Una mirada al papel del precedente judicial y su aplicación por parte de los jueces administrativos y de la administración pública. estudio del propósito de las sentencias de unificación jurisprudencial y del mecanismo de extensión de jurisprudencia, consagrados en la ley 1437 de 2011.

El Ordenamiento jurídico colombiano desde sus inicios se ha enmarcado en la familia jurídica Romano Germánica, donde la Jurisprudencia ocupa un papel secundario en el momento de tomar decisiones por parte de los jueces, fungiendo como un instrumento meramente auxiliar, totalmente opacado por la ley. Sin embargo, a partir de la entrada en vigencia de la Constitución de 1991, con la creación de la Corte Constitucional junto al valor vinculante que se ha dado a sus decisiones, el tradicional sistema de fuentes ha presentado una evolución que lo aproxima al uso de instituciones, como el precedente judicial, que parecían exclusivas del Common Law. De esta manera, lo novedoso del problema de investigación es que la discusión sobre la alteración de la jerarquía de las fuentes del derecho, se aborda desde una perspectiva teórica, pero desarrolla puntualmente, mecanismos como las sentencias de unificación y la extensión de jurisprudencia, que posiblemente dan alcance al concepto de precedente judicial en el Contencioso Administrativo en la práctica.

The relevance of context in property law: a case for judicial restraint?

A distinction between the domestic and commercial context is commonly drawn in property law discourse and has been brought into focus by three recent House of Lords' decisions. The thesis of this paper is that while the distinction is a useful explanatory tool, it runs into difficulties when given legal effect by the courts. There is a definitional problem in understanding what is included within each context. Indeed, the distinction assumes the existence of a dichotomy when, in fact, the domestic and commercial spheres are better seen as a continuum. In Stack v Dowden, the majority of the House of Lords gave legal effect to context and considered that different rules should apply to determine ownership of the home. This paper locates its decision in the broader debate on judicial restraint and creativity. By analogy with current discussion of due deference in public law, it is suggested that, in light of the policy issues involved and the broader ramifications of the decision, insufficient justification was given for the approach adopted by the majority.

A gestão em vara judicial sob a visão do juiz pro ativo

O modelo de gestão inovador mostrou que é possível fazer um ambiente de excelência onde o Poder Judiciário seja reconhecido, respeitado e confiável aos jurisdicionados, na medida em que se assegura uma prestação jurisdicional efetiva num espaço de tempo razoável, garantindo legitimidade e credibilidade às suas decisões, sob a visão de um juiz proativo, com objetivos estratégicos pré-definidos, sob um olhar idealizador, uma equipe integrada, motivada e comprometida. O modelo de gestão inovador foi experimentado na Vara do Juizado Especial Cível da Comarca de Jaru, no Estado de Rondônia, onde se procurou conferir uma rotina lógico-jurídica ao fluxo processual, sem prejuízo da qualidade, e em com total harmonia aos postulados normativos do Juizado Especial Cível e as regras constitucionais prescritas.

A Trava bancária na recuperação judicial

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a aplicação teórica e prática dos mecanismos de garantia de crédito previstos nos §§ 3º e 5º do art. 49 da Lei nº 11.101/2005. A partir de uma conceituação das modalidades de garantia abordadas, serão analisadas as perspectivas doutrinárias e jurisprudenciais quanto aos aspectos e os efeitos do enquadramento de determinados créditos à previsão legal. A estrutura do presente estudo é feito de modo a permitir uma comparação entre as normas legais, a abordagem da doutrina e as decisões dos Tribunais brasileiros.

Judicial system performance and economic development

The role of judicial systems in determining economic perfonnance has gained increasingly attention in recent years. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a clearly articulated framework to examine how judicial systems influence the investment and production decisions of economic agents. This paper tries to till in this gap. It examines what constitutes a well-functioning judiciary, analyzes how dysfunctional judicial systems compromise economic growth, and reviews the relevant empirical literature. It concludes with some remarks about why, despite the widespread perception that well-functioning legal and judicial systems are key to the success of market-oriented reforms in developing and transition countries, judicial refonn has lagged so much behind other reforms.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.

Reports of decisions in the Supreme court of British Guiana ... and in the West Indian court of appeal

Editors: 19 -1921, L.C. Dalton; 1922, L.C. Dalton, S.J. Van Sertima; 1923, S.J. Van Sertima; 1924, E.M. Duke; 1925, E.M. Duke, S.J. Van Sertima; 1926-1930, S.J. Van Sertime; 1931, E.M. Duke

Report of review of court decisions.

Mode of access: Internet.

A conduta judicial ética teórica e aplicada contida em princípios e regras deontológicos abrangidos pelo sistema constitucional

Research on Legal Deontology dedicated to theoretical and applied ethics on judicial conduct grounded in legal principles and rules set out in the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Organic Law of the National Judiciary, also contemplating propositional instruments covered by the constitutional system, which conveys behavioural paradigms inserted in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, in the Universal Statute of the Judge and in the Latin-American Code of Judicial Ethics, as well as highlight the influence of those instruments in the Brazilian Ethical Code of the Magistrates and in the official complementary training of judges in charge of Judiciary Schools. The study provides the theoretical influxes of moral norm, passing by behavioural social norm to consolidate the ideal standards of judicial conduct into legal standards and related instruments. The Legal Deontology directed to the ethical judicial conduct is confronted with the stereotype that society expressed in relation to the judge's person, who is the political agent that interprets the law for making decisions which directly influences the realization of access to justice, that is constitutionally guaranteed to all. Core values inserted in the constitutional system intended to discipline the judicial conduct are presented and analysed under a critical view, since they are enclosed in prescriptive language that conveys behavioural aspects open to interpretation and which compliance is revealed as a proposition focused on promoting a better solution of interest’s conflicts under the responsibility of those who constitute the distinctive corporation of the Judiciary. The theme’s contextualization also focuses on applied ethics, based on the approach of normative and propositional instruments of deontological content, still focusing on the study of real cases examined by the Brazilian National Council of Justice, as part of its correctional goals.

Bias on the Bench: How Judges’ Legal Backgrounds Influence Their Decisions

The ideal conception of a judge is that of a neutral arbitrator. However, there exist good reasons to believe that personal characteristics, including professional experiences, bias judges. Such suspicions inspired two hypotheses: (1) judges that are former prosecutors are biased in favor of the government in criminal appeals; (2) judges that are former criminal defense attorneys are biased in favor of the criminal appellant. These hypotheses were tested by gathering professional information about state supreme court judges in the south during the years from 1995 until 1998. That was then matched to an existing database that recorded those judges’ demographics and decisions in criminal appeals during that time. Logistic regressions of that data revealed that despite when other characteristics, including gender, race, and legal experience, were accounted for, criminal defense remained a statistically significant predictor. Judges with a background in criminal defense were more likely to reverse criminal court decisions. In contrast, prosecutorial experience was not a good predictor of how a judge ruled. Judges that had backgrounds in prosecution did not rule much differently than those that did not have such a background.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The role of Constitutional Courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision-making and, consequently, undermine judicial independence and impartiality. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court’s decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long-term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno-nationalism on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that the longer a judge serves on the Court the more ethno-national affiliation seems to influence her decision-making. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.

Imagens da imparcialidade entre o discurso constitucional e a prática judicial

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, 2016.