Long-run effects of unfunded social security with earnings-dependent benefits

This paper examines the effects of unfunded social security with bequests, fertility and human capital by considering a mix of earnings-dependent and universal social security benefits. We show that social security is more likely to promote growth by reducing fertility and increasing human capital investment if its benefits are more dependent on individuals' own earnings. Through simulations, we find that the differences in the effects of social security resulting from variations in the benefit formula can be too substantial to be ignored. We also investigate the welfare effect in calibrated economies. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Chagas' disease and social security: a case-control study in an urban area, Goiás, Brazil

One hundred and twenty subjects with Chagas' cardiopathy and 120 non-infected subjects were randomly selected from first time claimants of sickness benefits in the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) in Goiás. Cases of Chagas' cardiopathy were defined based on serological test, history of residence in an endemic area and, clinical and/or electrocardiogram (ECG) alterations suggestive of Chagas' cardiomyopathy. Controls were defined as subjects with at least two negative serological tests. Case and controls were compared in the analysis for age, sex, place of birth, migration history, socio-economic level, occupation, physical exertion at work, age at affiliation and years of contribution to the social security scheme, clinical course of their disease and ECG abnormalities. Chagas' disease patients were younger than other subjects and predominantly of rural origin. Non-infected subjects presented a better socio-economic level, were performing more skilled activities and had less changes of job than cases. No important difference was observed in relation to age at affiliation to INPS. About 60% of cases have claimed for benefits within the first four years of contribution while among controls this proportion was 38.5%. Cases were involved, proportionally more than controls, in "heavy" activities. A risk of 2.3 (95%CL 1.5 - 4.6) and 1.8 (95%CL 1.2- 3.5) was obtained comparing respectively "heavy" and "moderate" physical activity against "light". A relative risk of 8.5 (95%CL 4.9 - 14.8) associated with the presence of cardiopathy was estimated comparing the initial sample of seropositive subjects and controls. A high relative risk was observed in relation to right bundle branch block (RR = 37.1 95%CL = 8.8 - 155.6) and left anterior hemiblock (RR = 4.4, 95%CL = 2.1 - 9.1).

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

An ASsessment of Relationship between Students' Perception of Social Studies and their Academic Performance in Colleges of Education in Kaduna State

The objective of this study was to find out the relationship between students’ perception of Social Studies and their academic performance in the subject in Colleges of Education in Kaduna State. The respondents of the study comprised NCE 2 and NCE 3 students of Social Studies at the Federal College of Education in Zaria and the Kaduna State College of Education in Gidan Waya. The data for the study was collected using a questionnaire with reliability coefficient of 0.87. The Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient was used to test the hypotheses formulated for the study. The hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance with df = 232. The findings were as follows: 1. The Social Studies students in colleges of education in Kaduna State do not record high academic performance in the subject. 2. Students’ perception of the Social Studies curriculum does affect their academic performance in the subject 3. Students’ perception of relevance of Social Studies education has no bearing on their academic performance in the subject. 4. Students’ perception of public attitude towards Social Studies has no impact on their academic performance in the subject. 5. Students’ general perception of Social Studies does not affect their academic performance in the subject. Based on these findings the following recommendations were proffered for Social Studies researchers and policy makers. a. There is need for further research in order to determine the actual cause of students’ failure to display high performance in Social Studies. b. The NCE Social Studies curriculum should be reviewed in terms of volume and difficulty.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

Social security effects on income distribution: a counterfactual analysis for Brazil

According to Diamond (1977), one of the reasons for the existence of social security systems is that they function as an income redistribution mechanism. There is an extensive literature that tests whether social security systems produce the desired results in developed countries (mainly for the U.S.A.). Nevertheless, there is not an obvious consensus about this social security property and there is little evidence for developing countries. In this article, we test this property for the Brazilian Social Security System. In addition, we also look at another question which has not been answered yet in the previous literature. Is the trend of social security systems increasingly progressive or regressive? We conclude that the changes in Brazilian Social Security legislation reduced inequality between 1987 and 1996, but only for the elderly. For the other age groups, there is a stable trend. Results for the period between 1996 and 2006 reveal that the Brazilian system is neutral for all cohorts. Therefore, we found out that social security systems are not an effective mechanism for income redistribution, as predicted by previous studies.

Social security in the english-speaking Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Social security in the english-speaking Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Social security reforms and their implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Social security in the English-speaking Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Welfare Lobby Groups responding to Globalisation: A Comparison of the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) and the UK Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG)

The past decade has witnessed a period of intense economic globalisation. The growing significance of international trade, investment, production and financial flows appears to be curtailing the autonomy of individual nation states. In particular, globalisation appears to be encouraging, if not demanding, a decline in social spending and standards. However, many authors believe that this thesis ignores the continued impact of national political and ideological pressures and lobby groups on policy outcomes. In particular, it has been argued that national welfare consumer and provider groups remain influential defenders of the welfare state. For example, US aged care groups are considered to be particularly effective defenders of social security pensions. According to this argument, governments engaged in welfare retrenchment may experience considerable electoral backlash (Pierson 1996; Mishra 1999). Yet, it is also noted that governments can take action to reduce the impact of such groups by reducing their funding, and their access to policy-making and consultation processes. These actions are then justified on the basis of removing potential obstacles to economic competitiveness (Pierson 1994; Melville 1999).