Folk Concepts of Intentional Action in the Contexts of Amoral and Immoral Luck

This paper concerns a recently discovered, puzzling asymmetry in judgments of whether an action is intentional or not (Knobe 2003a, b). We report new data replicating the asymmetry in the context of scenarios wherein an agent achieves an amoral or immoral goal due to luck. Participants’ justifications of their judgments of the intentionality of the agent’s action indicate that two distinct folk concepts of intentional action played a role in their judgments. When viewed from this perspective, the puzzle disappears, although the asymmetry remains

The problem with law in books and law in computers - the oral nature of law

It is becoming clear that, contrary to earlier expectations, the application of AI techniques to law is not as easy nor as effective as some claimed. Unfortunately, for most AI researchers, there seems to be little understanding of just why this is. In this paper I argue, from empirical study of lawyers in action, just why there is a mismatch between the AI view of law, and law in practice. While this is important and novel, it also - if my arguments are accepted - demonstrates just why AI will never have success in producing the computerised lawyer.