Sociological Agents for Effective Social Action

This paper is concerned with the problem of how effective social interaction arises from individual social action and mind. The need to study the individual social mind, suggests a move towards the notion of sociological agents who can model their social environment as opposed to acting socially within it. This does not constrain such social behaviour; on the contrary, we argue that it provides the requisite information and understanding for such behaviour to be effective. We argue that effective social agents must be sociological in modelling agents and agent relationships. In this paper, we show how an existing agent framework leads naturally to the enumeration of a map of inter-agent relationships that can be modelled and exploited by sociological agents to enable more effective operation.

Interaction among agents that plan

The development of practical agent languages has progressed significantly over recent years, but this has largely been independent of distinct developments in aspects of multiagent cooperation and planning. For example, while the popular AgentSpeak(L) has had various extensions and improvements proposed, it still essentially a single-agent language. In response, in this paper, we describe a simple, yet effective, technique for multiagent planning that enables an agent to take advantage of cooperating agents in a society. In particular, we build on a technique that enables new plans to be added to a plan library through the invocation of an external planning component, and extend it to include the construction of plans involving the chaining of subplans of others. Our mechanism makes use of plan patterns that insulate the planning process from the resulting distributed aspects of plan execution through local proxy plans that encode information about the preconditions and effects of the external plans provided by agents willing to cooperate. In this way, we allow an agent to discover new ways of achieving its goals through local planning and the delegation of tasks for execution by others, allowing it to overcome individual limitations.

Large economies with differential information but without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.

The macroeconomic effects of infrequent information with adjustment costs

We extend the macroeconomic literature on Sstype rules by introducing infrequent information in a kinked ad justment cost model. We first show that optimal individual decision rules are both state-and -time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. In our model, a vast number of agents act together, and more so when uncertainty is large.The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. These results are in contrast with those obtained with full information ad justment cost models.

The influence of the supply chain agents on the new product development's performance: an analysis based on the multi-group moderation

Este estudo buscou verificar a influencia dos agentes da cadeia de suprimentos no desempenho do desenvolvimento de novos produtos quando os agentes são analisados em conjunto. A motivação desta pesquisa veio de estudos que alertaram para a consideração da integração da cadeia de suprimentos como um constructo multidimensional, englobando o envolvimento da manufatura, fornecedores e clientes no desenvolvimento de novos produtos; e devido à falta de informação sobre as influencias individuais destes agentes no desenvolvimento de novos produtos. Sob essas considerações, buscou-se construir um modelo analítico baseado na Teoria do Capital Social e Capacidade Absortiva, construir hipóteses a partir da revisão da literatura e conectar constructos como cooperação, envolvimento do fornecedor no desenvolvimento de novos produtos (DNP), envolvimento do cliente no DNP, envolvimento da manufatura no DNP, antecipação de novas tecnologias, melhoria contínua, desempenho operacional do DNP, desempenho de mercado do NPD e desempenho de negócio do DNP. Para testar as hipóteses foram consideradas três variáveis moderadoras, tais como turbulência ambiental (baixa, média e alta), indústria (eletrônicos, maquinários e equipamentos de transporte) e localização (América, Europa e Ásia). Para testar o modelo foram usados dados do projeto High Performance Manufacturing que contém 339 empresas das indústrias de eletrônicos, maquinários e equipamentos de transporte, localizadas em onze países. As hipóteses foram testadas por meio da Análise Fatorial Confirmatória (AFC) incluindo a moderação muti-grupo para as três variáveis moderadoras mencionadas anteriormente. Os principais resultados apontaram que as hipóteses relacionadas com cooperação foram confirmadas em ambientes de média turbulência, enquanto as hipóteses relacionadas ao desempenho no DNP foram confirmadas em ambientes de baixa turbulência ambiental e em países asiáticos. Adicionalmente, sob as mesmas condições, fornecedores, clientes e manufatura influenciam diferentemente no desempenho de novos produtos. Assim, o envolvimento de fornecedores influencia diretamente no desempenho operacional e indiretamente no desempenho de mercado e de negócio em baixos níveis de turbulência ambiental, na indústria de equipamentos de transporte em países da Americanos e Europeus. De igual forma, o envolvimento do cliente influenciou diretamente no desempenho operacional e indiretamente no desempenho de mercado e do negócio em médio nível de turbulência ambiental, na indústria de maquinários e em países Asiáticos. Fornecedores e clientes não influenciam diretamente no desempenho de mercado e do negócio e não influenciam indiretamente no desempenho operacional. O envolvimento da manufatura não influenciou nenhum tipo de desempenho do desenvolvimento de novos produtos em todos os cenários testados.

