Stability in a Network Economy: The Role of Institutions

We consider an economy in which agents are embedded in a network of potential value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic interactions: Autarkic self-provision; bilateral interaction; and multilateral collaboration through endogenously provided platforms.
We introduce two stability concepts and provide sufficient and necessary conditions on the network structure that guarantee existence, in cases of the absence of externalities, link-based externalities and crowding externalities. We show that institutional arrangements based on socioeconomic roles and leadership guarantee stability. In particular, the stability of more complex economic outcomes requires more strict and complex institutional rules to govern economic interactions. We investigate strict social hierarchies, tiered leadership structures and global market places.

Avaliação imobiliária: entre a ciência da avaliação e a arte da apreciação

Recentemente a avaliação imobiliária levou ao colapso de instituições financeiras e à crise no Subprime. A presente investigação pretende contribuir para perceber quais os factores preponderantes na avaliação imobiliária. O trabalho aborda a problemática da assimetria de informação, os diferentes métodos de avaliação imobiliária e a importância das externalidades. Empiricamente há diversos casos analisados através do uso da metodologia da Regressão Linear, Análise de Clusters e Análise de Componentes Principais da Análise Factorial. O primeiro caso analisado é direccionado à avaliação das externalidades, onde os resultados indicam que as externalidades positivas principais são as seguintes: as vistas de marina são mais valorizadas que as vistas de mar, as vistas frontais são mais valorizadas que as vistas laterais e existem diferenças de valorização ao nível do piso de acordo com o tipo de habitação (residência ou férias). O segundo estudo analisa como o método do rendimento ajuda na explicação da realidade portuguesa, no qual foram obtidos três clusters de rendas e três clusters de yields para cada uma das amostras. Os resultados demonstram que: (a) ambos os clusters, das yields e das rendas são formados por diferentes elementos (b) que o valor da oferta é explicado pelo método do rendimento, pelo cluster das yields e pela densidade populacional. No terceiro estudo foram inquiridos 427 indivíduos que procuravam apartamento para residência. A partir da Análise de Componentes Principais da Análise Factorial efectuada obtiveram-se sete factores determinantes na procura de apartamento: as externalidades negativas, as externalidades positivas, a localização de negócios no rés-do-chão do edifício de apartamentos, os interesses racionais de proximidade, as variáveis secundárias na utilização do edifício, as variáveis de rendimento e as variáveis de interesses pessoais. A principal conclusão é que como é uma área transdisciplinar, é difícil chegar a um único modelo que incorpore os métodos de avaliação e as diferentes dinâmicas da procura. O avaliador, deve analisar e fazer o seu scoring, tendo em conta o equilíbrio entre a ciência da avaliação e a arte da apreciação.

How does globalization affect the tax burden on labour income, capital income and consumption in different welfare regimes? The case of Western and Eastern EU Member States

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social-democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social-democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)

Increase urban freight efficiency with delivery and servicing plan

Delivery and Servicing Plan (DSP) is an innovative logistics concept for more efficient organisation of deliveries from the point of view of the receiver of the goods. DSP actions tested in this study include reducing the number of suppliers, grouping deliveries, selecting less distant suppliers and others. It is shown that DSP can help reduce externalities and lead to a substantial reduction of costs. A new tool was developed to calculate the benefits of different DSP options for businesses and the public sector. Reductions in costs and externalities exceeding 50% have been demonstrated in a few cases. Remaining difficulties with the concept are organisational issues, lack of knowledge, need to give external advisory support for shop owners and the limited number of successful applications to date.

Improving health and wellbeing independently of GDP: dividends of greener and prosoical economies

Increases in gross domestic product (GDP) beyond a threshold of basic needs do not lead to further increases in well-being. An explanation is that material consumption (MC) also results in negative health externalities. We assess how these externalities influence six factors critical for well-being: (i) healthy food; (ii) active body; (iii) healthy mind; (iv) community links; (v) contact with nature; and (vi) attachment to possessions. If environmentally sustainable consumption (ESC) were increasingly substituted for MC, thus improving well-being and stocks of natural and social capital, and sustainable behaviours involving non-material consumption (SBs-NMC) became more prevalent, then well-being would increase regardless of levels of GDP. In the UK, the individualised annual health costs of negative consumption externalities (NCEs) currently amount to £62 billion for the National Health Service, and £184 billion for the economy (for mental ill-health, dementia, obesity, physical inactivity, diabetes, loneliness and cardiovascular disease). A dividend is available if substitution by ESC and SBs-NMC could limit the prevalence of these conditions.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Methodology in Economics: the Logic of Appraisal

