Demokratie, good governance und Entwicklung: Eine quantitative Analyse für 191 Staaten im Zeitraum 1996 bis 2005

Das Jahr 1989 markiert nicht nur den Beginn entscheidender geopolitischer Veränderungen, sondern gleichzeitig den Ursprung eines bedeutsamen Wandels in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mit der viel beachteten Studie ‚Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth’ initiierte die Weltbank eine Debatte über die Relevanz institutioneller Faktoren für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die in den folgenden Jahren unter dem Titel ‚Good Governance’ erhebliche Bedeutung erlangte. Nahezu alle zentralen Akteure begannen, entsprechende Aspekte in ihrer praktischen Arbeit zu berücksichtigen, und entwickelten eigene Konzepte zu dieser Thematik. Wenn auch mit der Konzentration auf Institutionen als Entwicklungsdeterminanten eine grundlegende Gemeinsamkeit der Ansätze festzustellen ist, unterscheiden sie sich jedoch erheblich im Hinblick auf die Einbeziehung politischer Faktoren, so dass von einem einheitlichen Verständnis von ‚Good Governance’ nicht gesprochen werden kann. Während die meisten bilateralen Akteure sowie DAC und UNDP Demokratie und Menschenrechte explizit als zentrale Bestandteile betrachten, identifiziert die Weltbank einen Kern von Good Governance, der unabhängig von der Herrschaftsform, also sowohl in Demokratien wie auch in Autokratien, verwirklicht werden kann. Die Implikationen dieser Feststellung sind weit reichend. Zunächst erlaubt erst diese Sichtweise der Bank überhaupt, entsprechende Aspekte aufzugreifen, da ihr eine Berücksichtigung politischer Faktoren durch ihre Statuten verboten ist. Bedeutsamer ist allerdings, dass die Behauptung der Trennbarkeit von Good Governance und der Form politischer Herrschaft die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Entwicklung zu erreichen ohne eine demokratische Ordnung zu etablieren, da folglich autokratische Systeme in gleicher Weise wie Demokratien in der Lage sind, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu verwirklichen, welche als zentrale Determinanten für wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt identifiziert wurden. Damit entfällt nicht nur ein bedeutsamer Rechtfertigungsgrund für demokratische Herrschaft als solche, sondern rekurrierend auf bestimmte, dieser zu attestierende, entwicklungshemmende Charakteristika können Autokratien nun möglicherweise als überlegene Herrschaftsform verstanden werden, da sie durch jene nicht gekennzeichnet sind. Die Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank unterstützen somit auch die vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Erfolgsgeschichte der ostasiatischen Tigerstaaten vertretene Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur, die heute mit dem Aufstieg der Volksrepublik China eine Renaissance erlebt. Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg dieser Staaten ist danach auf die überlegene Handlungsfähigkeit autokratischer Systeme zurückzuführen, während Demokratien aufgrund der Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Regierenden und Regierten nicht in der Lage sind, die notwendigen Entscheidungen zu treffen und durchzusetzen. Die dargestellte Sichtweise der Weltbank ist allerdings von verschiedenen Autoren in Zweifel gezogen worden, die auch für ein im Wesentlichen auf technische Elemente beschränktes Good Governance-Konzept einen Zusammenhang mit der Form politischer Herrschaft erkennen. So wird beispielsweise vertreten, das Konzept der Bank bewege sich ausdrücklich nicht in einem systemneutralen Vakuum, sondern propagiere zumindest implizit die Etablierung demokratischer Regierungsformen. Im Übrigen steht die aus den Annahmen der Weltbank neuerlich abgeleitete Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur in einem erheblichen Widerspruch zu der von multilateralen wie bilateralen Akteuren verstärkt verfolgten Förderung demokratischer Herrschaft als Mittel für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie der fortschreitenden Verbreitung der Demokratie. Besteht nun doch ein Einfluss der Herrschaftsform auf die Verwirklichung von Good Governance als zentraler Entwicklungsdeterminante und kann zudem davon ausgegangen werden, dass Demokratien diesbezüglich Vorteile besitzen, dann ist eine Entwicklungsdiktatur keine denkbare Möglichkeit, sondern im Gegenteil demokratische Herrschaft der gebotene Weg zu wirtschaftlichem Wachstum bzw. einer Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse. Aufgrund der mit den Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank verbundenen bedeutsamen Implikationen und der bisher weitestgehend fehlenden ausführlichen Thematisierung dieses Gegenstands in der Literatur ist eine detaillierte theoretische Betrachtung der Zusammenhänge zwischen den zentralen Elementen von Good Governance und demokratischer Herrschaft notwendig. Darüber hinaus sollen die angesprochenen Beziehungen auch einer empirischen Analyse unterzogen werden. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist deshalb die Fragestellung, ob Good Governance eine von demokratischer Herrschaft theoretisch und empirisch unabhängige Entwicklungsstrategie darstellt.