Information learning and the stability of fiat money

We analyze the stability of monetary regimes in a decentralized economy where fiat money is endogenously created, information about its value is imperfect, and agents only learn from their personal trading experiences. We show that in poorly informed economies, monetary stability depends heavily on the government's commitment to the long run value of money, whereas in economies where agents gather information more easily, monetary stability can be an endogenous outcome. We generate a dynamics on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual colIapse of overissued paper money. Moreover, our results provide an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is a very recent development.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Organizations redesign and building of information systems

Develop software is still a risky business. After 60 years of experience, this community is still not able to consistently build Information Systems (IS) for organizations with predictable quality, within previously agreed budget and time constraints. Although software is changeable we are still unable to cope with the amount and complexity of change that organizations demand for their IS. To improve results, developers followed two alternatives: Frameworks that increase productivity but constrain the flexibility of possible solutions; Agile ways of developing software that keep flexibility with less upfront commitments. With strict frameworks, specific hacks have to be put in place to get around the framework construction options. In time this leads to inconsistent architectures that are harder to maintain due to incomplete documentation and human resources turnover. The main goals of this work is to create a new way to develop flexible IS for organizations, using web technologies, in a faster, better and cheaper way that is more suited to handle organizational change. To do so we propose an adaptive object model that uses a new ontology for data and action with strict normalizing rules. These rules should bound the effects of changes that can be better tested and therefore corrected. Interfaces are built with templates of resources that can be reused and extended in a flexible way. The “state of the world” for each IS is determined by all production and coordination acts that agents performed over time, even those performed by external systems. When bugs are found during maintenance, their past cascading effects can be checked through simulation, re-running the log of transaction acts over time and checking results with previous records. This work implements a prototype with part of the proposed system in order to have a preliminary assessment its feasibility and limitations.

Information for the diagnosis and treatment of root resorption due to tooth replantation.

A favorable prognosis after tooth avulsion depends on some variables, such as the extra-alveolar period and storage medium. Vitality of the periodontal ligament cells is considered a critical factor for a successful outcome without root resorption. The dental surgeon is provided with clinical information and radiographic findings to establish a diagnosis and may rely on current available guidelines. Once trauma has occurred, treatment must be quick and effective, and periodic follow-up must be performed. Clinical, radiographic, and histologic characteristics for each type of root resorption due to tooth replantation are presented, with the aim to provide information for the diagnosis and treatment of healing complications.

A comparison between diuretics and angiotensin-receptor blocker agents in patients with stage I hypertension (PREVER-treatment trial): Study protocol for a randomized double-blind controlled trial

Background: Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of death in Brazil, and hypertension is its major risk factor. The benefit of its drug treatment to prevent major cardiovascular events was consistently demonstrated. Angiotensin-receptor blockers (ARB) have been the preferential drugs in the management of hypertension worldwide, despite the absence of any consistent evidence of advantage over older agents, and the concern that they may be associated with lower renal protection and risk for cancer. Diuretics are as efficacious as other agents, are well tolerated, have longer duration of action and low cost, but have been scarcely compared with ARBs. A study comparing diuretic and ARB is therefore warranted.Methods/design: This is a randomized, double-blind, clinical trial, comparing the association of chlorthalidone and amiloride with losartan as first drug option in patients aged 30 to 70 years, with stage I hypertension. The primary outcomes will be variation of blood pressure by time, adverse events and development or worsening of microalbuminuria and of left ventricular hypertrophy in the EKG. The secondary outcomes will be fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events: myocardial infarction, stroke, heart failure, evidence of new subclinical atherosclerosis and sudden death. The study will last 18 months. The sample size will be of 1200 participants for group in order to confer enough power to test for all primary outcomes. The project was approved by the Ethics committee of each participating institution.Discussion: The putative pleiotropic effects of ARB agents, particularly renal protection, have been disputed, and they have been scarcely compared with diuretics in large clinical trials, despite that they have been at least as efficacious as newer agents in managing hypertension. Even if the null hypothesis is not rejected, the information will be useful for health care policy to treat hypertension in Brazil. Clinical trials registration number: ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT00971165. © 2011 Fuchs et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.

Nubbe natural products, source of molecular diversity for the design of new anticancer agents

Pós-graduação em Química - IQ