have suggested that long-term, low-dose macrolides may be efficacious in the treatment of chronic rhinosinusitis; however, these studies have lacked a control group. To date, this effect has not been tested in a randomized, placebo-controlled study. Method: The authors conducted a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trial on 64 patients with chronic rhinosinusitis. Subjects received either 150 mg roxithromycin daily for 3 months or placebo. Outcome measures included the Sinonasal Outcome Test-20 (SNOT-20), measurements of peak nasal inspiratory flow, saccharine transit time, olfactory function, nasal endoscopic scoring, and nasal lavage assays for interleukin-8, fucose, and a2-macroglobulin. Results. There were statistically significant improvements in SNOT-20 score, nasal endoscopy, saccharine transit time, and IL-8 levels in lavage fluid (P < .05) in the macrolide group. A correlation was noted between improved outcome measures and low IgE levels. No significant improvements were noted for olfactory function, peak nasal inspiratory flow, or lavage levels for fucose and a2-macroglobulin. No improvement in any outcome was noted in the placebo-treated patients. Conclusion: These findings suggest that macrolides may have a beneficial role in the treatment of chronic rhinosinusitis, particularly in patients with low levels of IgE, and supports the in vitro evidence of their antiinflammatory activity. Additional studies are required to assess their place in clinical practice.
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Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-08
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The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the dtente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the transatlantic bargain became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnsons office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnsons administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnsons grand design proved to be different from the Kennedys one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real dtente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.
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Includes bibliographical references.
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[Harlan Hatcher greeting Johnson as he leaves helicopter]
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[Harlan Hatcher greeting Johnson as he leaves helicopter]
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[Johnson entering Michigan Stadium through the tunnel]
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[view of lectern and crowd, security officers]