Nongovernmental organization staff views of global water privatization

More than 1 billion people lack access to clean water and proper sanitation. As part of efforts to solve this problem, there is a growing shift from public to private water management led by The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This shift has inspired much related research. Researchers have assessed water privatization related perceptions of consumers, government officials, and multinational company agents. This thesis presents results of a study of nongovernmental (NGO) staff perceptions of water privatization. Although NGOs are important actors in sustainable water related development through water provision, we have little understanding of their perceptions of water privatization and how it impacts their activities. My goal was to fill this gap. I sampled international and national development NGOs with water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) foci. I conducted 28 interviews between January and June of 2011 with staff in key positions including water policy analysts, program officers, and project coordinators. Their perceptions of water privatization were mixed. I also found that local water privatization in most cases does not influence NGO decisions to conduct projects in a region. I found that development NGO staff base their beliefs about water privatization on a mix of personal experience and media coverage. My findings have important implications for the WASH sector as we work to solve the worsening global water access crisis.

Policy Contexts of Social Work in Britain: the wider implications of 'New' Labour and the 'New Legal Regime'

Several commentators have expressed disappointment with New Labour's apparent adherence to the policy frameworks of the previous Conservative administrations. The employment orientation of its welfare programmes, the contradictory nature of the social exclusion initiatives, and the continuing obsession with public sector marketisation, inspections, audits, standards and so on, have all come under critical scrutiny (c.f., Blyth 2001; Jordan 2001; Orme 2001). This paper suggests that in order to understand the socio-economic and political contexts affecting social work we need to examine the relationship between New Labour's modernisation project and its insertion within an architecture of global governance. In particular, membership of the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) set the parameters for domestic policy in important ways. Whilst much has been written about the economic dimensions of 'globalisation' in relation to social work rather less has been noted about the ways in which domestic policy agenda are driven by multilateral governance objectives. This policy dimension is important in trying to respond to various changes affecting social work as a professional activity. What is possible, what is encouraged, how things might be done, is tightly bounded by the policy frameworks governing practice and affected by those governing the lives of service users. It is unhelpful to see policy formulation in purely national terms as the UK is inserted into a network governance structure, a regulatory framework where decisions are made by many countries and organisations and agencies. Together, they are producing a 'new legal regime', characterised by a marked neo-liberal policy agenda. This paper aims to demonstrate the relationship of New Labour's modernisation programme to these new forms of legality by examining two main policy areas and the welfare implications they are enmeshed in. The first is privatisation, and the second is social policy in the European Union. Examining these areas allows a demonstration of how much of the New Labour programme can be understood as a local implementation of a transnational strategy, how parts of that strategy produce much of the social exclusion it purports to address, and how social welfare, and particularly social work, are noticeable by their absence within policy discourses of the strategy. The paper details how the privatisation programme is considered to be a crucial vehicle for the further development of a transnational political-economy, where capital accumulation has been redefined as 'welfare'. In this development, frameworks, codes and standards are central, and the final section of the paper examines how the modernisation strategy of the European Union depends upon social policy marked by an employment orientation and risk rationality, aimed at reconfiguring citizen identities.The strategy is governed through an 'open mode of coordination', in which codes, standards, benchmarks and so on play an important role. The paper considers the modernisation strategy and new legality within which it is embedded as dependent upon social policy as a technology of liberal governance, one demonstrating a new rationality in comparison to that governing post-Second World War welfare, and which aims to reconfigure institutional infrastructure and citizen identity.