This Paper Intends to Develop a Coherent Methodological Framework Concerned with the Appraisal of Scientific Theories in Economics, and Which Is Based on a Postulated Aim of Science. We First Define the Scope of a Methodological Inquiry (Precise Definition of What Is Meant by the Logic of Appraisal of Scientific Theories) and Review the Work of Popper and Lakatos in the Philosophy of Science. We Then Use Their Results to Develop a Rational Structure of Scientific Activity. We Identify and Analyse Both a Micro and Macro Framework for the Process of Appraisal and Single Out the Importance of So-Called 'Fundamental Assumptions' in Creating Externalities in the Appraisal Process Which Forces Us to Adop a Multi-Level Analysis. Special Attention Is Given to the Role and Significance of the Abstraction Process and the Use of Assumptions in General. the Proposed Structure of Scientific Activity Is Illustrated with Examples From Economics.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

What’s so Special About Cyberspace ? Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

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La corporation sert-elle bien ses stakeholders?

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit Option recherche (LL.M)"

Essais sur la conception de mécanismes et les enchères

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais liés à la conception de mécanisme et aux enchères. Dans le premier essai j'étudie la conception de mécanismes bayésiens efficaces dans des environnements où les fonctions d'utilité des agents dépendent de l'alternative choisie même lorsque ceux-ci ne participent pas au mécanisme. En plus d'une règle d'attribution et d'une règle de paiement le planificateur peut proférer des menaces afin d'inciter les agents à participer au mécanisme et de maximiser son propre surplus; Le planificateur peut présumer du type d'un agent qui ne participe pas. Je prouve que la solution du problème de conception peut être trouvée par un choix max-min des types présumés et des menaces. J'applique ceci à la conception d'une enchère multiple efficace lorsque la possession du bien par un acheteur a des externalités négatives sur les autres acheteurs. Le deuxième essai considère la règle du juste retour employée par l'agence spatiale européenne (ESA). Elle assure à chaque état membre un retour proportionnel à sa contribution, sous forme de contrats attribués à des sociétés venant de cet état. La règle du juste retour est en conflit avec le principe de la libre concurrence puisque des contrats ne sont pas nécessairement attribués aux sociétés qui font les offres les plus basses. Ceci a soulevé des discussions sur l'utilisation de cette règle: les grands états ayant des programmes spatiaux nationaux forts, voient sa stricte utilisation comme un obstacle à la compétitivité et à la rentabilité. Apriori cette règle semble plus coûteuse à l'agence que les enchères traditionnelles. Nous prouvons au contraire qu'une implémentation appropriée de la règle du juste retour peut la rendre moins coûteuse que des enchères traditionnelles de libre concurrence. Nous considérons le cas de l'information complète où les niveaux de technologie des firmes sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de l'information incomplète où les sociétés observent en privée leurs coûts de production. Enfin, dans le troisième essai je dérive un mécanisme optimal d'appel d'offre dans un environnement où un acheteur d'articles hétérogènes fait face a de potentiels fournisseurs de différents groupes, et est contraint de choisir une liste de gagnants qui est compatible avec des quotas assignés aux différents groupes. La règle optimale d'attribution consiste à assigner des niveaux de priorité aux fournisseurs sur la base des coûts individuels qu'ils rapportent au décideur. La manière dont ces niveaux de priorité sont déterminés est subjective mais connue de tous avant le déroulement de l'appel d'offre. Les différents coûts rapportés induisent des scores pour chaque liste potentielle de gagnant. Les articles sont alors achetés à la liste ayant les meilleurs scores, s'il n'est pas plus grand que la valeur de l'acheteur. Je montre également qu'en général il n'est pas optimal d'acheter les articles par des enchères séparées.

The Impact of Recycling on the Long-Run Stock of Trees

Interest in recycling of forest products has grown in recent years, one of the goals being to conserve the stock of trees or possibly increase it to compensate for positive externalities generated by the forest and neglected by the market. This paper explores the issue as to whether recycling is an appropriate measure to attain such a goal. We do this by considering the problem of the private owner of an area of land, who, acting as a price taker, decides how to allocate his land over time between forestry and some other use, and at what age to harvest the forest area chosen. Once the forest is cut, he makes a new land allocation decision and replants. He does so indefinitely, in a Faustmann-like framework. The wood from the harvest is transformed into a final product which is partly recycled into a substitute for the virgin wood, so that past output affects the current price. We show that in such a context, increasing the rate of recycling will result in less area being devoted to forestry. It will also have the effect of increasing the harvest age of the forest, as long as the planting cost is positive. The net effect on the flow of virgin wood being harvested to supply the market will as a result be ambiguous. The main point however is that recycling will result in a smaller, not a larger, stock of trees in the long run. It would therefore be best to resort to other means if the goal is to increase the stock of trees.