The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v Lithuania

This article analyses the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of domestic violence, with a particular focus on Valiuliene v Lithuania. It seems that to date the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat inconsistent, and with Valiuliene v Lithuania the Court was given an opportunity to clarify its approach in this area. There are certainly a number of positive aspects to the Court’s judgment, however there are also difficulties with the approach of the Court in this case. Overall it is to be hoped that the judgment in Valiuliene v Lithuania will mark the beginning of a more coherent jurisprudence as regards domestic violence.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.

The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication

This chapter considers judicial reasoning in ‘human rights’ cases. Are there techniques that courts share, or are different techniques adopted, to decide how human rights, in this broader sense, are protected? The chapter aims to adopt a comparative approach to the examination of this reasoning, through a detailed examination of similar human rights issues in a range of jurisdictions. The aim of the chapter is to examine the similarities and divergences in the reasoning developed by courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. The chapter shows that human rights reasoning involves distinctive and particular forms of legal reasoning, but that its form and content differ significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time within jurisdictions. Building upon these findings, the chapter explores what these similarities and differences tell us about the nature, and the direction of travel, of human rights law which comprises notionally universal norms.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human Rights

The critique of human rights has proliferated in critical legal thinking over recent years, making it clear that we can no longer uncritically approach human rights in their liberal form. In this article I assert that after the critique of rights one way human rights may be productively re-engaged in radical politics is by drawing from the radical democratic tradition. Radical democratic thought provides plausible resources to rework the shortcomings of liberal human rights, and allows human rights to be brought within the purview of a wider political project adopting a critical approach to current relations of power. Building upon previous re-engagements with rights using radical democratic thought, I return to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to explore how human rights may be thought as an antagonistic hegemonic activity within a critical relation to power, a concept which is fundamentally futural, and may emerge as one site for work towards radical and plural democracy. I also assert, via Judith Butler's model of cultural translation, that a radical democratic practice of human rights may be advanced which resonates with and builds upon already existing activism, thereby holding possibilities to persuade those who remain sceptical as to radical re-engagements with rights.

The Right to Water in the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

The human right to water is nowadays more broadly recognised, mainly due to the essential societal function that this resource plays; likewise, because of the present water scarcity is generating conflicts between its different uses. Thus, this right aims at protecting human beings by guaranteeing access to clean water that is essential to satisfy vital human needs. Similarly, access to clean water is an important element to guarantee other rights including the right to life and health. The recognition of the right to water is mainly achieved in two ways: as a new and independent right and as a subordinate or derivative right. Concerning the latter, the right to water can emanate from civil and political rights, such as the right to life; or can be derived from economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to housing. This contribution explores the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the right to water, and analyses whether the Court has recognised the right to water and, if so, in which manner.

Some elements for the construction of a definition of human rights

This article seeks to demystify the foundations of rights. It looks at the search for some systemic differentiation. It emphasizes effectiveness, legitimacy, the importance of convention and of political participation as common elements of the different theoretical approaches to human rights. By analysing these elements it is possible to build the term “human rights” as a concept capable of being measured accurately by studying the effectiveness of legal rules as applied to human rights in specific contexts.

Poverty as an Abuse of Human Rights in Ghana. : A grass roots perspective on poverty and human rights.

The study aimed at getting a grass root opinion on poverty and why Ghana is still poor after 50 years of independence in spite of her richness in natural resources, second largest producer of cocoa in the word and appreciable stable political environment. The opinions of the ordinary people in the Bia district and their observed living conditions was analysed in line with theoretical basis of the study and previous studies to justify the stance that poverty should be considered as an abuse of human rights. It was concluded based on position of informants and previous data available that though many factors have been raised by previous scholars as the cause of poverty, the actions and inactions of both internal and external power-holders is the main source of poverty in Ghana. It was proposed that for poverty to be reduced in a sustainable way there should be strong civil society groups and active citizens through civic education to hold power-holders accountable. Until the actions and inactions of power-holders which have subjected many Ghanaians into intergenerational poverty are seen as human rights abuse, the rights of many Ghanaians would be constantly abused. This will eventually defeat the promotion of human rights culture in Ghana.