A Preliminary Impact Assessment of Doha Round Results on Agricultural Policies in Turkey

Turkish agriculture has been experiencing a period of unique policy experiment over the last couple years. A World Bank-initiated project, called the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP), has been at the forefront of policy change. It was initially promoted by the Bank as an exemplary reform package which could also be adopted by other developing countries. It was introduced in 2001 as part of a major International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank-imposed program of “structural adjustment” after the country had been hit by a major financial crisis. The project has finally come to an end in 2009, and there is now an urgent need for a retrospective assessment of its overall impact on the agricultural sector. Has it fulfilled its ambitious objective of reforming and restructuring Turkish agriculture? Or should it be recorded as a failure of the neo-liberal doctrine? This book aims at finding answers to these questions by investigating the legacy of ARIP from a multi-disciplinary perspective.

The dynamics of spending and absorption of aid : panel data analysis

In September 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to make the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth the fundamental objectives of lending operations in its poorest member countries. This paper studies the spending and absorption of aid in PRGF-supported programs, verifies whether the use of aid is programmed to be smoothed over time, and analyzes how considerations about macroeconomic stability influence the programmed use of aid. The paper shows that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the economy. In addition, the paper finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or spending of aid.

UMA ANÁLISE DA RELAÇÃO ENTRE VARIÁVEIS MACROECONÔMICAS E O COMPORTAMENTO DAS AÇÕES DE MAIOR LIQUIDEZ DO ÍNDICE IBOVESPA

As ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, refletem o comportamento das ações de um modo geral, bem como a relação das variáveis macroeconômicas em seu comportamento e estão entre as mais negociadas no mercado de capitais brasileiro. Desta forma, pode-se entender que há reflexos de fatores que impactam as empresas de maior liquidez que definem o comportamento das variáveis macroeconômicas e que o inverso também é uma verdade, oscilações nos fatores macroeconômicos também afetam as ações de maior liquidez, como IPCA, PIB, SELIC e Taxa de Câmbio. O estudo propõe uma análise da relação existente entre variáveis macroeconômicas e o comportamento das ações de maior liquidez do índice IBOVESPA, corroborando com estudos que buscam entender a influência de fatores macroeconômicos sobre o preço de ações e contribuindo empiricamente com a formação de portfólios de investimento. O trabalho abrangeu o período de 2008 a 2014. Os resultados concluíram que a formação de carteiras, visando a proteção do capital investido, deve conter ativos com correlação negativa em relação às variáveis estudadas, o que torna possível a composição de uma carteira com risco reduzido.

ANALISANDO A RELAÇÃO DOS VOLUMES DE EXPORTAÇÃO E DE IMPORTAÇÃO, PIB, TAXAS DE CÂMBIO E INFLAÇÃO NO PERÍODO DE 2004 A 2014.

Esta dissertação visa deslumbrar uma análise macroeconômica do Brasil, especialmente no que se refere à relação dos índices mensais dos volumes das exportações e das importações com os volumes mensais do PIB, da Taxa SELIC e as Taxas de Câmbio, conforme dados coletados no período de janeiro de 2004 a dezembro de 2014, através de pesquisa literária referente aos históricos sobre cada conceito envolvido no âmbito da macroeconomia das varáveis estudadas. Foi realizado um estudo de caso embasado em dados de sites governamentais, no período delimitado, empregando-se o método de regressão linear, com base na Teoria da correlação de Pearson, demonstrando os resultados obtidos no período do estudo para as varáveis estudadas. Desta maneira, conseguiu-se estudar e analisar como as variáveis dependentes (resposta): volume das exportações e volume das importações estão relacionadas com as varáveis independentes (explicativas): PIB, Taxa Selic e taxa de Câmbio. Os resultados apurados no presente estudo permitem identificar que existe correlação moderada e negativa, quando analisadas a Taxa Selic e a Taxa de Câmbio com os volumes das exportações e das importações, enquanto o PIB apresenta correlação forte e positiva na análise com os volumes das exportações e das importações

EU-IMF assistance to euro area countries: an early assessment. Bruegel Blueprint [No. 19?], 16 May 2013

Three years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland and Portugal went down the same path. This study provides an early evaluation of these assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in these three countries. The study assesses the economic impact of the programmes and the consequences of their particular institutional set-up.

Ukrainian economy overshadowed by war. OSW Commentary No. 148, 08.10.2014

Ukraine’s financial results over the past few months prove that the economic crisis which has been ongoing since mid 2012 has exacerbated. According to data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy, Gross Domestic Product for the first six months of 2014 shrank by 3%. In the second quarter, it fell by 4.6%1 and may further be reduced by as much as 8–10% over the year as a whole. After the first six months of this year, the balance of payments deficit reached US$4.3 billion. After deflation last year, prices grew by 12%, and the hryvnia dropped to a historic low. Although a surplus was seen in Ukrainian foreign trade in goods and services, reaching over US$3 billion at the end of June, its trade volume is shrinking. The main reason behind this deteriorating situation is the actions taken by Russia. Moscow has been fomenting the conflict in Donbas since April, has consistently imposed embargoes on imports of more and more Ukrainian goods and cut gas supplies to Ukraine in June. This has forced the government to focus on the current management of state finances and to carry out budget sequestration twice this year. The government has also used this as an excuse not to implement necessary systemic reforms. The increasing share of military expenditure, the shrinking exports (-5% in the first six months), including in particular to Russia, which until recently was Ukraine’s key trade partner, and the rapid fall in industrial production and investments have all made the situation even worse. All that saves Ukraine from an economic collapse is the loan from the International Monetary Fund and higher taxes, which allows the government to maintain budget liquidity. However, if the conflict in Donbas lasts longer and if Russia continues its economic blackmail, including withholding gas supplies, the economic crisis may prove to be long-lasting.

Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.

Systemic crisis in Alexander Lukashenko's regime. OSW Commentary No. 66, 2011-10-28

Measures undertaken by the Belarusian government in the areas of the economy, internal affairs and foreign policy in recent months have proven increasingly ineffective. Despite the deteriorating macroeconomic situation, Minsk is not implementing the reforms necessary to combat the crisis and its activity is limited only to feigned actions and administrative regulations. As a result, the economic situation is worsening but the chances of obtaining external loans as support, for example from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are decreasing. At the same time there is mounting fear among the regime of social unrest, therefore by raising salaries of the least well-off groups of citizens it is trying to compensate for the increased costs of living. On the other hand, the government is extending the scope of control over society and competences of enforcement bodies. Belarus’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy has also been diminishing substantially. Despite the EU’s declared willingness to reach an agreement and its encouragement, Lukashenko is not ready to make concessions in the political sphere (e.g. to rehabilitate political prisoners), and this is hindering the normalisation of relations with the West. Minsk furthermore feels a mounting pressure from Moscow, making the Belarusian negotiating position ever weaker. The lack of freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy, no possibility to maintain a costly economic model and the lack of support from the majority of society all prove that Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is in severe crisis. The system he established is no longer able to respond to current threats with adequate and effective strategies. This situation is challenging the regime’s stability and calls into question its viability in the longer term.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

It’s not just Russia: Currency crisis in the Commonwealth of independent states. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/01, February 2015

The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.

The harsh reality of Ukraine's fiscal arithmetic. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/07, June 2015

Ukraine is struggling with both external aggression and the dramatically poor shape of its economy. The pace of political and institutional change has so far been too slow to prevent the deepening of the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises, while business confidence continues to be undermined. • Unfortunately, the 2015 International Monetary Fund Extended Fund Facility programme repeats many weaknesses of the 2014 IMF Stand-by Arrangement: slow pace of fiscal adjustment especially in the two key areas of energy prices and pension entitlements, lack of a comprehensive structural and institutional reform vision, and insufficient external financing to close the expected balance-of-payments gap and allow Ukraine to return to debt sustainability in the long term. • The reform process in Ukraine must be accelerated and better managed. A frontloaded fiscal adjustment is necessary to stabilise public finances and the balance-of-payments, and to bring inflation down. The international community, especially the European Union, should offer sufficient financial aid backed by strong conditionality, technical assistance and support to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.